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Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) describes in his famous textbook “The Theory of Economic 
Development” the phenomenon of ‘creative destruction’ – the development of new solutions that 
cause significant change in whole industries. As a student, I recognized the power of creative 
destruction when following the downfall of global players such as Kodak and Nokia. I asked 
myself how these corporations should have organized innovation to adapt successfully to the 
technological shifts that caused their collapse. Inspired by this question, I decided to pursue a PhD 
study at the Leiden University with the aim to examine how corporations renew their business 
portfolio in anticipation of changing business conditions. 
Soon, I read about a form of self-organized innovation that enables corporations to effectively 
renew their business portfolio – corporate ventures. The idea that corporations renew their business 
portfolio by continuously entering novel business domains with small entrepreneurial teams was 
fascinating. However, I could not find any empirically evaluated management model that would 
tell corporate executives how to manage corporate ventures effectively. As an engineer, I was 
curious to investigate corporate venture management, not knowing that my research would provide 
a first empirical model that reveals essential principles for effective corporate venture 
management.  
For accomplishing my PhD research I received support from many people who I would like to 
acknowledge in the following. First, I had the honor to receive optimistic, motivating and thorough 
guidance from my first promotor Professor Bernhard Katzy and my co-promotor Professor Guido 
Baltes. Then the team was broadened by my second promotor Professor Jaap van den Herik. In 
particular, I own many thanks to Bernhard Katzy for supporting my research and providing the 
freedom to follow my own path. A special gratitude goes to Guido Baltes for providing a great 
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Chapter 1  
1 Understanding Successful Corporate 
Venture Management 
The thesis investigates the challenge of corporations around the globe to develop new businesses. 
They do so in order to adapt their business portfolio to the changing environmental conditions (i.e., 
new technologies, new competitions and changing market demands). The failure of corporations 
to adapt their business portfolio caused many economic tragedies in the past. The downfall of 
Nokia’s market leadership in the cell phone industry is a calling example. All tragedies together 
illustrate that the development of new businesses in anticipation of future environmental changes 
is essential and not easy to achieve.  
The ongoing booming of founding international start-ups demonstrates that small entrepreneurial 
teams are an effective means to develop new businesses (see, e.g., Fritsch & Schroeter, 2011). 
Large corporations as well as Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) should be able to benefit 
from this form of self-organized innovation when entering novel business domains. However, 
entrepreneurial teams established by corporations often fail (cf. Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). The 
high failure rates are, among others, attributed to the complexity that is inherent in the relationship 
between corporations and their entrepreneurial teams. Two examples of this complexity are given 
below.  
First, corporations need to provide their entrepreneurial teams with sufficient freedom to act 
successfully. Freedom allows entrepreneurial teams to engage effectively in explorative activities 
(i.e., search, experimentation and improvisation) through which the new businesses evolve to a 
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mature part of the corporation (McGrath, 2001). Second, we see that these entrepreneurial teams 
clearly differ from independent start-ups as they are still in any form related to the corporation 
(i.e., controlled, supported or integrated). In summary, the challenge for corporate management is 
thus to grant entrepreneurial teams with sufficient freedom without losing control over their 
activities. So far, it remains however debatable how corporate management may master this 
challenge. Therefore, in this thesis, I investigate the guiding question: how are entrepreneurial 
teams managed successfully by corporate management? 
The course of the first chapter is as follows. Section 1.1 gives the author’s motivation for the 
research topic. In Section 1.2, the problem statement and the three research questions are presented. 
Section 1.3 provides the research objective and the research methodology. The structure of the 
thesis is presented in Section 1.4. 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
In my research, I am motivated by the dynamic reality in which corporations have to compete 
nowadays. In our globalized economy, there is an obvious need for corporations to respond rapidly 
when business opportunities emerge. Really, it is necessary to do so before someone else takes the 
chance and realizes competitive advantage. Establishing entrepreneurial teams aside the 
mainstream business is a legitimate path for corporations to generate organizational settings that 
allow them to capitalize responsively on emerging business opportunities (cf. Kuratko, 2010). 
However, there are two obstacles. The first obstacle is that these entrepreneurial teams often fail 
and the second obstacle is that it remains unclear how their success may be improved (see, e.g., 
Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett, 2009). The success of entrepreneurial teams is among others associated 
with the organizational form chosen by the corporate managers. They do establish the teams (a) as 
external subunits that operate independent from other business units or (b) as internal subunits that 
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are integrated with other business units. Below a general definition of corporate venture is provided 
in order to define how the term entrepreneurial team is used throughout the thesis.  
Definition 1.1: A Corporate Venture “is an entrepreneurial team that develops a new business 
for the corporation, often following the purpose to enter a novel business domain” (cf. Garrett & 
Covin, 2013).  
Both organizational forms (external and internal) have their merits. Establishing corporate ventures 
as external subunits provides the freedom and flexibility necessary to develop new capabilities. 
Establishing corporate ventures as internal subunits facilitates the exploitation of capabilities that 
do already exist in the corporation, allowing corporate ventures to take advantage of corporate 
strengths by achieving synergetic effects. The well-developed business intuition of the reader may 
lead to the preliminary conclusion that corporate ventures will achieve best results when being 
established as semi-autonomous subunits that are independent, yet integrated (cf. Burgers, Jansen, 
Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009).  
However, it remains ambiguous how to manage corporate ventures successfully as semi-
autonomous subunits (Johnson, 2012; Garrett & Covin, 2013). Research acknowledges that 
examining the relationship between the corporation and the corporate venture (henceforth called 
corporation-venture relations) will contribute to a proper understanding of effective venture 
management (Thornhill & Amit, 2000). Prior studies have investigated corporation-venture 
relations by applying (a) the resource-based view (see, e.g., Sorrentino & Williams, 1995) and (b) 
the organizational design-based view (see, e.g., Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012) as analytical 
frameworks. However, such research does not (sufficiently) take into consideration the current 
dynamics of the technological developments in combination with their competitive consequences.  
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While it is promising for corporate management to enter a novel business domain with a corporate 
venture, corporations often fail when taking these initiatives. The costly mistakes are attributed 
mostly to the mismanagement of corporate ventures (cf. Ginsberg & Hay, 1994; Birkinshaw & 
Hill, 2005). As stated in Section 1.1, prior research has followed (a) the resource-based view (cf. 
Penrose, 1959; Pitelis, 2007) and (b) the organizational design-based view (cf. Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Burgers et al., 2009) in an attempt to explore effective venture management practice. 
Alternatively, this thesis builds on (c) the dynamic capability-based view (cf. Teece & Pisano, 
1994; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). The reasoning leading to this choice is briefly given below by 
comparing the three views. An extensive reasoning is later provided in the literature review 
(Chapter 2).  
Ad (a), the resource-based view assumes that an organization achieves competitive advantage 
through its ability to protect the resources it possesses from imitation, transfer and substitution (cf. 
Barney, 1991). Proponents following this view consider that venture management is associated 
with the effective management of resources (i.e., stocks of available factors owned and controlled 
by an organization) being shared among corporations and their ventures (see, e.g., Sorrentino & 
Williams, 1995).  
Ad (b), the organizational design-based view assumes that organizations achieve competitive 
advantage by matching high levels of differentiation (i.e., subdivision of tasks) with high levels of 
integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Proponents following this view consider that venture 
management is attributed to designing corporate ventures as separated subunits and integrate them 
at the same time with other corporate subunits (see, e.g., Burgers et al., 2009; Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2012). Both views have motivated studies that explored principles for transferring resources 
effectively (see, e.g., Garrett & Covin, 2013) and that identified mechanisms to integrate corporate 
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ventures (see, e.g., Burgers et al., 2009). However, the literature review (Chapter 2) shows that 
studies building on either of the two views have not yet explained corporate venture success 
sufficiently. Guidelines for effective corporate venture management are consequently not provided 
so far by studies that follow the resource-based view or the organizational design-based view. One 
explanation for this lack of managerial implications may be associated with the key shortcoming 
of both views, viz. the dynamics in the business environment.  
Ad (c), the dynamic capability-based view is chosen in the thesis as it addresses this shortcoming 
by assuming that organizations achieve competitive advantage through the continuous 
reconfiguration of their resource base in adaptation to changes in the business environment (see 
Teece, 2012). The reconfigurations are the outcome of routines (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) which 
are in this thesis defined as the regular and recurring meetings between the corporate management 
and the venture management. The terms corporate management and venture management are 
defined below. 
Definition 1.2: Corporate Management is the group of executive managers of the corporation 
supervising venture managers, sometimes also referred to as corporate managers. 
Definition 1.3: Venture Manager is the leader of a corporate venture team, sometimes also 
referred to as venture management. 
Although the context is specified and it is clear to which outcome the routines refer to in this thesis, 
it is still difficult, if not impossible to measure the routines directly, e.g., for investigating their 
effects on corporate venture success (cf. Strehle, Katzy, & Davila, 2010). The best we can state is 
that the interaction between corporate management and venture management reflects the routines 
(cf. Becker, 2004). Corporate managers exercise oversight and control (tight or loose) over venture 
managers through the interactions carried out in the routines. Corporate management defines 
thereby the autonomy that is granted to venture managers at various degrees and dimensions. 
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Autonomy is thus an essential aspect of the routinized interaction among corporate management 
and venture management, on which my research is focused. Correspondingly, the thesis 
investigates (1) what kind of autonomy is granted by corporate management to venture managers 
and (2) how the distinct autonomy dimensions influence corporate venture success. The research 
approach chosen promises to explore how corporate ventures are managed effectively by corporate 
management.  
Considering the fact that so far guidelines for effective corporate venture management are missing, 
the following problem statement (PS) is formulated. 
PS:  How can corporate management effectively manage corporate ventures? 
In order to answer the problem statement, three research questions (RQs) are formulated. The 
research questions are guiding the research carried out in this thesis.  
An essential assumption in this thesis is that autonomy is the authority of individuals to make 
decisions without approval (cf. Brock, 2003). The authority to make decisions may be associated 
with a broad range of conditions (cf. Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). However, the literature review 
(Chapter 2) shows that the autonomy dimensions reflecting these conditions are not determined 
properly. In order to generate a comprehensive conceptual understanding of the autonomy that 
venture managers may enjoy, I formulate the first research question as follows. 
RQ1:  What are the dimensions reflecting the autonomy that corporate management 
grants to venture managers? 
Having the autonomy dimensions at my disposal, I noticed that a construct (a measurement 
instrument) that enables us to measure the autonomy dimensions is not yet available. Therefore, I 
formulate the second research question as follows.  
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RQ2:  How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 be operationalized in a 
construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? 
Having operationalized a construct for measuring, I noticed that the autonomy of venture managers 
does not indicate to what extent and in which dimension the autonomy is relevant for effective 
corporate venture management. To make an assessment based on the impact that the autonomy 
dimensions have on corporate venture success, I formulate the third research question as follows. 
RQ3:  How are the autonomy dimensions related to the success of the corporate 
ventures? 
Answering the three research questions will lead to an answer of the PS. For achieving an answer 
to the RQs we need a clear research objective and a research methodology.  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research objective of this thesis is to understand how corporate ventures should be managed 
by the corporate management in order to obtain the qualification of ‘successful’ corporate venture. 
For addressing the research objective, the thesis performs empirical research according to the 
following four steps:  
(1) Exploring the autonomy of corporate ventures 
(2) Operationalizing a multidimensional autonomy construct 
(3) Evaluating and adapting the autonomy construct  
(4) Applying the autonomy construct 
The results of each research step forms a part of the outcome that answers the research questions 
(RQs) and the problem statement (PS). The research steps are described in Subsections 1.3.1 to 
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1.3.4 . An overview of the four research steps together with the research methodology and the data 
sets applied is given in Table 1.1. 
1.3.1 EXPLORING THE AUTONOMY OF CORPORATE VENTURES 
In the first step, case study research is carried out (see Chapter 3). The aim is to answer RQ1 by 
exploring the dimensions that determine the autonomy of venture managers based on qualitative 
research. A series of thirteen interviews is conducted with corporate managers (CEOs) and venture 
managers of seven technology-based German SMEs in order to examine the autonomy that 
corporate management grants to venture managers in real-life settings. Using grounded theory as 
an analytical methodology (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1983), interviews are transcribed 
and coded. The explored autonomy dimensions are compared with those in literature for further 
characterization.  
1.3.2 OPERATIONALIZING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUTONOMY CONSTRUCT 
The second step is carried out in Chapter 4 with the aim to operationalize an initial 
multidimensional construct that allows to measure the autonomy of venture managers. Results 
contribute to answer RQ2. A theoretical model is developed that associates the explored autonomy 
dimensions (Step 1) with corporate venture success. The measures of the theoretical model are 
subsequently operationalized. For evaluating the appropriateness of the operationalizations in the 
context of corporate ventures, twelve managers involved in corporate venture management 
(corporate managers and venture managers) are interviewed to assess the relevance of each 
measure. The outcome of the second step is an initial multidimensional autonomy construct. 
Definition 1.4: Construct describes in this thesis a measurement instrument. In particular, the 
term multidimensional (autonomy) construct refers to an instrument that measures the autonomy 
of venture managers at various dimensions.  
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1.3.3 EVALUATING AND ADAPTING THE CONSTRUCT 
In the third step performed in Chapter 5, the validity and the reliability of the initial 
multidimensional autonomy construct (Step 2) is evaluated. Therefore, the evaluation procedure 
as described by Field (2013) is applied. The procedure includes four stages. In the first stage, the 
correlation matrix is inspected, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index is calculated and the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity is conducted in order to test whether data is appropriate for Principal 
Component Analysis. In the second stage, Principal Component Analysis is performed in order 
to extract the components from the data. Therefore, the eigenvalues of the (a) extracted 
components are checked according to the Kaiser’s Criterion, (b) the Scree Plot of the 
eigenvalues is inspected and (c) Parallel Analysis is conducted to cross check the visual 
inspections. In the third stage, Varimax Rotation is performed with the extracted components. 
General threshold criteria (cross-loadings <.0 and component loadings >.6) are checked for 
each item in the rotated component solution. Items not fulfilling these thresholds are excluded. 
In the fourth stage, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients are calculated to evaluate the reliability of 
the component solution.  
1.3.4 APPLYING THE AUTONOMY CONSTRUCT 
In the fourth step carried out in Chapter 6, the evaluated autonomy construct is applied to answer 
RQ3. Linear multiple regression analysis is performed in two stages by using a data set of 87 
venture managers of distinct SMEs in the German IT consulting industry. First, regression analysis 
is conducted to investigate the relation between corporate venture success and the autonomy that 
corporate management grants to venture managers at distinct dimensions. Second, interaction 
terms are included in the multiple regression analysis to illustrate how the relations between the 
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autonomy dimensions and corporate venture success are influenced when corporate management 
pushes venture managers to achieve exploitative objectives.  
Table 1.1: Research Steps 
Research Steps Ch. Research Methodology 
Data 
Set PS RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 
Introduction 1 -     2 Literature Review     















5 Statistical Analysis C    
Step 4 Applying the Autonomy Construct 6 
Statistical 
Analysis C    
         
Discussion and Conclusion 7 -     
Data set  
A: 13 interviews in 7 SMEs in high-tech industries with corporate managers and venture managers 
(see Appendix A) 
B: 12 interviews in 6 SMEs in high-tech industries with managers involved in corporate venture 
management either as corporate managers or venture managers (see Appendix B) 
C:  87 valid survey responses from venture managers of SMEs in the German IT consulting 
industry (see Appendix C) 
In my research I focus on SMEs. This implies that I do not take into account the conditions of large 
corporations. I focus on SMEs because they are the main drivers of innovation across many 
industries (cf. World Economic Forum, 2015). The innovation capacity is known to be associated 
with dynamic capabilities (routines) (cf. Teece, 2012). It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
dynamic capabilities are well developed within SMEs. Correspondingly, it seems promising to 
focus on SMEs to investigate corporate venture management from a dynamic capability-based 
view. Moreover, the assumptions of (a) the resource-based view and (b) the organizational design-
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based view are of limited relevance for SMEs due to the small size of these firms. Ad (a), SMEs 
have fewer resources to share than large firms which limits the opportunity for corporate ventures 
to benefit from corporate strengths. Ad (b), SMEs are also less diversified in itself which questions 
the necessity to integrate corporate ventures with other corporate subunits. Hence, the effects 
assumed by the resource-based view and the organizational design-based view seem to be of 
limited relevance to explain corporate venture management in SMEs.  
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. They are described briefly below. The structure of the thesis 
is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Chapter 1:  Understanding Successful Corporate Venture Management. The chapter 
introduces the reader to the thesis by presenting the motivation, the problem 
statement and three research questions. It further defines the research objective and 
the research methodology applied to answer the research questions and the problem 
statement. An overview of the structure of the thesis is also given.  
Chapter 2: Related Work and Theoretical Embedding. In this chapter the literature review 
conducted for the thesis is provided. First, the chapter discusses related research that 
positions corporate ventures as a means for corporations to realize a dual structure to 
achieve ambidexterity. Second, the chapter gives an overview of the analytical 
frameworks applied in prior research to investigate the management of corporate 
ventures. The dynamic capability-based view is discussed as an alternative analytical 
framework that defines corporation-venture relations in the form of routines.  
Chapter 3: Exploring the Autonomy of Corporate Ventures. RQ1 is addressed in this chapter. 
The qualitative research carried out to explore the autonomy of corporate ventures is 
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presented. Case studies demonstrate that venture managers have a pivotal role to 
develop new business by engaging in explorative learning with their teams. Four 
autonomy dimensions, namely functional autonomy, decision autonomy, job 
autonomy and strategic autonomy are revealed.  
Chapter 4: Operationalizing a Multidimensional Autonomy Construct. This chapter 
contributes to RQ2 by operationalizing the four autonomy dimensions (explored in 
Chapter 3) in an initial four-dimensional autonomy construct. This autonomy 
construct is an instrument that allows to measure a broad spectrum of autonomy that 
venture managers may enjoy.  
Chapter 5: Evaluating and Adapting the Autonomy Construct. This chapter provides a 
conclusive answer to RQ2. The initial four-dimensional autonomy construct 
(operationalized in Chapter 4) is evaluated and adapted statistically in Chapter 5. The 
scale evaluation procedure described in Subsection 1.3.3 is therefore applied. As a 
result of this procedure, two autonomy dimensions were excluded for ensuring the 
validity and reliability of the autonomy construct. Thus, a two-dimensional construct 
is evaluated.  
Chapter 6: Applying the Autonomy Construct. This chapter answers RQ3 by testing 
quantitatively the power of the two-dimensional autonomy construct to explain 
corporate venture success. In general, the results confirm the relevance of the 
autonomy construct. Based on the statistical results of the analysis, a model for 
effective corporate venture management is evaluated, which gives an answer to the 
problem statement.  
Chapter 7: Answering the Problem Statement and Identifying the Conclusions. The three 
research questions are answered in the first section, which contributes to answering 
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the problem statement. The final answer to the problem statement is given in the 
second section. The theoretical and practical contributions are identified as 
conclusions in the third section. The fourth section reports the limitations of the 
research. The last section concludes with recommendations for future research 
directions.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Related Work and Theoretical 
Embedding 
This chapter provides the literature review conducted for the research. Section 2.1 (Related Work) 
introduces the reader to the challenge of corporations to renew their business portfolio strategically 
by establishing corporate ventures alongside the mainstream business. Section 2.2 (Theoretical 
Embedding) reveals the complexity of corporation-venture relations. The dynamic capability-
based view is discussed as an analytical framework that defines corporation-venture relations in 
the form of management routines. 
2.1 THE CHALLENGE TO RENEW THE BUSINESS PORTFOLIO STRATEGICALLY 
The strategic renewal of the business portfolio is a well-known challenge for corporations in 
innovation-driven industries where market parameters quickly change. The changing conditions 
erode and sometimes disrupt current businesses (cf. D’Aveni, 1994). Renewing the business 
portfolio strategically is therefore a core challenge for corporations confronted with changing 
environmental conditions (cf. Volberda, Baden-Fuller, & Van den Bosch, 2001). For this reason, 
corporations need simultaneously (1) to improve existing businesses and (2) to create new ones 
(see Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009). Exploiting established businesses to ensure current 
profits and explore new businesses to ensure future incomes requires a dual capacity (see Raisch 
& Birkinshaw, 2008), which is described in 2.1.1. Dual capacity calls for a dual structure (see 
2.1.2). In Subsection 2.1.3, the emergence of dual structures through corporate ventures are 
discussed.  
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2.1.1 DUAL CAPACITY 
The term dual capacity refers to the ability of corporations (1) to engage concurrently in 
exploitative learning for improving existing businesses and (2) to invent new businesses by 
engaging in explorative learning (e.g., March, 1991a; McGrath, 1995). Corporations that achieve 
both simultaneously are characterized as ambidextrous organizations (see O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2013). These organizations achieve a superior long-term performance as they are prepared for 
today’s and tomorrow’s business environments (cf. Burgers & Jansen, 2008; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008). However, ambidexterity is not easy to achieve because exploitative and explorative modes 
of learning are associated with negative externalities (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Exploitation 
is associated with levering the existing knowledge base (i.e., improve existing capabilities) 
whereas the purpose of exploration is to enlarge the current knowledge base (i.e., develop new 
capabilities) (see Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). They are mutually incompatible as exploitative 
learning modes involve refinement, selection and improvement, whereas explorative learning 
refers to modes of search, variation and experimentation (March, 1991). Both are associated with 
a self-reinforcing behavioral tendency that may cause corporations to be trapped into the 
overemphasis of either mode to the detriment of the other (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Overemphasis may have negative performance implications as it reflects the trade-off to generate 
short-term profits by focusing on the exploitation of established businesses instead of creating 
long-term benefits by focusing on the exploration of emerging alternatives (see March, 1991b; He 
& Wong, 2004). Corporations therefore face the challenge to balance both modes in order to 
achieve superior long-term performance (see Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). 
2.1.2 DUAL STRUCTURES 
For realizing the balance between the exploitation and exploration modes, dual structures are 
proposed (cf. Duncan, 1976: 167). Establishing such structures refers to “the subdivision of tasks 
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into distinct organizational units that tend to develop appropriate contexts for exploitation and 
exploration” (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009: 686). The structural differentiation 
or separation of tasks into distinct subunits creates “pragmatic boundaries” (Carlile, 2004) that 
allow the two incompatible learning modes to coexist within one organization (Jansen, Tempelaar, 
Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). The separation of exploitative and explorative tasks enables 
corporations to improve capabilities for the mainstream business and to develop new capabilities 
for entering novel business domains simultaneously (Raisch, 2008). Corporations may realize dual 
structures by establishing explorative subunits alongside the mainstream business (cf. Jansen et 
al., 2009).  
The mainstream business is generally formalized in order to maximize efficiency and control 
through process management (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Benner & Tushman, 2003). Such a 
formalized organizational context is ill-suited for explorative subunits which are established 
typically as small teams with flexible routines that facilitate explorative learning modes such as 
experimentation or improvisation (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). Hence, explorative subunits 
are often separated from the mainstream business to avoid cultural and procedural spillovers that 
may constrain their explorative task (Christensen, 1997). 
2.1.3 DUAL STRUCTURES THROUGH CORPORATE VENTURES 
Large corporations generally establish explorative subunits such as corporate ventures as separated 
subunits (see Birkinshaw, van Basten Batenburg, & Murray, 2002). Corporate ventures are small 
entrepreneurial teams focused on the explorative task to develop new businesses for the 
corporation (Garrett & Covin, 2013). Separation protects the corporate ventures from the 
managerial cognitions (Gilbert, 2005), inertia (Simon & Houghton, 1999) and short-term pressure 
(McGrath, Keil, & Tukiainen, 2012) of the mainstream business (Kanter, 1985; Block & 
MacMillan, 1993; Jansen et al., 2009). The prevailing yet normative view is that the extent of 
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separation thus increases the corporate venture’s success as it enables ventures to mould their own 
“processes, structures, and cultures” (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004: 3) that suit their new task 
environment (Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 1999; Simon & Houghton, 1999).  
While common wisdom follows the normative assumption that corporate ventures should be 
separated from the mainstream business (Burgelman, 1983; Kanter, 1985; Schuler, 1986; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Burgers et al., 2009), empirical evidence associating separation with 
corporate venture success is yet to be provided (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2002). Rather than that, 
empirical findings contradict the common wisdom and show that separation may also influence 
corporate venture success negatively (Johnson, 2012) or may have no impact at all (Kuratko et al., 
2009; Garrett & Covin, 2013).  
The evidence that separation may have negative performance implications shows that establishing 
corporate ventures as fully autonomous subunits may not be the optimal form. Instead, the 
relationship between corporations and their ventures is more complex (cf. Thornhill & Amit, 
2000). For example, studies show that corporate ventures are subject to subtle control (Simon & 
Houghton, 1999). With subtle control, corporate management allows ambiguity for creative 
problem-solving. At the same time corporate management exercises sufficient control to ensure 
that product-market offerings fit corporate strategy and competences (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). 
Subtle control puts corporate ventures into a somewhat semi-autonomous position (Kuratko, 
2010). Thus, corporation-venture relations are more complex than it may appear at first glance.  
2.2 RESOLVING THE COMPLEXITY OF CORPORATION-VENTURE RELATIONS 
Untangling the complexity of corporation-venture relations, Thornhill and Amit (2000) assume 
that corporate ventures are tight and loose coupled with their corporations. Tight and loose 
coupling mirror the challenge of corporate ventures (1) to benefit simultaneously from existing 
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corporate strengths and (2) to develop something new. Tight coupling facilitates corporate ventures 
to exploit capabilities that already exist in the corporation (MacMillan, Block, & Narasimha, 1986; 
Dougherty, 1995). Loose coupling, in contrast, facilitates freedom and flexibility required to 
develop new capabilities (Burgelman, 1983; Simon & Houghton, 1999). Research acknowledges 
the relevance to resolve the complexity that is inherent in corporation-venture relations and have 
shed light from different viewpoints. The literature review highlights three different viewpoints by 
which we can manage this complexity. These are the resource-based view, the organizational 
design-based view and the dynamic capability-based view. They are discussed in the Subsections 
2.2.1 to 2.2.3.  
2.2.1 A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW 
An organization seen from a resource-based view is considered as a bundle of resources (Penrose, 
1959). Competitive advantage is explained based on the characteristics of the organization’s 
resources and its ability to protect them from imitation, transfer and substitution (Barney, 1991). 
Resources include (a) tangible assets such as machinery, infrastructure or skilled personnel, (b) 
intangible assets such as knowledge of technologies, reputation or brand names and (c) financial 
assets such as capital (Wernerfelt, 1984). Following the resource-based view, corporation-venture 
relations may be regarded as being formed through the relatedness of corporations and their 
ventures (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995). 
In theory, relatedness reflects the extent to which corporate ventures share corporate resources. 
The extent to which resources are shared defines how tight or loose corporate ventures are coupled 
with their corporations (MacMillan et al., 1986; Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995a). 
Synergetic effects may emerge when ventures utilize corporate resources (MacMillan et al., 1986). 
It is believed that high levels of relatedness or tight coupling influence corporate venture success 
positively when the corporate and venture businesses are similar, for example, with respect to 
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products, markets or technologies (see, e.g., Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995b). In contrast, 
other studies find that tight coupling is antithetical to corporate venture success as the purpose of 
ventures is rather explorative. Thus, the proponents proposed to share a minimum of resources or 
low levels of relatedness (Burgelman, 1983; Ginsberg & Hay, 1994). 
In practice, Sorrentino and Williams (1995) report however that (1) there is no significant 
association between relatedness and corporate venture success in either form. Garret and Neubaum 
(2013) find that (2) low levels of relatedness (referring to the venture’s initial resource base) exhibit 
a positive association with corporate venture success. However, they further show that business 
similarity (referring to the product lines) has a negative impact on the positive association between 
low levels of relatedness and corporate venture success. The explanation for that may be that (3) 
the share of resources reduces “the venture’s ability or willingness to think outside the box and 
pursue disruptive innovations” (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013: 911). In summary, the limited 
empirical evidence indicates that the impact of relatedness on corporate venture success remains 
discussed. In any case, the literature review shows that the resource-based view has not yet 
provided sound managerial implications for successful corporate venture management.  
2.2.2 AN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN-BASED VIEW 
The organizational design-based view assumes that diversified firms should match high levels of 
differentiation with high levels of integration in order to achieve superior performance (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). Differentiation is defined as the subdivision of tasks (e.g., 
marketing and R&D) into distinct subunits. Integration includes mechanisms such as liaison roles, 
temporary teams or common goals (Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Independent 
of its form, it is agreed that integration facilitates the coordination of activities and resource in 
diversified organizations (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1999; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). Proponents of the organizational design-based view allocate corporation-
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venture relations to design arrangements of differentiation and integration (Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2012). Both design arrangements are seen as complementing. Tight relations are referred to 
integration whereas loose relations are associated with differentiation, which positions corporate 
ventures as loosely-coupled subunits (Burgers et al., 2009). 
In theory, it is assumed that differentiation provides ventures with the freedom required to develop 
new knowledge and integration facilitates the transfer of knowledge already existing in the 
corporation which may stimulate cross-fertilization and enforce strategic coherence (Jansen et al., 
2009; McGrath et al., 2012). Research suggests accordingly that differentiated corporate ventures 
should be integrated with the rest of the corporation (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012). Integration may 
be achieved through formal and informal integration mechanisms (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000).  
In practice, a study confirms that informal integration mechanisms pursue “corporate venturing” 
(the extent to which corporations enter novel product/market domains by creating corporate 
ventures) whereas formal integration mechanisms are found to be ineffective (Burgers et al., 2009). 
While this study highlight the relevance to integrate corporate ventures informally, we do not know 
whether the matching of differentiation and integration is associated with corporate venture 
success (see Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012). Hence, the organizational design-based view has so far not 
provided insights into successful venture management practice.  
2.2.3 A DYNAMIC CAPABILITY-BASED VIEW 
The dynamic capability-based view evolved as an analytical framework in consequence of the 
paradigmatic change from stable to dynamic environmental conditions (D’Aveni, 1994) in which 
corporations compete today (Li & Liu, 2014). The analytical framework assumes that corporations 
accomplish competitive advantage by reconfiguring their resource base quickly in adaptation to 
the business environment (cf. Teece, 2012). The reconfiguration of resources is realized through 
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routines (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Routines are defined generally as the recurrent 
interaction patterns carried out by multiple actors (Becker, 2004). An organization’s routines are 
embedded in individual processes and thus specific to the context (see Cohen et al., 1996). Below, 
management routines are defined in order to specify the context in which the term routine is used 
in this thesis.  
Definition 2.1: Management Routines are the regular and recurring meetings among corporate 
management and venture management. 
Building on this definition, the thesis assumes in theory that corporation-venture relations are 
formed through management routines. This assumption is reasonable as the interaction between 
corporate management and venture management is carried out through the management routines. 
Although it seems promising to investigate management routines to explain effective corporate 
venture management, it is not yet tested in practice whether this research attempt explains 
corporate venture success. One reason for the lacking evidence may be that it is difficult or even 
impossible to measure routines directly in order to quantify their effects on corporate venture 
success (see, e.g., Strehle et al., 2010). 
Therefore, I focus on the interaction among corporate management and venture management 
which is carried out through the management routines. More specifically, I investigate a particular 
part of this interaction, namely, the oversight and control that corporate management exercises 
over venture management. Similar to prior studies, oversight and control is measured in this thesis 
through the degree and types of autonomy that corporate management disperses to venture 
management (Crockett, McGee, & Payne, 2013). Investigating the impact of autonomy on 
corporate venture success seems promising to explore effective venture management practice. 
However, the remainder of this section demonstrates that a construct to measure the autonomy of 
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venture managers is not yet satisfactorily developed. Therefore, I propose a multidimensional 
autonomy construct. 
A construct to measure autonomy is still to be developed 
Prior research has measured the autonomy of venture managers based on two constructs (see 
Thornhill & Amit, 2000; Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Kuratko et al., 2009). The first construct gathers 
the extent to which venture managers operate independent from the rest of the corporation 
(Kuratko et al., 2009). The second construct measures the extent to which venture decision-making 
is separated from the corporation in the sense that corporate management disperses decision power 
to venture managers.  
The first autonomy construct is known as venture planning autonomy and measures “the extent to 
which venture managers are responsible for establishing goals, timetables, event milestones, and 
strategy for the venture” (Kuratko et al., 2009: 465). However, studies aligning this type of 
autonomy with corporate venture success are inconclusive. Kuratko et al. (2009) find that venture 
planning autonomy exhibits a positive association with corporate venture success. Garret and 
Neubaum (2013) confirm these results reporting that venture planning autonomy exhibits a 
positive influence on corporate venture success. In contrast, Johnson (2012) reports a negative 
relation between venture planning autonomy and corporate venture success. The contradicting 
results of these studies demonstrate that the relevance of the first construct to explain corporate 
venture success is discussed controversially. 
Studies applying the second autonomy construct for investigating the association between 
autonomy and corporate venture success are similarly inconclusive. Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) 
report that venture managers with increased decision authority concerning “investment and 
management matters” outperform their counterparts with low decision authority (Birkinshaw & 
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Hill, 2005: 251). Crockett et al. (2013) come to a similar conclusion and find that venture managers 
enjoying high decision authority are more likely to achieve strategic milestones. In contrast, 
Thornhill and Amit (2000) find that corporate venture success is influenced negatively when 
venture managers have the authority to make decisions. The contradicting findings of these studies 
illustrate that the relevance of the second autonomy construct for explaining corporate venture 
success may also be questioned. 
A multidimensional autonomy construct is proposed 
The ambiguous evidence concerning the relevance of both autonomy constructs supports the 
previous assumption that the construct reflecting the autonomy of venture managers is not yet well 
understood (see, e.g., Lumpkin, Cogliser, & Schneider, 2009; Johnson, 2012). The ambiguity of 
available autonomy constructs to explain corporate venture success suggests that it may be fruitful 
to establish a more detailed view on autonomy (Johnson, 2012). The suggestion to measure 
autonomy more precisely is consistent with the notion that further conceptual work is required to 
generate a more comprehensive understanding of the autonomy construct (see Birkinshaw & Hill, 
2005; Lumpkin et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; Crockett et al., 2013; Garrett & Covin, 2013).  
All in all, we have shown that research suggests a multidimensional construct to measure the 
autonomy of venture managers more precisely (Johnson, 2012: 473). The autonomy that venture 
managers may enjoy, reflects many conditions such as loose versus tight corporate control 
(Crockett et al., 2013), centralized versus decentralized decision making (Birkinshaw & Hill, 
2005), independent versus dependent venture operations (Garrett & Covin, 2013) or dependency 
versus independency on corporate resources (Sathe, 1985). The distinct conditions reflecting 
autonomy imply that different constructs are required to measure the full spectrum of autonomy. 
Johnson (2012) proposes accordingly that it might be best to measure autonomy based on a 
multidimensional construct, which is however missing so far. Following the recommendation to 
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Chapter 3  
3 Exploring the Autonomy of Corporate 
Ventures 
This chapter investigates RQ1: What are the dimensions reflecting the autonomy that corporate 
management grants to venture managers? The prevailing view in the ongoing scientific discussion 
is that corporate ventures require a high level of autonomy in order to develop new businesses 
successfully (see, e.g., Kuratko et al., 2009).  
This chapter is based on the following two publications1: 
Gard, J., Baltes, G., & Katzy, B. (2012). Towards a Concept of Autonomy for Teams 
Developing a New Business within Existing Companies. In the proceedings of the 18th 
International ICE Conference on Engineering, Technology and Innovation (ICE), pp. 226-238. 
Munich, Germany.  
Gard, J., Baltes, G., & Katzy, B. (2013). Managing Autonomy of Teams in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship – Evidence from Small to Medium Firms. In the proceedings of the 22nd 
International Conference on Management of Technology (IAMOT), pp. 134-154. Porto Alegre, 
Brazil. 
While it is recognized that autonomy may be associated with many conditions, the dimensions 
reflecting the autonomy of venture managers are not well understood so far in studies by corporate 
venture scholars (cf. Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Crockett et al., 2013). Thirteen interviews are 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank his co-authors and the publishers of the ICE 2012 and IAMOT 2013 proceedings for 
their permission to reuse relevant parts of the articles in this thesis. 
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conducted in seven SMEs with corporate managers and venture managers (see Appendices A1 and 
A2) to understand (a) how SMEs renew the business portfolio through corporate ventures and (b) 
how the autonomy works that venture managers may enjoy. Literature research is conducted to 
explore the dimensions reflecting the autonomy to be observed. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 3.1 presents related work. The research methodology is given in Section 3.2. 
Section 3.3 describes two case studies contrasting the level of autonomy that venture managers 
may enjoy. In Section 3.4, literature research is conducted in order to explore the dimensions 
reflecting the autonomy observed in the cases. Section 3.5 summarizes the results of the study. 
3.1 THE RELEVANCE OF AUTONOMY TO EXPLORE NEW BUSINESSES 
Innovative products are generated through new product development teams involving 
representatives from different functional areas (e.g., experts on sales, manufacturing and design). 
Concurrent engineering is applied broadly as a management philosophy for these cross-functional 
teams (cf. Susman & Dean, 1992; Gerwin & Moffat, 1997). The basic requirement for concurrent 
engineering is that the product development team is able to work in an autonomous manner. The 
required level of autonomy can be described through two types. First, the team needs to be 
functional autonomous from the rest of the corporation, thus incorporate all experts on function 
required to perform their task. Second, the team needs to be able to make job-related decisions 
without approval (cf. Gulowsen, 1972 ; Klein, 1991; Gerwin & Moffat, 1997; Boyle, Kumar, & 
Kumar, 2005). 
Such cross-functional teams are known by scholars in corporate entrepreneurship as corporate 
ventures (see, e.g., Hill & Hlavacek, 1972; Alterowitz, 1988; Christensen, 2004; Kuratko et al., 
2009). Similar to the new product development team, the corporate venture team is 
interdisciplinary as it involves distinct experts on function (see, e.g., Christensen, 2004). In contrast 
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to the new product development teams, innovation is however not limited to product development 
but also requires to build the business for commercialization. For instance, the corporate venture 
team may develop a new product to enter a novel business domain where collaborations, customer 
contacts or distribution channels are yet to be established. Thus, for successful commercialization 
the corporate venture team has the challenge to develop a new product as well as the business 
around the product. At this point we should see the relevance of autonomy in exploring new 
businesses. Corporations providing adequate support to their corporate ventures are able to 
capitalize on emerging business opportunities and thereby achieve superior long-term performance 
by introducing strategic renewal to the business portfolio (see, e.g., Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 
1994; Zahra & Hayton, 2008; Kuratko, 2010; Simsek & Heavey, 2011). 
Adequate support involves however more than money and people, but also requires a certain level 
of autonomy that enables corporate ventures to behave in an entrepreneurial manner (cf. Simon & 
Houghton, 1999). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) highlight that autonomy is the “freedom granted to 
individuals and teams who can exercise their creativity and champion promising ideas that is 
needed for entrepreneurial behavior to occur” (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996: 140). However, the 
concept of autonomy is complex for two reasons: (1) corporate ventures are in contrast to 
independent ventures (i.e., start-ups) not fully autonomous and (2) autonomy may reflect many 
conditions such as oversight, dependence or decision authority (cf. Johnson, 2012).  
It is criticized that the label autonomy is often “too simplified” (Lumpkin et al., 2009) as corporate 
ventures cannot simply be characterized as autonomous or not autonomous (cf. Hill & Hlavacek, 
1972; Thornhill & Amit, 2000; Kuratko, 2010). Instead, it is assumed that the autonomy of 
corporate ventures differentiates among distinct dimensions and degrees of autonomy (e.g., 
Johnson, 2012). This understanding is critical. Corporate venture research assumes generally that 
autonomy is essential for corporate venture success (see, e.g., Simon & Houghton, 1999; 
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Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). Organizational life-cycle theory supports this view and finds that 
growth can only be achieved when corporate management disperses an adequate level of 
autonomy throughout the corporation (cf. Greiner, 1997). However, the understanding of the 
dimensions reflecting the autonomy of corporate ventures remains ambiguous (see, e.g., Lumpkin 
et al., 2009; Crockett et al., 2013). 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the conceptual understanding of autonomy by 
exploring the multiple dimensions that reflect the autonomy of venture managers. We conduct case 
study research in combination with literature research in order to identify distinct dimensions that 
determine the autonomy of venture managers. The research methodology is presented in the 
following section. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The research is based on an explorative methodology in combination with literature research. The 
research approach is described in the Subsection 3.2.1. The data collection is reported in the 
Subsection 3.2.2 and the data analysis is described in the Section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1 RESEARCH APPROACH  
Initially, we aimed to understand how SMEs renew their business portfolio by developing new 
strategies. It is acknowledged by scholars in strategic management that the development of new 
strategies is a social interaction process that involves various actors (see, e.g., Ansoff, 1967; 
Andersen, 2000). Researchers have recognized that such “social processes are not captured in 
hypothetical deductions, covariances and degrees of freedom (thus quantitative research). Instead, 
understanding a social process involves getting inside the world of those generating it” (Rosen, 
1991:9). Therefore, we have given priority to qualitative research. More specifically, explorative 
case study research is carried out. This approach enables to examine the social process of strategy 
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making (a) in its full complexity from a holistic perspective and (b) in real-life settings (Yin, 2009). 
Following an interpretive approach, we focus on the perception of individuals to generate our 
insights into the phenomenon of business portfolio renewal (cf. Patton, 2002).  
While the scientific value of qualitative research is sometimes questioned, a literature review 
provides evidence that the qualitative research methodology is well established in publications by 
management scholars (see, e.g., Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011). Nevertheless, the author 
is aware of the limitations associated with qualitative research. Most notably, the generalizability 
of the qualitative research results is questionable for two reasons: (a) the perception of people is 
gathered, which is not objective and (b) in our case the sample size is quite small. Therefore, we 
carry out literature research in order to bring our qualitative results into line with prior studies (see 
Section 3.4). Moreover, it is important to note that the qualitative research presented in this chapter 
is only the first of four research steps carried out in the thesis. An overview of the four research 
steps is reported in Section 1.3. The following subsection describes the data collection that is 
carried out in this chapter.  
3.2.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Data was collected from May 2011 to April 2012 through two series of semi-structured interviews 
(overall thirteen) in seven SMEs with a time frame between 1 and 2.5 hours. The first series of six 
interviews (see Appendix A1) was conducted with corporate managers (in the role of the CEO) in 
six different SMEs (Company 1 to 6) across three German high-tech industries (Photovoltaic 
Industry, Information Technology and Automotive Supplier). In order to obtain initial insights, the 
first interviews were guided by the research question: “how do SMEs develop new strategies to 
renew their business portfolio?” The research question that guided the second series of interviews 
was more specific, well informed by the answers to the first research question. The second series 
of interviews (see Appendix A2) was guided by the following research question: “how do SMEs 
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enter novel business domains in order to diversify their business portfolio?” In order to answer the 
second research question, seven interviews were conducted with three corporate managers (in 
Company 2, 5 and 7) and three venture managers (in Company 3, 4 and 5) in four out of the initial 
six SMEs (Company 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) and one additional SME (Company 7). An overview of 
the overall thirteen interviews (six plus seven) is given in the Appendices A1 and A2. The analysis 
of the interview data is described in the Subsection 3.2.3. 
3.2.3 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW DATA 
We used grounded theory as a methodology to analyze the interview data (cf. Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). Therefore, the interviews were transcribed and coded. The coded data was used to write 
case descriptions (final cases are presented in Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2) and to compare the 
cases (in Subsection 3.3.3). The detailed data analysis procedure is described in the following.  
The interview data of the first six interviews (Company 1 to 6) was coded in order to gain initial 
insights into how SMEs develop new strategies to renew their business portfolio. Based on the 
coded interview data, discussions were conducted between the researchers (the authors of the two 
publications on which this chapter builds) in weekly Skype conferences. The outcome of these 
discussions were rough case descriptions which summarized the observations. The case 
descriptions showed that the real-world problem of the CEOs (corporate managers) was not related 
to the strategy-making associated with the established businesses. Instead, the challenge of the 
corporate management was to develop new strategies to enter novel business domains, outside the 
scope of the established businesses. 
The first series of interviews 
Building on these initial insights, the business portfolios of the six corporations (first series of 
interviews) were examined based on the interview data and through web research. The results 
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showed that the business portfolio of four (Company 2, 3, 4 and 5) out of six corporations was 
diversified (more than three business domains where established) whereas the portfolio of two 
corporations was limited to one or two business domains only (Company 1 and 6). Interview data 
indicated that the four diversified companies attempted to systematically enter novel business 
domains. The two other companies had no history of systematical new business development.  
The second series of interviews 
Accordingly, the second series of interviews was conducted with the four diversified corporations 
(Company 2, 3, 4 and 5) in order understand how corporations systematically diversify the 
business portfolio by entering novel business domains. An additional interview was conducted 
with one further SME. This company (Company 7) was not part of the first series of interviews. 
Nevertheless, it was promising to incorporate the company in the second series of interviews as its 
business portfolio was also diversified. Correspondingly, the second series of interviews was 
conducted with five SMEs (Company 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7).  
The interviews were transcribed and coded in the same manner as the first interviews. The 
discussions between the researchers based on the coded interview data was continued through 
weekly skype conferences. The coding of the data revealed a common pattern through which three 
of the five corporations entered novel business domains (Company 4, 5, and 7). They did so by 
establishing small entrepreneurial teams (corporate ventures). Two of them were able to establish 
successfully new businesses through the corporate ventures (Company 4 and 7) whereas one 
corporation tried to do so but was not successful (Company 5). Essential differences were not 
found between the two successful corporations. However, one aspect distinguished fundamentally 
between the two successful corporations and the one unsuccessful corporation: the level of 
autonomy that was granted to the venture manager was contrasting.  
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The assumption arrived at 
Based on the interview data, the researchers carefully developed the assumption that “the level of 
autonomy which the venture manager enjoys will influence the success of the corporate venture”. 
Some evidence for our assumption is provided in the two case descriptions reported in the 
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The first case (Company 4) refers to one of the two corporations that 
successfully entered novel business domains with corporate ventures. Only one of the two 
successful cases is reported since the autonomy granted to the venture manager was quite similar 
in Company 4 and 7. Describing the cases of both successful corporations would thus not have 
provided further insights into the formulated assumption. The second case (Company 5) refers to 
the corporation that was unsuccessful with entering a novel business domain with corporate 
ventures. Both cases are reported in Section 3.3. 
3.3 CASE STUDIES 
Two cases of new business development through corporate ventures are described in this section. 
The first case (Company 4) describes an SME within the photovoltaic industry that levers growth 
by entering successfully novel business domains with a corporate venture. The second case 
(Company 5) refers to an SME within the information technology industry that exploits 
successfully existing businesses but is rather unsuccessful to enter novel business domains with 
corporate ventures. The two cases are described in the Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. 
In Subsection 3.3.3, the two cases are compared with respect to the autonomy that the corporate 
managers grant to the venture managers.  
3.3.1 THE CASE OF COMPANY 4 (PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY) 
The case study on Company 4 refers to a company in the photovoltaic (PV) industry with around 
130 employees and a turnover of about 25 million Euro. The company’s solutions focus on the 
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improvement of production processes for PV wafers, cells and modules. The company provides 
quality measurement equipment, chemical additives for production and consultancy for quality 
management. Despite the consolidation and fierce price competition in the PV industry, the 
company was able to generate continuous growth by developing a new business domain through 
a corporate venture. The case of successful new business development is described below in seven 
stages.  
Stage 1: Company 4 started as a distributor 
Founded in 1999 as a university spin-off, Company 4 had high knowledge related to production 
processes for PV cells and modules, resulting from university research. At this early phase, the 
business was based on production process consultancy. Some time later, consultancy was 
combined with hardware sales of quality measurement equipment. Therefore, a partner was 
identified who had developed quality measurement equipment, i.e., for production processes in the 
semiconductor industry. Cooperation between the two firms was started with the aim of combining 
the process knowledge of Company 4 with the hardware knowledge of the partner. The outcome 
yielded quality measurement equipment for laboratories and in-line production processes in the 
PV industry. Company 4 acted as a representative and received a sales commission, whereas the 
partner signed the contracts and provided the equipment.  
Stage 2: The turnkey business was explored as a new business opportunity 
Involved in sales activities, the interviewee (leader of the team that developed the new turnkey 
business), still working part-time at the university, became more and more involved in business 
development activities. Based on his interaction with customers when conducting sales activities, 
he recognized that the customer’s knowledge related to PV quality management was low. This was 
not only the case for the equipment that Company 4 provided but also for third-party equipment 
(e.g., scales or microscopes). He perceived this lack of knowledge as a business opportunity and 
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developed the business idea to combine Company 4’s process know-how with market-available 
quality measurement equipment in order to offer a turnkey package to the customers. The package 
included the equipment, service and operational training related to the equipment.  
Stage 3: A small team developed the turnkey business, guided by a powerful team leader 
Driven by this idea, the interviewee initiated and coordinated several team activities for developing 
the new business. First, a marketing concept was developed. Based on the different customer needs 
(e.g., high quality vs. high quantity production), differentiated standard packages were developed 
and productized as hybrid products (e.g., brochures, flyers, sales presentations and the webpage 
were redesigned). Second, the interviewee initiated business partnerships and signed cooperation 
contracts with the different manufacturers of equipment (e.g., Carl Zeiss AG). Third, a training 
concept was developed in order to support the end-customer in implementing the equipment into 
their production processes. Fourth, a team was built to train end-customers and provide field 
service. These activities were conducted by a cross-functional team (i.e., team members from 
marketing, sales and service) that the interviewee supervised and coordinated.  
The newly established business was unique in the PV industry. Company 4 offered a productized 
hybrid bundle or a comprehensive set of quality measurement equipment, implementation service, 
field service and training. As the partner only provided one part of the range of this bundle, the 
interviewee was in a good position for re-negotiating contractual conditions. Based on the 
argument that the customer requires turnkey offerings that only Company 4 could offer, the 
authority for signing the contracts was transferred to Company 4. Thereby the interviewee was put 
in the position to establish relationships with customers based on intensified interaction (e.g., 
conducted training and provided service). The interactions provided deeper customer 
understanding that was important for further developing the market solution, which subsequently 
improved Company 4’s market position.  
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This new position paved the way for reaching a new customer group – PV turnkey manufacturers 
(companies providing ready-for-operating production facilities for solar cells and modules). The 
new business enabled Company 4 to establish a temporary monopoly in this market segment, 
leading to contracts with every turnkey manufacturer in Germany. Before building the new 
business in 2005, Company 4 was still small (with less than 20 employees), many projects were 
conducted with external consultants and production capacity did not expand beyond prototype 
level. The business was changed through the new business fundamentally. Sales as well as sales 
margins increased significantly. Similarly, the number of customer relations as well as the number 
of employees increased.  
Stage 4: The turnkey business was internationalized 
In 2006, the demand for turnkey solutions began to decrease in Germany and to increase in Asia, 
simultaneously. Consequently, the turnkey manufacturers entered the Asian markets. The 
interviewee recognized this development due to his intensive interactions with these customers. 
Accordingly, he perceived entering the Asian market as another business opportunity. Based on 
this idea, he initiated a deal with turnkey manufacturers that Company 4 would provide a 
comprehensive quality measurement bundle (e.g., providing the equipment, consultancy, training 
and service) in the turnkey projects. As the agreement was settled, the first projects (three at the 
same time) were conducted in Taiwan. To deliver the contract volume, the interviewee set up a 
small team of experts, most of them worked earlier for Company 4 as external consultants (now 
hired fulltime). The team started with the three parallel projects and initiated further sales and 
service activities. According to the interviewee, “the team was the nucleus for the sales and service 
organization that was built later on”.  
These projects opened access to the Asian markets. The interviewee engaged in further sales 
activities and was able to sign contracts for follow-up projects as well as projects with new 
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customers without the support of the turnkey manufacturers. Ultimately, the interviewee 
established a stand-alone position (with an own market presence) in the Asian market which was 
the basis for further growth. Retrospectively, the interviewee stated: “We would have never 
managed to enter the Asian markets without the turnkey partners. We had not even been present at 
a single trade fair.” 
Subsequently, sales increased significantly in 2006 and the interviewee hired local employees 
(from Asia) and invested in their qualifications in order to be able to manage the increasing number 
of projects. While the initial team members were sent to Asia with German employment contracts 
in a freelancer’s scheme, international employment and business law became more relevant with 
the international employees. Since 2006, Company 4 spent tens of thousands of Euros on 
consultancy in order to sort out these legal aspects. In this context the interviewee stated: “If we 
had done everything strictly following international employment and business law, we could never 
have afforded to enter the Asian markets. Today, we have of course solved these legal issues, but 
the required consultants were very expensive.”  
Stage 5: The turnkey business turned into an international sales and service organization 
In order to scale sales and service, the team in Asia was expanded into a new organization. The 
interviewee had the choice to build their own sales and service organization or to outsource sales 
and service to one of the local organizations specializing in these fields. When the first projects 
were conducted, the interviewee immediately recognized that it was of significant importance to 
guarantee reliable service because only good service would ensure production stability for the 
customers. He further realized that “there is nothing better than a reliable service if you want to 
sell again and again to the same customer”. He therefore decided to build the company’s own sales 
and service organization based on the existing team. More than that, engaged in sales in Asia, the 
interviewee realized that their customers utilized the trademark “Made in Germany” of their 
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quality measurement equipment as a marketing aspect. He decided that a unique product design, 
highlighting the German brand, would be helpful. To achieve a new product design, the 
interviewee initiated the redesign of the hardware, the webpage, brochures, sales presentations and 
so forth. 
Stage 6: Research and development was insourced 
In line with that, the CEO and the interviewee decided that it was time to no longer rely on the 
equipment of the partner company but develop their own equipment: “Thus, with a forerun of 1 to 
2 years, we invested several millions in product development.” Software development was the 
core activity of the hired engineers whereas the production of hardware was outsourced. In 2010, 
the development department comprised more than 20 engineers. In product development, it was 
decided to develop equipment for high quality production processes instead of high quantity 
production processes. The interviewee stated that “the customers asked to have the equipment at a 
lower price, but customers always have a tendency to get things cheaper in order to increase their 
margins”. It was expected that production process optimization towards high-end products would 
become the key success factor for manufacturers of wavers, modules and cells. Years later, this 
anticipation of market demand turned out to be true as was seen in 2011 when high-end modules 
achieved at least a 50% higher price than average modules and manufacturers of high-end products 
seemed to be secure whereas others went bust (e.g., German producers such as Q-Cells or Sunways 
collapsed). 
Stage 7: The turnkey business achieved significant growth 
When the crisis in the PV industry hit Germany around 2008 to 2009, the international run of solar 
cell and module manufacturers in the Asian market started. This crisis was based on the fact that 
the Chinese government subsidized Chinese PV manufacturers with billions of Euro. Thus, 
Chinese manufacturers were able to provide solar cells and modules for one third of the price 
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compared to their competitors in Europe (some offers even below factor costs). Company 4 took 
advantage from this crisis situation because they were able to provide mature quality measurement 
equipment solutions (e.g., sets of equipment, training and service) to these companies. Well in 
time, market-ready equipment was just produced when sales increased. High sales rates in 
combination with significantly increased sales margins determined the company’s growth. In 
2011, the interviewee stated that entering the Asian market has been essential for survival. Most 
companies with a similar business model were squeezed out of the market at that time. In contrast, 
Company 4 grew from around 20 employees in 2005 to 130 employees in 2010 and the company’s 
major revenue was generated in Asia.  
Lessons learned 
Our research describes the case of a company in the photovoltaic industry that performed corporate 
venturing successfully and was thereby able to achieve significant growth when the industry 
shifted from boom to bust. The following four lessons can be concluded based on the case 
description. 
 Establishing corporate ventures is an effective means for corporation to enter novel 
business domains for realizing strategic renewal and growth 
 A venture manager that thinks entrepreneurial and acts proactively is required to pursue 
business opportunities through to completion 
 Venture managers require a significant level of autonomy to engage effectively in 
explorative activities for inventing the new business 
 Venture managers should be established as cross-functional teams with experts on distinct 
business functions 
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3.3.2 THE CASE OF COMPANY 5 (INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY) 
The case study on Company 5 refers to an IT consulting company with a turnover of around 2 to10 
million Euro. The company provides solutions for visualization in management control systems, 
product-life-cycle management (PLM) and collaboration platforms. Due to fierce price 
competition the company had to cash-out the mainstream business (PLM) and develop new 
businesses. Below, we first describe the company’s situation in four stages with respect to the 
mainstream business (PLM). We then report on two trials through which the company engaged 
with the aim to develop new businesses with corporate ventures.  
Stage 1: The PLM business was successfully exploited 
Around 1996, the CEO had the vision that web-based technologies would change the way people 
work: “Everybody laughed at me these days but I went my way.” He developed a solution for 
integrating product-life-cycle relevant applications (PLM) in firm-specific portals. The value 
proposition for the customer was, for example, that the integration of different engineering 
applications enabled internationally distributed engineers to operate as a team. The solution was 
so innovative that Company 5 won competitions with global players such as HP and IBM for 
projects with the major OEMs within the automotive industry (Germany). Highly customized 
projects with a timeframe sometimes between 10 and 15 years were conducted successfully. These 
projects materialized in solutions that were tailored perfectly to the customer’s requirements which 
resulted in high customer satisfaction. Consequently, the company grew to a level of complexity 
(e.g., number of projects and employees) where the CEO alone was not able to manage the 
company by himself. Accordingly, he qualified managers responsible for the respective business 
units. These managers became strategic assets for the company. Based on their experience, they 
developed their own vision for the respective business units.  
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Stage 2: Managers left Company 5 to found their own company  
In order to develop their respective businesses accordingly, they required a level of autonomy that 
the CEO was not able to provide. The interviewee said: “There were demands expressed, a demand 
for autonomy which I was not able to fulfill … I had debts which I needed to pay back to the 
investor … there was a large list of prohibitions (enforced by the investors)… my people required 
a level of autonomy that I didn’t even have myself.” In fact, the CEO was unable to provide his 
managers with the requested level of autonomy as the investor enforced harsh contractual 
conditions in order to avoid any uncontrolled activities, such as investments in other firms or inter-
firm cooperation. Due to the limited autonomy, the managers were unable to develop their business 
units according to their vision and perceived the conditions in Company 5 as an obstacle rather 
than being supportive. As a consequence, the managers left and founded their own company in 
2000. The drain of managerial competence was not constrained by binding instruments such as 
contractual clauses (e.g., a non-competition clause was not included in employment contracts).  
In order to build their business, the managers recruited some of the best people from Company 5 
as well as specialists that at the time were in the job application process at Company 5. Company 
5’s CEO stated: “I have invested a lot in qualifying managers, with the effect that I generated my 
own competition. I qualified every chief executive manager including some executive managers 
of the company my own people founded.” The company they founded has grown to more than 
100 employees successfully and is in a good market position.  
Stage 3: In consequence the CEO cut the competences of his employees  
As a result, Company 5’s CEO decided to cut the competences of his employees in order to avoid 
such events in the future. For example, employees were only trained in competences which were 
at the core of their job (e.g., sales). Moreover, the CEO found out that an employee of Company 5 
worked secretly for the newly founded company. The employee had full access to Company 5’s 
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intranet which was a repository for business-relevant knowledge. Subsequently, some of the stored 
information was used by the employees of the new company (e.g., sales presentations). The CEO 
of Company 5 limited his employees’ access to the intranet to a minimum immediately when he 
realized that the knowledge was leaking. 
The cutting short of competences as well as the limiting of access to business-relevant knowledge, 
however, caused new problems after a while. The CEO stated: “I seriously cut the competences of 
my employees. It seemed to work. However, the company lost its ability to generate further growth 
… this was simply too extreme.” He created a rather “mechanistic” organization in which 
employees followed documented guidelines, working procedures, regulations and business 
processes in order to do their job. 
The organization was sufficient for managing existing projects efficiently. But as the CEO claimed 
later, the company lost its ability to generate innovative solutions for customers and to generate 
new business. The lacking ability to generate new solutions was particularly tremendous for the 
PLM business where the company transformed gradually from a tier-1 supplier to a tier-2 supplier. 
A long-term customer in the automotive industry even refused follow-up projects with the 
argument that the degree of innovation on offer was too low. 
The economic outcome displayed its full effect when the economic crisis hit the automotive 
industry in 2008. The PLM business that had provided steady growth for the past 10 to 15 years 
started to stagnate. The CEO was not surprised as he had noticed standard solutions dominating 
the market whereas prices for specialized programmers (Java) had been dropping continuously. In 
contrast, Company 5 focused on individualized solutions. At a point before the financial crisis in 
2008, he decided that it was time to cash-out the old business and create a new business. 
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Stage 4: The mainstream business was unable to develop new businesses 
Correspondingly, the CEO forced his employees to work on developing new business ideas. 
However, he stated: “I failed. I seriously tried everything but the company was neither moving 
forward nor backwards. I would never have believed it if I hadn’t seen it with my own eyes … 
Everybody was used to coming to work and to having work … The Company needed that shock 
if you ask me today.” The shock was that no new business was developed. Instead, employees 
stuck with “business-as-usual”. As a result, around 25 specialized programmers had no project 
when some of the long-term projects ended. Subsequently, the CEO downsized the business over 
a two-year period from around 75 to 30 employees without generating losses. The result was 
surprising because the company generated exactly the same (absolute) profit with 30 employees 
as it had before with 75 employees. After that, the CEO managed the remaining projects himself. 
The CEO recognized that new businesses (e.g., in new business domains) would not emerge from 
the mechanistic type of organization (mainstream business) that had evolved over the years. 
Therefore, the CEO engaged into two trials (A and B) to develop new businesses with corporate 
ventures, outside the scope of the mainstream business. In trial A, two subsidiaries were 
established. The hope was that the subsidiary/venture managers were able to enter novel business 
domains (other than the known automotive industry) with the established PLM solutions. In trial 
B, a small team was established at the company’s headquarter some time later for the purpose to 
develop the new “collaboration platform” business. The two trials are reported below.  
Lessons learned: 
So far, our research describes the case of a company that capitalized successfully on the 
mainstream business while failing to renew the business portfolio strategically. The following five 
lessons can be concluded based on the case description. 
 Corporations require strategic renewal to achieve long-term survival 
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 A lack of autonomy limits the ability of employees to act proactively 
 Managers that think entrepreneurial require supportive organizational settings 
 Cutting the competences of employees reduces their ability to think entrepreneurial 
 The corporate mainstream business is not necessarily a good place to pursue the 
development of new businesses 
Trial A – Stage 1: Two small teams were established to enter novel business domains 
The CEO recognized that his executive managers needed more autonomy and decided for 
organizational change. Two of his executive managers were given the opportunity to establish their 
own businesses in a new environment. For that, subsidiaries were established in Ingolstadt and 
Stuttgart with the executive managers in charge. Each executive manager was provided with one 
major customer (automotive industry) and a small team of programmers and consultants. The aim 
of both initiatives was to maintain existing customers and gain new customers in industries other 
than the automotive industry. In fact, the teams were allowed to conduct projects with existing 
customers, engage in further sales efforts (70% of the executive manager’s work time) and human 
resource development activities for building their own team. Every other business function (e.g., 
R&D, marketing and controlling) was provided by Company 5 and the executive managers were 
controlled tightly by the CEO.  
In the interviews it became clear that basic decisions (e.g., how brochures and other marketing 
material should be utilized, when and where an offer should be made and which customer should 
be contracted) were basically made by the CEO. Similarly, the influence of the team leaders on the 
current concept of strategy was rather low. The CEO stated that he discussed strategic issues with 
three employees (chief of development, chief of product management and chief of finance). The 
team leaders were, however, not part of this group. 
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Not surprisingly, new business did not emerge and one of the subsidiaries was closed. It was argued 
that the team leader did not have the ability to acquire new customers and the nearly 10-year-old 
project with the main customer ended without a follow-up project. At the beginning, things went 
wrong in the second subsidiary as well. The team leader had trouble managing the programmers 
in his team. He was a consultant, and thus struggled to provide constructive feedback on the 
technical side and to guide programming activities. The team leader agreed with the CEO that it 
would be best to abandon programming activities for his business. Accordingly, the business was 
adapted with the focus on process consultancy. The business started running when after a while 
the team acquired a new OEM in the automotive industry and several smaller customers. 
Strategically, however, the CEO still saw the initiative in a cash-out position for cross-financing 
the development of new businesses.  
Trial B – Stage 1: A new business opportunity was explored 
Over the years, the CEO recognized that business process integration in a “collaboration platform” 
is not only a topic for large companies but also for SMEs. However, he knew that individual 
solutions (which his company developed in the PLM business) were not marketable because they 
were simply not affordable for SMEs. Nevertheless, technology in this field advanced and standard 
solutions (such as Microsoft SharePoint) appeared on the market. Thus, business-process 
integration became suddenly affordable for SMEs and a new business idea was born. The value 
proposition was to generate individualized collaboration platforms (based on the standard 
software) that integrated information and applications from different systems in a short time and 
at low cost. 
Trial B – Stage 2: A small team was established to develop the new business 
However, the CEO argued that the mechanistic part of his company would not be able to develop 
such a new business. He stated that this team was good for administrating and conducting projects 
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but unable to think outside the box and not willing to enter unknown terrain. It was further argued 
that the guidelines, regulations, procedures and processes that were helpful for the mechanistic 
team hindered innovative people to create something new. The CEO stated: “I want to create a 
team that is completely detached from the rest of the organization, so they can create their own 
culture, their own spirit. And I don’t want to be their leader in terms that I pull them like I have 
done in the past … honestly, I am tired … they can get every support they require but they need to 
generate growth themselves. This is now something new, a trial … but I believe that it will work.” 
With this basic idea in mind, the CEO established a small team of around four full-time employees 
with the aim of developing the new business. In the beginning, the team members developed the 
conceptual design of the new business. While the business solution matured, the team engaged 
increasingly in sales activities and human resource development. Questions such as what activities 
to pursue and how to develop the business were made primarily by the team members. Even 
strategic issues (e.g., research focus, development activities, which solutions should be developed, 
and issues of qualification) were decided by the team. The CEO stated: “I don’t want to tell them 
what to develop or give them other directions for the content of their business as long as the 
business is moving forward … The only guideline they have is the vision to generate collaborative 
solutions for SMEs and their budgets.”  
Still, the new business was causing trouble with the key performance indicators and controlling 
procedures derived from those in the established businesses at an early stage. Targets (e.g., budgets 
and turnover) were planned but did not reflect real-world conditions. Milestones such as number 
of customer acquisitions and cost coverage seemed to be more valid and were implemented. After 
a period of excessive customer acquisition, first projects were initiated and turnover started to 
increase around two years after initial investments were made (break even was not yet achieved).  
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Lessons learned: 
Our research continued with describing the two trials of corporate venturing through which the 
CEO pursued the development of new businesses. The CEO learned five lessons from these trials 
which are concluded in the following.  
 Establishing corporate ventures as separated subunits is not necessarily effective 
 A venture manager that thinks and acts entrepreneurial is required to purse the new 
business in a novel business domain 
 Corporate management should not expect that corporate ventures reach profitability in a 
short time 
 Corporate management should disperse autonomy to the corporate venture for enabling 
to learn how the new business works 
 Small teams with limited budget are already sufficient to test new business ideas 
3.3.3 COMPARING THE AUTONOMY OF THE VENTURE MANAGERS IN THE TWO CASES 
In this subsection, the case of successful new business development in Company 4 is compared 
with the case of Company 5 where new business development was rather unsuccessful (which is 
at least evident in the first trial). Both cases are meticulously analyzed with emphasis on the 
contrasting level of autonomy that was granted to the venture managers. 
Company 4 – Enabling corporate venturing through autonomous action 
The case of Company 4 (Photovoltaic Industry) describes how a new business was developed 
successfully through a small team (corporate venture). The team leader (venture manager) 
developed the new business by adapting the business model various times, in accordance with the 
opportunities that he explored by interacting with customers (market stimuli). The business model 
was adapted four times. First, the distributor business was turned into the turnkey business (Stage 
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3), which increased growth in terms of both sales and employment. Second, the venture manager 
internationalized the turnkey business (Stage 4) and was able to achieve a stand-alone position 
(while first contracts were not made with the end-customers but with the turnkey manufacturers). 
Third, the venture manager established an own sales organization in Asia (Stage 5), which resulted 
in further growth. Fourth, own equipment was developed instead of relying on the supplies of the 
partner company (Stage 6).  
Empowered by the corporate manager, the venture manager was able to adapt the business in all 
four cases (Stage 3 to Stage 6) through autonomous action. In Stage 3, the venture manager (a) 
developed a new marketing concept, (b) initiated business partnerships, (c) developed a training 
concept and (d) built a team to train end-customers and provide field service. These business 
development activities were decided and implemented without the approval of corporate 
management. In Stage 4, also autonomously, the venture manager (a) initiated a deal with turnkey 
manufacturers, (b) set up a team in Asia, (c) engaged in sales and service activities in Asia and (d) 
sign contracts for follow-up projects. In Stage 5, the venture manager decided without consensus 
seeking (a) that is was necessary to build an own sales and service organization based on the 
existing team and (b) to establish a new product design for the Asian markets. In Stage 6, several 
million Euros were invested to establish an own product development department, a decision 
which was made in consensus with the corporate manager.  
In a summary, the case of Company 4 highlights that the venture manager was able to act 
autonomously, which was essential to develop the new business in accordance to the experiences 
that the venture manager made through interaction with market stimuli. 
Company 5 – Impeding corporate venturing due to lacking autonomy 
The case of Company 5 (Information Technology Industry) illustrates that the lack of autonomy 
can have tremendous negative effects on the ability of an organization to development new 
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businesses. The following three situations that were observed in Company 5 describe the negative 
effects of lacking autonomy.  
First, the business unit managers developed their own vision for their business unit in Stage 2. 
They recognized the necessity to collaborate with other firms in order to realize their vision. 
However, the corporate manager had to prohibit any collaboration (which would have implied 
investments though other corporations) due to the contract concluded with his investor. As a 
consequence of the lacking freedom to act, the business unit managers left and founded their own 
company, which has grown to more than 100 employees. This growth potential could have had 
also materialized in Company 5 if the business unit managers would have had sufficient autonomy 
to act. 
Second, the corporate manager reduced the autonomy of his employees significantly in Stage 3 
when the business unit managers founded their own company and recruited therefore some of the 
best employees of Company 5. The reduction of autonomy is indicated through the following three 
reactions. Reaction 1: the corporate manager enforced directive leadership as all projects were 
managed by himself. The projects were before managed rather autonomously by the project 
managers. Reaction 2: employees were now treated as functional specialists with restricted 
qualification, training, strict job descriptions and limited access to the intranet. Reaction 3: rather 
than treating employees as independent decision-makers, decisions were now almost exclusively 
made by the corporate manager. Consensus exists that directive leadership (reaction 1), limitations 
concerning the employee’s competences (reaction 2) and centralized decision making (reaction 3) 
indicate limited autonomy which decreases the organizational ability to generate innovation (cf. 
Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Confirming this assumption, it is described in 
Stage 4 that the reactions of the corporate manager (a, b and c) had negative effects on the ability 
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of his company to generate innovation. The corporate manager stated, that due to his reactions, the 
employees at his company were unable to invent new business ideas. 
Third, the corporate manager learned that the ability to generate a new business is directly 
associated with an increase of autonomy. He initiated two trials to develop new businesses through 
corporate ventures. In the first trial, two corporate venture (subsidiaries) were established in 
Stuttgart and Ingolstadt in order to enable the venture managers (subsidiary managers) to act 
autonomously. In fact however, sales targets were set by the corporate manager mindful of tight 
budgets, basic decisions (e.g., which commercials to provide or where to place an offer) were made 
by the corporate manager and the operational business influenced through close project plan 
reviews and other controlling instruments. New businesses did not emerge and the corporate 
manager engaged in a second trial where he established a corporate venture that should develop 
the collaboration business rather autonomously. In contrast to the first trial, the corporate manager 
stated that he would like the team to act autonomously in order to develop the new business.   
Although, the new business was at an early stage when interviews ended, we may conclude that 
the corporate manager recognized through his learning experience (the three described situations) 
that sufficient autonomy is a prerequisite for the ability to develop new businesses successfully 
through corporate ventures.   
3.4 ABSTRACTING FOUR DISTINCT AUTONOMY DIMENSIONS FROM THE CASES 
The two cases of Company 4 and Company 5 give a first idea to how the autonomy of the venture 
manager is characterized. Literature research was conducted to explore the dimensions of 
autonomy that were observed in the cases. In the Subsections 3.4.1 to 3.4.4, we identified four 
autonomy dimensions, namely, (1) functional autonomy, (2) decision autonomy, (3) strategic 
autonomy and (4) job autonomy.  
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3.4.1 FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY 
Literature research: In the engineering literature, functional autonomy is an established concept. 
Consensus exists that new product development teams should be functional autonomous, thus 
incorporate all experts on function in order to perform their tasks concurrently (cf. Clark & 
Fujimoto, 1991; Susman & Dean, 1992; Gerwin & Moffat, 1997). Corporate ventures are similar 
to new product development teams cross-functional. Corporate venture teams generally involve 
representatives from distinct functional areas (e.g., sales, marketing, R&D) (cf. Hill & Hlavacek, 
1972; Burgelman, 1983; Alterowitz, 1988; Brazeal, 1993). Corporate ventures with full functional 
autonomy would operate independent from the corporation as functional complete subunits.  
Refection: In the case of Company 4, the level of functional autonomy was rather low, which is 
evident from a high sharing of experts on function (e.g., marketing and sales) between the 
corporation and the corporate venture team. For example, the turnkey business was developed and 
internationalized through a cross-functional team (e.g., experts in marketing, sales, training and 
service). However, many of these experts on function (e.g., concerning sales, training or 
marketing) worked actually for Company 4 and were only involved in some venture activities. In 
contrast, the sharing of experts on function was rather low in the case of Company 5. Only one 
expert on function (sales) was temporarily provided by the corporation in the first trial. In the 
second trial, the team was functionally complete.  
3.4.2 DECISION AUTONOMY 
Literature research: Decision autonomy is described in prior studies as the authority to make 
operational decisions without consensus seeking or the freedom from excessive control (see, e.g., 
Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002a; Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby, 2005). Decision 
autonomy is seen as one major antecedent for entrepreneurial initiatives to emerge and thrive (cf. 
Kanter, 1989; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Hornsby et al., 2002a; Kuratko et al., 2005; Lumpkin et al., 
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2009). Negative implications on corporate venture success are expected when corporate 
management does not provide venture managers with the authority to make operational decisions 
(e.g., Quinn, 1985; Crockett et al., 2013). 
Reflection: High levels of decision autonomy enabled the venture manager in Company 4 to act 
with greater flexibility when developing the new business. For example, the venture manager 
recognized the turnkey business opportunity and made several decisions responsively in order to 
develop the business. He decided which third party equipment manufacturers to collaborate with, 
to develop marketing and training concepts and to establish training and service teams. These 
decisions were made basically by the venture manager (interviewee) without time-consuming 
approval meetings with the corporate manager. Thus, decisions related to business development 
activities were made flexible and free from direction and limitation enforced by the corporation. 
In Company 5, the decision autonomy granted to the venture managers in charge for the teams in 
Stuttgart and Ingolstadt (first trail) was rather low as only some decisions referring to project 
management and human resource development could be made without the approval of the 
corporate manager.  
3.4.3 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
Literature research: In strategic management, strategic autonomy is a further measure 
underpinning the concept of autonomy (Floyd & Lane, 2000). This dimension of autonomy can 
be characterized as the authority to make strategic decision without approval (Andersen, 2004). 
One stream of research in strategic management builds on the assumption that new strategic 
influence evolves bottom-up (cf. Mintzberg, 1973, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Bower, 1986; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Burgelman & Grove, 1996). It is acknowledged that such a bottom-up approach 
requires autonomous strategic decision-making across the corporation in order to enable new 
strategic influence to emerge (cf. Hart, 1992; Andersen, 2000). Accordingly, strategic influence 
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may be achieved by allowing venture managers to make strategic decisions without approval (cf. 
Burgelman, 1983; Andersen, 2004).  
Reflection: In Company 4, high levels of strategic autonomy enabled the venture manager to 
develop the strategic direction of the turnkey business. The strategy to enter the Asian markets and 
to establish a sales and service organization subsequently was not intended when the venture 
manager decided to develop the turnkey business in the first place. Rather, the venture manager 
recognized the tendency of turnkey manufacturers to enter the Asian market through close 
interaction with these customers. Perceiving this tendency as an opportunity, he made the strategic 
decision to enter the Asian market in cooperation with the turnkey manufacturers. Similarly, the 
strategic decision to establish an own sales and service organization in Asia emerged when the 
venture manager recognized (when he engaged in first sales activities) that service reliability was 
one major value proposition for Asian end-customers. Another strategic decision referred to the 
strategic direction of R&D activities. Here the venture manager decided without approval to focus 
on quality measurement equipment for high quality instead of high quantity production processes 
(based on experience gained from trade fairs). Thus, the level of strategic autonomy was rather 
high in Company 4. In Company 5, the venture managers (Stuttgart and Ingolstadt) had a rather 
low influence on the strategic direction of their businesses. They were not part of the group in 
which strategic issues were discussed and strategic decisions were made by the corporate manager. 
3.4.4 JOB AUTONOMY 
Literature research: In work design scholars, job autonomy can be described as the authority to 
make work-mode decisions without approval or the authority that one holds in his job (cf. 
Hackman & Oldham, 1975a; Hackman, 1990). Work-mode decisions refer to the legitimacy to 
autonomously choose the work methods, define the scheduling of the work and select the work 
criteria (cf. Gulowsen, 1972 ; Breaugh, 1985). Job autonomy alludes to the independence of 
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individuals to fulfill a job free from restrictions (see, e.g., Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), which is a 
major motivation for people to perform their job (cf. Spector, 1986) and show creative work 
involvement (Volmer, Spurk, & Niessen, 2012).  
Reflection: The case of Company 4 shows that the venture manager was the only driver for making 
work-mode decisions. When it was decided to adapt the business model towards the turnkey 
business, he decided how to do the job and coordinated marketing experts, composed a training 
team, mobilized experts that worked for the company beforehand and managed the work of these 
experts when conducting first projects in Asia. Similarly, the job to establish the sales and service 
organization in Asia was also conducted autonomously by the venture manager. In the case of 
Company 5, the level of job autonomy (Stuttgart and Ingolstadt) was moderate. The corporate 
manager took over the work-mode decisions for both teams when the business showed bad 
performance (i.e., lost key customers and where not able to acquire new projects). For example, 
the corporate manager decided how the teams should go over the job and rescheduled the activities 
of programmers (Stuttgart) and sales experts (Ingolstadt). The insights that can be drawn from 
these characterizations are concluded in the following.  
3.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter answers RQ1: What are the dimensions reflecting the autonomy that corporate 
management grants to venture managers? The dimensions reflecting the autonomy of venture 
managers were explored and characterized. The results indicate that the venture manager’s ability 
to launch a new business for the corporation is determined through four autonomy dimensions: (1) 
functional autonomy, (2) decision autonomy, (3) strategic autonomy and (4) job autonomy. The 
identification of the four autonomy dimensions provides the conceptual framework for Chapter 4 
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where the autonomy dimensions are operationalized in an initial four-dimensional autonomy 
construct that reflects the autonomy of venture managers.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Operationalizing a Multidimensional 
Autonomy Construct 
This chapter contributes to answering RQ2: How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 
be operationalized in a construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? 
The attempt for providing an answer to this research question is supplemented by the 
corresponding partial answer given in Chapter 5. The research presented in Chapter 3 identified 
that the autonomy of venture managers is reflected in four dimensions, namely, functional 
autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job autonomy. In this chapter, a theoretical 
model is developed that associates the four autonomy dimensions with corporate venture success. 
The model is operationalized in such a way that it provides an initial construct reflecting the 
autonomy of venture managers.  
This chapter is based on the following publication2: 
Gard, J., Baltes, G., & Katzy, B. (2013). An Integrating Model of Autonomy in Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. In the proceedings of the 19th ICE & IEEE-ITMC International Conference, 
pp. 221-235. The Hague, Netherlands.  
The structure of the study is as follows. Section 4.1 sheds light on the semi-autonomous nature of 
corporate ventures and the necessity to measure autonomy at various dimensions. Section 4.2 
                                                 
2 The author would like to thank his co-authors and the publishers of the ICE & IEEE-ITMC 2013 proceedings for 
their permission to reuse relevant parts of the articles in this thesis. 
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highlights the prevailing theoretical assumption that autonomy is essential for successful corporate 
venture creation and discusses established autonomy constructs. In Section 4.3, the theoretical 
model is designed and further developed. It is operationalized in Section 4.4. The chapter 
conclusion in Section 4.5 provides a partial answer to RQ2.  
4.1 THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS NATURE OF CORPORATE VENTURES 
Corporate ventures develop new businesses for the corporation and are therefore separated 
typically from the mainstream business (see, e.g., Kuratko, 2010). They are entrepreneurial teams 
with the explorative task to invent a new business for entering novel business domains (Garrett & 
Covin, 2013). The new business evolves essentially through explorative learning efforts, such as 
experimentation, improvisation and search for alternatives (Simon & Houghton, 1999; McGrath, 
2001). However, the corporate mainstream business is built generally around formalization and 
rigid hierarchies with the aim to achieve organizational efficiency (cf. Jansen et al., 2009). The 
organizational settings are usually ill-suited to support the explorative learning efforts through 
which the corporate venture thrives to a mature subunit (Dess et al., 1999). It is therefore assumed 
that corporate ventures should be separated from the corporation (see, e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2002) 
in order to protect them from the rigid managerial cognitions and organizational inertia of the 
mainstream business (Block, 1989; Dougherty, 1995; Gilson, Mathieu, Shalley, & Ruddy, 2005; 
McGrath et al., 2012). Building on this logic, it is acknowledged that corporate venture success is 
associated positively with separation/autonomy (see Schuler, 1986; Kanter, 1989; Simon & 
Houghton, 1999; Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Burgers et al., 2009).  
However, autonomy needs to be balanced carefully. Autonomy may (a) provide corporate ventures 
with the freedom and flexibility required to engage effectively in explorative learning modes for 
exploring new capabilities (Thornhill & Amit, 2000; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). It may, however, 
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also (b) hamper the exploitation of those capabilities already existing in the corporation as 
separation isolates corporate ventures from the rest of the corporation (Garrett & Covin, 2013). 
Building on the assumption that corporate ventures are most successful when having the ability to 
simultaneously develop new capabilities and capitalize on those that already exist in the 
corporation (cf. Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012), it does not seem promising to establish corporate 
ventures as fully autonomous subunits. 
Therefore, it is considered that establishing corporate ventures with suitable autonomy is more 
complex than simple physical separation would imply (see, e.g., Kuratko, 2010). Studies show that 
the autonomy of corporate ventures may reflect many conditions, such as loose versus tight control 
(Crockett et al., 2013), centralized versus decentralized decision-making (Birkinshaw & Hill, 
2005) or dependent versus independent venture operations (Garrett & Covin, 2013). Capturing 
these distinct conditions involves multiple measures. It is therefore assumed that a 
multidimensional construct is necessary to measure the autonomy of corporate ventures precisely 
(see Johnson, 2012). However, research highlights that such a construct is yet to be developed 
(Kuratko et al., 2009; Lumpkin et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; Crockett et al., 2013). This chapter 
contributes to the current body of knowledge by operationalizing an initial multidimensional 
construct that reflects the autonomy of venture managers. 
4.2 AUTONOMY OF CORPORATE VENTURES 
Corporate ventures are established by corporations for the purpose to develop a new business, 
tailored to enter novel business domains (e.g., Block & MacMillan, 1993; Garrett & Covin, 2013). 
Separation or autonomy allows corporate ventures to operate outside the established managerial 
cognitions (Gilbert, 2005), restrictive control systems (Simon & Houghton, 1999) and standard 
operating procedures of the mainstream business, all of which is necessary to invent the new 
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business (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Kuratko et al., 2009). Autonomy is particularly essential 
because prior knowledge concerning the market parameters (i.e., costumers or technologies) in the 
novel business domains is generally low (Kanter, 1985; Birkinshaw, 2005). This lack of prior 
knowledge involves that the task environment of corporate ventures is highly unpredictable (e.g., 
McGrath et al., 2012). Business development activities emerge and thrive under these conditions, 
essentially through explorative learning (Simon & Houghton, 1999). Autonomy is acknowledged 
as a prerequisite for effective explorative learning and thus essential for corporate venture success 
(McGrath, 2001).  
Although scholars hold the prevailing view that autonomy is critical for the success of corporate 
ventures (see, e.g., Simon & Houghton, 1999; Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Crockett et al., 2013). It 
is however criticized by some that autonomy is often oversimplified (e.g., establishing corporate 
ventures as separated subunits) which may result in quick but not necessarily effective 
implementation of autonomy (see Lumpkin et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012). The autonomy of 
corporate ventures was measured previously through the extent to which (1) venture decision 
making is separated from the corporation and (2) venture operations are separated from the 
corporation (cf. Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Kuratko et al., 2009). However, these measures were 
severely criticized. Consequently, the discussion of the relationship between these two autonomy 
measures and corporate venture success falls prey to great controversy (Garrett & Covin, 2013). 
We illustrate the controversy by two examples. First, whereas some studies show that corporate 
venture success increases when venture managers enjoy high levels of decision authority 
(Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Crockett et al., 2013), others have found an inverse relationship 
(Thornhill & Amit, 2000). Second, studies investigating the separation of venture operations have 
been similarly inconclusive as they also show contradicting relations with corporate venture 
success (cf. Kuratko et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; Garrett & Covin, 2013). 
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These findings highlight that the autonomy determining corporate venture success may not be well 
understood and that further conceptual work, in particular refining the ideas of autonomy, is 
required to generate a comprehensive understanding of the measurement construct (cf. Johnson, 
2012). An explorative study was therefore conducted in Chapter 3. The results indicate that the 
autonomy of venture managers is mainly determined through the following four autonomy 
dimensions: functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job autonomy. 
These four autonomy dimensions are discussed in the following and propositions are developed 
that associate them with corporate venture success. 
4.3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
In this section, our theoretical model is presented. Therefore, propositions are developed for each 
autonomy dimension. In the Subsections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 the propositions that integrate the autonomy 
dimensions as distinct measures in the theoretical model are developed. The propositions are 
summarized in Subsection 4.3.5 and illustrated in Figure 4.7.  
4.3.1 FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY 
In early studies, corporate ventures are characterized as cross-functional teams (e.g., with its own 
sales, marketing and controlling experts) that are functional autonomous from their corporations 
(cf. Hill & Hlavacek, 1972; Alterowitz, 1988). Later studies acknowledge that it may be beneficial 
to establish corporate ventures as (autonomous) cross-functional teams in order to enter new 
business domains successfully, in particular when the degree of novelty is high (Hitt, Nixon, 
Hoskisson, & Kochhar, 1999). In these cases, concurrent engineering is known as a means to 
coordinate the parallel work activities of the multiple experts effectively (McDonough, 2000; 
Koufteros, Vonderembse, & Jayaram, 2005). New business development requires multi-functional 
expertise and research demonstrates that it is essential for corporate venture success to pursue these 
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multidisciplinary activities concurrently (Katzy, Baltes, & Gard, 2014). An essential principle of 
concurrent engineering is that the team should consist of all experts on function that are required 
to perform the task (Hauptman & Hirji, 1999). Otherwise, the multiple experts on function need 
to be coordinated across the boundaries of functional departments (i.e., marketing, sales, R&D 
etc.), which is inappropriate for concurrent engineering. Building on the principle of concurrent 
engineering that cross-functional teams are essential to coordinate the parallel work effectively, I 
develop the proposition that functional autonomy (reflecting cross-functional teams) is associated 
positively with corporate venture success. 
Proposition 1:  Functional autonomy is related positively to corporate venture success.  
Figure 4.1: The Impact of Functional Autonomy on Corporate Venture Success 
 
Whether it is more beneficial for corporate ventures to develop their own functional expertise (e.g., 
knowledge and competences concerning marketing, R&D and sales) or corporate ventures should 
instead utilize the expertise that is already existing in the corporation remains open for discussion 
(cf. Newburry & Zeira, 1999; Briody, Cavusgil, & Miller, 2004; Crockett, Payne, & McGee, 2007). 
Corporate ventures relying on corporate expertise increase unwittingly their dependence on the 
corporation (Christensen, 1997). Depending on corporate expertise restricts the venture’s 
flexibility as ventures need to rely on rigid corporate rules to acquire corporate expertise, known 
as core incompetencies (Dougherty, 1995). These core incompetencies make it more unlike that 
new capabilities are developed and may therefore have a negative influence on corporate venture 
success (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). However, it is also acknowledged that the redeployment of 
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innovative products and solutions, which may increase corporate venture success (see Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; McGrath et al., 2012).  
While this debate continues, it is recognized that the benefits corporate ventures gain from 
corporate expertise may depend on how critical particular functional expertise (e.g., marketing 
expertise) is for corporate ventures to perform their task well (cf. Crockett et al., 2007; Garrett & 
Neubaum, 2013). Crocket et al. (2007) assume that corporate ventures should possess their own 
expertise on function (e.g., marketing) that are critical to perform their task successfully. Building 
on this prior assumption, I consider that the impact of functional autonomy on corporate venture 
success may be stronger when corporate ventures possess their own functional expertise in 
functional areas that are critical (functional importance) to achieve their task.  
Proposition 2:  The relation between functional autonomy and corporate venture success 
is stronger when expertise in critical functional areas are possessed by 
corporate ventures. 
Figure 4.2: Functional Importance Amplifies the Impact of Functional Autonomy  
 
The moderation effect that functional importance (business functions that are critical for corporate 
venture success) has on the relationship between functional autonomy and corporate venture 
success is not to be confused with a mediation effect. The moderation effect has a direct impact on 
the relationship between functional autonomy and corporate venture success whereas mediation 
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4.3.2 DECISION AUTONOMY 
Decision autonomy refers to the authority of venture managers to make decisions without seeking 
consensus with corporate management (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). Decision autonomy 
enhances venture managers to become more proactive and willing to take risks (cf. Bruining & 
Wright, 2002), which is attributed to entrepreneurial behavior (cf. Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002b). The authority to make decisions without consensus seeking 
allows venture managers further to respond quickly to changes in their task environment (cf. 
Ginsberg & Hay, 1994) which allows them to pursue novel business opportunities more effectively 
(cf. Oates, 1971; Jones & Wilemon, 1973; McGrath et al., 2012). In contrast, venture managers 
without the authority to make decisions autonomously are unlikely to engage in innovative 
problem-solving and to foster new ideas (cf. McGrath, 2001). 
However, some research indicates that too much decision autonomy may increase the risk of 
failure (cf. Block & MacMillan, 1993; Simon & Houghton, 1999; Gebert, Boerner, & Lanwehr, 
2003). Thornhill and Amit (2000) provide evidence that high levels of decision autonomy have a 
negative impact on corporate venture success. For example, such negative impact may occur due 
to opportunistic behavior, which can shift the vision of the new business towards individual 
interests (cf. Weinzimmer & Nystrom, 2015) and manifest inconsistencies with corporate strategy 
(cf. Feldman, 1989).  
Further studies show that decision autonomy varies among functional areas, meaning for example 
that venture managers may have the authority to make decisions in marketing whereas corporate 
management makes R&D-related decisions (cf. Hill & Hlavacek, 1972; Crockett et al., 2007). 
Research illustrates that it is beneficial to grant decision autonomy in business functions that allow 
market adaptation through close interaction with market stimuli, such as customers (see Garnier, 
1982; Harzing, 1999; Edwards, Ahmad, & Moss, 2002). In line with these findings, I argue that 
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corporate venture success is increased when venture managers are granted with decision autonomy 
in market-related business functions (e.g., marketing and sales).  
Proposition 3:  Decision autonomy in business functions enabling market interaction is 
associated positively with corporate venture success.  
Figure 4.3: The Impact of Decision Autonomy on Corporate Venture Success 
 
Moreover, the following proposition assumes that functional importance (business functions that 
are critical for corporate venture success) moderates the relationship between decision autonomy 
and corporate venture success. A positive association is found when decisions in critical business 
functions are made by venture managers (see Crockett et al., 2007). I build on this previous finding 
and argue that the impact of decision autonomy on corporate venture success depends on the 
importance of the respective business function (functional importance) to which decisions refer.  
Proposition 4:  The relation between decision autonomy and corporate venture success 
increases when decisions in critical business functions are made by 
venture managers without approval. 
Figure 4.4: Functional Importance Amplifies the Impact of Decision Autonomy 
 
The moderation effect of functional importance is not to be confused with a mediation effect, 
which would imply an indirect impact on the relationship between decision autonomy and 
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4.3.3 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
Strategic autonomy can be defined as the authority of venture managers to make strategic decisions 
without seeking consensus (cf. Andersen, 2004). The relevance of strategic autonomy is rooted in 
the emergent nature of strategy, adhering that strategic initiatives emerge from and thrive through 
the managerial grassroots, i.e., middle management such as venture managers (see, e.g., 
Mintzberg, 1973, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Bower, 1986; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; 
Mintzberg, 1994; Burgelman & Grove, 1996). Emerging strategy entails that strategic initiatives 
can evolve unhindered from the current concept of corporate strategy (cf. Burgelman, 1983), and 
may even be unintended by corporate management (cf. Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
Correspondingly, it is argued in prior studies that managers should be allowed to define the means 
and ends of strategy autonomously (cf. Bouchard, 2002; Lumpkin et al., 2009). 
Research provides evidence that strategic autonomy influences corporate success positively, 
especially in dynamic environments (cf. Burgelman, 1983; Andersen, 2004; Kuratko et al., 2005; 
Andersen & Knudsen, 2006). Thus, strategic autonomy seems to be particularly essential in 
uncertain task conditions where the cost for increased informal coordination of resources for 
mutual adjustments are outweighed by increased adaptability (cf. Thompson, 1966; Perrow, 1967). 
Corporate venturing is associated generally with high levels of task uncertainty (McGrath & Kim, 
2013). It is therefore reasonable to assume that corporate venture success increases when venture 
managers are granted strategic autonomy. Correspondingly, I posit the following proposition.  
Proposition 5: Strategic autonomy is related positively to corporate venture success. 
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4.3.4 JOB AUTONOMY 
Job autonomy is an essential characteristic of job design and refers to the discretion that the venture 
manager enjoys in his job (see, e.g., Hackman & Oldham, 1975b; Breaugh, 1985). Individuals 
with increased job autonomy are found to feel more motivated and responsible to achieve their 
tasks (see Parker & Sprigg, 1999; Volmer et al., 2012) which may explain the positive association 
between job autonomy and job performance (cf. Hackman & Oldham, 1976). It is further 
acknowledged that job autonomy enables self-determination (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000; Niemiec, 
Ryan, & Deci, 2010), fosters creativity (cf. Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Unsworth & Clegg, 
2010), inspires creative work involvement (cf. Volmer et al., 2012), and role breath self-efficacy 
(cf. Axtell & Parker, 2003). These findings indicate that job autonomy allows venture managers to 
break out of established work procedures and think outside the box, which is essential to invent 
effective work methods for the new business (see Block & MacMillan, 1993; Kuratko, 2010). I 
therefore assume that corporate venture success increases when venture managers are granted with 
high levels of job autonomy. 
Proposition 6:  Job autonomy is related positively to corporate venture success. 
Figure 4.6: The Impact of Job Autonomy on Corporate Venture Success 
 
4.3.5 SUMMARIZING THE MODEL 
The six propositions integrate the four autonomy dimensions into a theoretical model that relates 
functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job autonomy with corporate 
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autonomy and decision autonomy with corporate venture success. The propositions are illustrated 
in Figure 4.7 and summarized below.  
Figure 4.7: A Theoretical Model Associating Autonomy with Corporate Venture Success 
 
Functional autonomy refers to the extent that functional expertise is available in the corporate 
venture team and may thus be seen as an indicator for cross-functionality. Proposition 1 (P1) 
assumes that venture creation involves the concurrent coordination of multidisciplinary activities 
(cf. Katzy et al., 2014) and cross-functionality has positive implications on corporate venture 
success. Proposition 2 (P2) builds on prior research which indicates that the impact of functional 
autonomy on corporate venture success may be enforced when functional expertise in critical 
business functions is available in the corporate venture team. 
Decision autonomy reflects the authority of venture managers to make decisions in distinct 
business functions without approval. Proposition 3 (P3) acknowledges that new business 
development activities emerge and thrive through market interaction. Venture managers require 
therefore the ability to make responsive decisions in business functions that enable market 
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venture success is enforced when venture managers are authorized to make decisions in market-
related business functions without approval. Proposition 4 (P4) considers that corporate venture 
success may be influenced positively when the venture manager enjoys the authority to make 
decisions in business functions that are critical for new business development (cf. Crockett et al., 
2007).  
Strategic autonomy is the extent to which venture managers have the authority to make strategic 
decisions without approval (cf. Andersen, 2004). This authority underpins the ability of venture 
managers to undertake autonomous strategic initiatives (see Burgelman, 1983). The ability to do 
so is particularly important when environmental conditions are unpredictable, which is generally 
the case for corporate ventures (cf. Garrett & Covin, 2013). Proposition 5 (P5) therefore considers 
that corporate venture success is increased when venture managers are granted strategic autonomy.  
Job autonomy defines the extent to which venture managers enjoy the authority to make work-
mode decisions without seeking consensus with corporate management (cf. Breaugh, 1985). This 
authority allows venture managers to operate outside the established work procedures, which is 
essential to invent effective work methods (cf. Block & MacMillan, 1993; Kuratko, 2010). 
Correspondingly, Proposition 6 (P6) assumes a positive relationship between job autonomy and 
corporate venture success. The measures of the model are operationalized in the following section.  
4.4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MEASUREMENT SCALES 
The measurement scales associated with the variables highlighted in Figure 4.7 are operationalized 
in this section. Although established measurement scales are utilized, the scales needed to be 
adapted in order to ensure their appropriateness to the context of corporate ventures. Therefore, an 
evaluation study is conducted with five venture managers and six corporate managers (overall 
twelve interviews as one manager is interviewed twice). On overview is given as an information 
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example in Appendix B. The measures are operationalized (questionnaire) by Jérôme Gard, 
Bernhard Katzy and Guido Baltes and finally approved by the latter two. The operationalized 
measurement scales are reported in the Subsections 4.4.1 to 4.4.6. The measures are 
operationalized on a 6-point Likert scale, which is chosen for two reasons. First, the 6-point Likert 
scale is consistent with the German school grading system, which ensures that the participants are 
familiar with the meaning of the scale. Second, a neutral answer is not possible on a 6-point Likert 
scale as there is no central point, which would be the case on a 5-point and 7-point Likert scale. 
4.4.1 FUNCTIONAL IMPORTANCE 
Definition 4.1: Functional Importance “refers to the relevance of the eight business functions (1) 
marketing, (2) human resource development, (3) sales, (4) service, (5) finance and controlling, (6) 
legal affairs, (7) project management and (8) research and development to develop a new business 
successfully” (cf. Crockett et al., 2013).  
The scale for measuring functional importance is adapted from Crocket et al. (2007). A list of ten 
business functions (Marketing, HR, Sales, Customer Service, Technical Support, Strategy, Finance 
and Controlling, Legal Affairs, Production and R&D) is presented to the participants of the 
evaluation study while they are asked to select the most critical business functions for successful 
new business development. Out of ten, the following eight business functions are identified as 
critical: Marketing (e.g., marketing of new products and services), Human Resource Development 
(e.g., training and recruiting), Sales (e.g., sales activities), Service (e.g., support and service), 
Finance and Controlling (e.g., project-controlling and profit-loss accounting), Legal Affairs (e.g., 
cooperation and patents), Project Management (e.g., definition of milestones and key performance 
indicators) as well as Research and Development (e.g., development- and programming activities).  
We adapted the original scale for the following four reasons. First, we consolidated the two 
business functions Customer Service and Technical Support to Service. The reason is that the two 
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business functions can often not be distinguished when the product is a service itself. This is 
particularly the case in the IT consulting industry for which the questionnaire is developed (see 
Subsection 1.3.4). Second, we question that Production in the sense of manufacturing products is 
relevant in the IT consulting industry where products are often software, thus manufacturing is not 
required. Third, we find that Project Management is an essential business function in the IT-
industry, where the project business is dominating the product business. We therefore consider 
Project Management as an import business function and operationalized it in our measurement 
scale. Fourth, we rejected Strategy as we do not perceive strategy making as a business function. 
We rather consider it as a competence of the venture manager as it is later described in Subsection 
4.4.4.  
Corresponding to the four reasons, the original ten-item measurement scale is reduced to the eight-
item scale. Our scale is summarized in Table 4.1. There, participants are asked to indicate the 
importance of each of the eight business functions for the success of the new business on a 6-point 
Likert scale. A score of 1 means that the function has very little influence on success and a score 
of 6 means that the function is critical for the success of the new business. The measurement scale 
is also presented in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Functional Importance Measurement Scale adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Functional Importance adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Participants are asked to indicate the importance of each of the eight business functions for the success 
of the new business. 
 Very little 
influence  
on success 
    Critical for  
success 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. Human Resource Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8. Research and Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4.4.2 FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY 
Definition 4.2: Functional Autonomy “reflects the extent to which corporate ventures rely on 
functional experts that are provided externally from the corporation or elsewhere, with respect to 
the eight business functions (1) marketing, (2) human resource development, (3) sales, (4) service, 
(5) finance and controlling, (6) legal affairs, (7) project management and (8) research and 
development” (cf. Crockett et al., 2013). 
The scale for measuring functional autonomy is also adapted from Crocket et al. (2007). The 
original measurement scale is adapted in such a way that participants are asked to indicate whether 
expertise in each of the eight business functions (highlighted in 4.4.1) is available in the corporate 
venture team or provided externally through the parent company or elsewhere. Therefore, a 6-point 
Likert scale is used. A score of 1 indicates that expertise is primarily provided externally and a 
score of 6 indicates that expertise is primarily available within the corporate venture team. The 
measurement scale is presented in Table 4.2. We adapted the measurement scale as we did in 
Subsection 4.4.1 with the same reasoning mentioned in 4.4.1.  
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Table 4.2: Functional Autonomy Measurement Scale adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Functional Autonomy adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Participants are asked whether expertise with respect to the following business functions is available within 
the team or provided externally. 








 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. Human Resource Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8. Research and Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4.4.3 DECISION AUTONOMY 
Definition 4.3: Decision Autonomy “is the authority of the venture manager to make decision 
concerning the eight business functions (1) marketing, (2) human resource development, (3) sales, 
(4) service, (5) finance and controlling, (6) legal affairs, (7) project management and (8) research 
and development” (cf. Crockett et al., 2013). 
The scale for measuring decision autonomy is also adapted from Crocket et al. (2007). The 
measurement scale indicates how frequently the venture manager relies on the approval of 
corporate management when making decisions in each of the eight business functions (highlighted 
in 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) on a 6-point Likert scale. A score of 1 means that approval through corporate 
management is almost always required and a score of 6 means that approval through corporate 
management is almost never required. Similar measures are applied previously in numerous 
studies (see, e.g., Hill & Hlavacek, 1972; Hedlund, 1979; Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998; Edwards et al., 2002; Manolopoulos, 2006; Crockett et al., 2007). Table 4.3 presents the 
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measurement scale. We adapted the measurement scale as we did in the Subsections 4.4.1and 4.4.2 
with the same reasoning given in 4.4.1 
Table 4.3: Decision Autonomy Measurement Scale adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Decision Autonomy adapted from Crockett et al. (2007) 
Participants are asked to indicate how frequently they need to seek the approval of their corporate 











 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. Human Resource Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
8. Research and Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4.4.4 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
Definition 4.4: Strategic Autonomy “is the authority of the venture manager to make strategic 
decisions without approval” (cf. Andersen, 2004).  
The measurement scale of strategic autonomy builds on the construct developed by Aiken and 
Hage (1967; 1971) for measuring centralization. Andersen (2004) modified the scale by 
considering strategic issues such as “market activities, product and service developments, change 
in practices and policies” (Miller, 1987). For the context of corporate ventures, these strategic 
issues are adapted, considering the following six strategic decisions: research and development 
initiatives, new products and services, qualification of employees for future projects, new market 
segments, new customer segments and new business practices. Thus, the strategic issues 
highlighted by Miller (1987) are applied and enlarged through the qualification of the employees. 
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The six items to measure strategic autonomy are operationalized on a 6-point Likert scale. A score 
of 1 means that the venture manager almost never makes strategic decisions without the approval 
of corporate management whereas 6 means that the venture manager makes almost always 
strategic decisions without approval. The measurement scale is listed in the Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4: Strategic Autonomy Measurement Scale adapted from Andersen (2004) 
Strategic Autonomy adapted from Andersen (2004) 
Participants are asked how frequently they make decisions concerning the development of the new 
business without the approval of their corporate supervisor(s).  
 Is almost 
never true 
    Is almost 
always true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. I can start research and development 
activities without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. I am able to develop new products 
and services without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. I can qualify employees for new 
projects without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. I can decide without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) in which market 
segments future activities are 
conducted 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. I can decide without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) which customer 
segments are targeted in the future 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. I can introduce new policies and 
practices without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4.4.5 JOB AUTONOMY 
Definition 4.5: Job Autonomy “is the authority of the venture manager to make work-mode 
decisions without approval” (cf. Breaugh, 1985).  
The measurement scale for job autonomy builds on the work by Breaugh (1985), which highlights 
three major aspects that one enjoys in a job (Breaugh, 1985, 1999). The aspects are method 
autonomy (”the degree of discretion/choice individuals have regarding the procedures/methods 
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they utilize in going about their work”), scheduling autonomy (“the extent to which individuals 
feel they can control the scheduling/sequencing/timing of their work activities”) and criteria 
autonomy (“the degree to which individuals have the ability to modify or choose the criteria used 
for evaluating their performance”). The three aspects are reflected in the seven-item measure given 
by Breaugh (1985). The measure indicates to what extent the venture manager is authorized to 
make decisions considering work procedures/methods, scheduling/sequencing/timing and the key 
performance indicators of his team, without approval. Participants are therefore asked to indicate 
how frequently the venture manager may act without the approval of corporate management 
concerning the identified aspects, on a 6-point Likert scale. A score of 1 means that approval is 
almost always required and a score of 6 means that approval is almost never required. The 
measurement scale is listed in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Job Autonomy Measurement Scale adapted from Breaugh (1985) 
Job Autonomy adapted from Breaugh (1985) 
Participants are asked how autonomous from their corporate supervisor(s) they can act to develop the new 
business. 
 Is almost 
never true 
    Is almost 
always true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. I can decide how to go about getting 
a job done without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. I choose the way the team goes 
about a job without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. I decide how the team reaches its 
goals without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. I can schedule the work of the team 
without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. I decide without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) when the team 
conducts particular work activities  
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. My job allows to modify the way 
work is evaluated, so I can 
emphasize some aspects of the work 
and play down others 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
7. I have control over what the team is 
supposed to accomplish ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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4.4.6 CORPORATE VENTURE SUCCESS 
Definition 4.6: Corporate Venture Success “reflects the extent to which corporate management 
is satisfied with performance of the corporate venture” (cf. Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986; 
Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992).  
A subjective measurement scale is chosen for measuring the success of corporate ventures. This 
choice is made as financial performance measures (that are applied typically when businesses are 
established) are inadequate for new businesses. Particularly at an early stage when the new 
business is founded, turnover may not be the primary aim. Furthermore, profitability would be 
inadequate because the business did not have sufficient time to reach break-even. Subjective 
performance measures are therefore applied generally to measure the success of new businesses 
(cf. Dess & Robinson, 2006). Subjective performance measures enable one to distinguish the 
perception of managers (cf. Bantel, 1998) as well as their satisfaction with the performance of an 
organization (cf. Covin, Slevin, & Covin, 1990). Two performance issues are chosen, namely (a) 
perceived financial performance and (b) overall satisfaction. The measures for perceived financial 
performance refer to (1) satisfaction with turnover, (2) satisfaction with the time in which break-
even is reached as well as (3) satisfaction with the increase of the sales margin. Overall satisfaction 
refers to (4) general meeting of expectations, (5) overall success of the new business, (6) 
achievement of milestones as well as (7) achievement of defined performance criteria. Participants 
are asked to indicate to what extent corporate management agrees with each of the seven items on 
a 6-point Likert scale. A score of 1 indicates total disagreement and a score of 6 means that 
corporate management agrees fully. Table 4.6 below shows the measurement scales. 
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Table 4.6: Corporate Venture Success Measurement Scale adapted from Brush & Vanderwerf 
(1992) and Venkatraman & Ramanujam (1986) 
Corporate venture success adapted from Brush & Vanderwerf (1992) and Venkatraman & Ramanujam 
(1986) 
Participants are asked to assess the extent to what the following aspects concerning the development of the 
new business are true.  
 Is not true     Is true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Corporate management is satisfied 
with the turnover that our team 
achieves 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
2. Corporate management is satisfied 
with the time that our team has 
reached (or will reach) break-even 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
3. Corporate management is satisfied 
with the sales margins that our team 
achieves 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. Our team generally fulfills the 
expectations of the corporate 
management 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
5. Overall corporate management 
perceives the development of the 
new business as being successful 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
6. Corporate management finds that 
our team fulfills the planned 
milestones as scheduled 
      
7. Corporate management finds that 
our team performs well according to 
the defined key performance 
indicators (KPIs) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The chapter provides a partial answer to RQ2: How can the autonomy dimensions identified by 
RQ1 be operationalized in a construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture 
managers? A theoretical model is developed that associates the four autonomy dimensions, 
namely, functional autonomy, decision autonomy, job autonomy and strategic autonomy with 
corporate venture success (see Figure 4.7). The model is subsequently operationalized, which 
provides an initial multidimensional construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture 
managers at various degrees and dimensions. The validity and reliability of the initial autonomy 
construct are evaluated statistically in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5  
5 Evaluating and Adapting the Autonomy 
Construct 
This chapter attempts to answer RQ2: How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 be 
operationalized in a construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? For 
this task, the validity and the reliability of the initial multidimensional autonomy construct, 
presented in Chapter 4, are statistically evaluated and adapted. The resultant construct is the answer 
to RQ2. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 presents the data set that is used to evaluate 
the initial autonomy construct. The procedure described by Field (2013) is followed in Section 5.2 
in order to evaluate the validity and the reliability of the autonomy construct. The results of the 
chapter are summarized in Section 5.3. There the answer to RQ2 is formulated. 
Parts of this chapter are based on the following publication3: 
Gard, J., Baltes, G., Andersen, T. J., & Katzy, B. (Forthcoming 2016). Corporate venture 
management in small-medium sized enterprise: The roles and effects of autonomy and 
corporate policy. In the Journal of Business Venturing. 
                                                 
3 The author would like to thank his co-authors and the publishers of the Journal of Business Venturing for their 
permission to reuse relevant parts of the articles in this thesis. 
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5.1 DATA SET USED TO EVALUATE THE AUTONOMY CONSTRUCT 
The data set used to evaluate the validity and the reliability of the initial autonomy construct 
(provided in Chapter 4) is presented in this section. The section proceeds as follows. The 
Subsection 5.1.1 reports on the sample framing. The Subsection 5.1.2 describes the data collection. 
The Subsection 5.1.3 reports on the identification of the target population in the collected sample.   
5.1.1 SAMPLE FRAMING 
Corporate ventures are in contrast to independent ventures (i.e., start-ups) not visible from the 
outside. There is nothing like an ultimate source that would enable one to identify venture teams 
of corporations. So, the first action is already critical for the sample framing, viz. to identify 
corporations that are engaged in corporate venturing. The German IT consulting industry is 
recognized as an adequate industry for collecting corporate venture-related data (Fincham, 
2006). The industry is facing continuous technological development and market change. 
Corporations competing in such an innovation-driven industry are required to renew 
continuously their businesses in order to establish long-time survival and profitability. Thus, 
the rate of corporate venture initiatives is expected to be rather high.  
Database used to collect firm information 
Firm information is gathered via the Hoppenstedt firm database4. More than 850,000 firms are 
listed and information, such as address, contact details, legal forms, NACE codes, size in 
number of employees and annual sales, names and positions of top and middle management, is 
available in the database (NACE is the European industry standard classification system; it 
                                                 
4 http://www.hoppenstedt-firmendatenbank.de/ 
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means Nomenclature Générale des Activités Économiques dans les Communautés 
Européennes). With respect to the sample framing, the Hoppenstedt database is chosen to 
identify small-size to medium-size IT consulting firms in Germany and to gather information 
concerning managers that are potentially involved in corporate venture initiatives. 
Gathering information on the target firms 
Data collection is restricted to SMEs for the reasons given in Subsection 1.3.4. According to 
the classification of the European Commission (Commission, 2003), a firm size between 30 to 
400 employees and a turnover above 4 million Euro are chosen as selection criteria. SMEs in 
the German IT-industry are identified through NACE codes. The codes are captured by using 
secondary databases provided by Oracle, Microsoft and SAP. The secondary databases contain 
IT consulting firms that are certified distribution partners and implementation partners of the 
three global players. The analysis of the databases reveals that IT consulting firms can be 
identified by the following 5-digit NACE codes: 72100, 72221, 72223, 72305, 72602 and 
74141. According to the German Classification of Economic Activities (WZ2003), the NACE 
codes have the following meanings: hardware consultancy (72100), software consultancy 
(72221), other software development (72223), other data processing (72223), other computer 
related activities n.e.c. (72602) as well as business and management consulting activities 
(74141).  
14451 corporations are identified in the Hoppenstedt database using the five identified NACE 
codes as selection criteria. 11495 of these firms are classified as micro firm (<30 employees) 
and 184 as large firms (>400 employees). The remaining 2772 (14451-11495-184) are 
identified as SMEs and retained for the study. Firm profiles are checked online and firms 
excluded when related to other industries. In total, 2649 German IT consulting firms remained 
and are identified in the database as SMEs.  
82 EVALUATING AND ADAPTING THE AUTONOMY CONSTRUCT 
The target population  
The target population are the managers of the 2649 firms that are involved in corporate venture 
management. However, there is no ultimate source that would clearly identify those managers. In 
fact, every top- and middle manager might or might have been involved in corporate venture 
management. In order to create a comprehensive list of potentially involved managers, the 
researcher and his support staff went through the Hoppenstedt firm database and extracted the 
names and email addresses of the top- and middle managers. In the 2649 firms, the names and 
email addresses of 15420 managers could be extracted from the Hoppenstedt database. All email 
addresses were checked by the support staff using google as a search engine, whereby only those 
email addresses were recorded that were found via google search. Overall, 14850 (of the 15420) 
email addresses were found, thus evaluated.  
As a result of our sample framing approach based on available information in the Hoppenstedt 
database in combination with google search, the resulting sample population of 14850 (the 
collected sample) may differ fundamentally from the target population. The difference is the result 
of an over-coverage of the target population. It can be expected that not all managers in the sample 
are/were involved in corporate venture management. The reason is that the Hoppenstedt database 
does not provide the exact job description so that for example project managers or assistants may 
be included in the sample. Thus, not all people in the sample population are part of the target 
population. In the following, the data collection is described before the method applied to extract 
the target population from the sample population is described in Subsection 5.1.3.  
5.1.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Data is collected via an online survey, using the web 2.0-based software Qualtrics. The data 
collection was started on November 5, 2012 and ended on January 10, 2013. Using the email 
template given in Appendix D1, the 14850 managers were invited via email to participate in the 
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study. Following the web link provided in the email, participants were directed automatically to 
the starting page of the online survey (see Appendix D2). By entering the access code, which was 
also provided in the email, they could start the survey.  
Overall, 2322 emails could not be delivered and were returned to the sender, primarily with the 
message that the email address did not exist. It was checked whether (a) the email addresses 
were outdated or (b) a mistake was made in the collection of email addresses or the sending of 
email. In fact, all email addresses could be found via google. A sample of 100 email addresses 
were cross-checked by searching on the homepage of the respective company whether the email 
addresses could be found. It was found that the email addresses were outdated as they could 
primarily not be found on the companies’ homepages.  
Although a certain number of email were invalid, the collection and the email sending was 
sound and 12528 emails reached their addressees. In total, 607 responses were received during 
the data collection period. These responses refer to fully completed surveys only. As invitations 
to the online survey where sent to several managers in the same firm, it is not surprising that 
several answers were received from the same firm. The 607 responses were received from 473 
distinct firms. In addition to the fully completed surveys, 553 partially completed surveys were 
received. They are however not considered as relevant for this thesis and excluded from data 
analysis.  
Particular care was taken to ensure that the respondents refer their answers to corporate 
ventures. Therefore, the following four steps are taken. First, a cover letter is provided to each 
participant on the start page of the online survey (see Appendix D2). The cover letter explains 
the aim of the study and gives a definition of the term corporate venture. Second, the first part 
of the survey is a Screener that includes (a) a question to identify whether participants are 
currently involved in corporate venturing or (b) participants were involved in corporate 
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venturing in the past (see the questions 3 and 4 in Appendix E2.1). Depending on their answers 
given, the questions of the survey are formulated in present of past tense. Those participants 
who had not experience with corporate ventures were directed to a different survey, which is 
not part of this study. Third, those participants with corporate venture experience are requested 
to make reference to a specific corporate venture team when responding to the survey. Fourth, 
the participants are asked to state their role in the corporation with respect to the relation they 
have with corporate ventures (see the question 8 in Appendix E2.1).  
Although, particular care was taken to ensure that participants refer their answers to corporate 
ventures, it is expected that not all of them are part of the target population. Therefore, the 
following approach is applied to identify the target population in the collected sample.  
5.1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE TARGET POPULATION IN THE COLLECTED SAMPLE 
Three questions are included in the first part of the survey (Screener) that enable us to identify 
the target population in the collected data.  
The first question (see the questions 1 in Appendix E2.1) aims to identify participants in a 
management position. Therefore, respondents are asked to state their current position in the 
company. Possible answers are, (1) Board of Directors, (2) Executive Board, (3) Chief 
Executive, (4) Head of the Business Development Department, (5) Head of another 
Department, (6) Project Manager/ Team Leader, (7) Employee and (8) another position. Only 
responses of participants in a management position (1-6) are considered.  
In a second question (see the questions 3 in Appendix E2.1), participants need to state whether 
there is a team in their company that currently develops a new business, or did so during the 
past 3 years. Possible answers are, (1) yes, there are one or more teams that are currently 
developing a new business; (2) yes, we had one or more teams that developed a new business 
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in the past 3 years; (3) no, there are no such teams in our company. Responses are only 
considered when the answer is: yes, there are one or more teams that are currently developing 
a new business.  
A third question (see the questions 8 in Appendix E2.1) identifies the relation that participants 
have with corporate ventures. Participants are asked to state which of the statements applies to 
them personally. Possible answers are: (1) I am currently the leader of a team that has the task 
to develop a new business; (2) I am currently the leader of a team that already has developed a 
new business in the past 3 years, (3) I am currently the supervisor of the leader of a team that 
currently develops a new business, (4) I am the supervisor of the leader of a team that already 
developed a new business in the past 3 years, (5) I am currently member of a team that currently 
develops a new business or that already did so in the past 3 years. (6) I have currently no relation 
with a team that develops a new business. However, I have made some experience in the past. 
(7) I have never made any experience with a team that develops a new business. Based on the 
respective answer, participants are differentiated in the seven respondent groups given in Table 
5.1.  
Table 5.1: Respondent Groups in the Sample Frame 
Respondent Group 
1 Venture manager currently involved in new business development 87 
2 Venture manager with past involvement in new business development  53 
3 Corporate manager currently supervising the venture manager 297 
4 Corporate manager supervising the venture manager in the past 43 
5 Employee of a corporate venture team 62 
6 Respondent who had a relation with a corporate venture in the past 34 
7 Respondent who has no experience with corporate venturing 31 
Responses (606) are received from all of the four respondent groups highlighted in Table 5.1. 
Ad (1), 87 participants are venture managers that are currently responsible for new business 
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development. Ad (2), 53 responses are received from venture managers that were responsible 
for new business development in the past. Ad (3), 297 respondents are corporate managers that 
are currently supervising venture managers. Ad (4), 43 responses refer to corporate managers 
that were responsible for corporate ventures in the past. Ad (5), 62 participants are/were 
employees (not in a management position) of a corporate venture team. Ad (6), 34 answers are 
given by participants that had a relation with corporate ventures in the past. Ad (7), 31 
participants have no experience with new business development through corporate ventures.  
Only the responses of group 1 (venture manager currently involved in new business 
development) are considered for data analysis in this thesis. The three reasons for this choice 
are given in the following.  
Judgment on the responses used for data analysis 
The first reason refers to the target population that is defined in Subsection 5.1.1. It is expected 
that only those respondents in a management position provide valid information on corporate 
venture management and are thus relevant for data analysis. It can be expected that at least 
some of the respondents of group 5 (employees of corporate venture) and group 7 (respondents 
with no experience with corporate venturing) are or were not in a management position. Their 
answers are consequently excluded from data analysis.  
The second reason refers to the general method validity. Data that managers provide on past 
experience may be subject to incorrect information due to loss of memory and re-interpretation, 
which is known as hindsight bias. In order to eliminate the possibility that data analysis is 
constrained through hindsight bias, the answers of the group 2 (venture manager with past 
involvement in new business development), group 4 (corporate manager supervising the 
venture manager in the past) and group 6 (respondent who had a relation with a corporate 
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venture in the past) are not considered for data analysis. These participants were involved in 
corporate venturing in the past.  
The third reason draws on the experiences made during the interviews (see Chapter 3). In the 
interviews (see Appendix A) it was observed that corporate managers may provided incorrect 
information on the autonomy that venture managers enjoy. For example, one corporate manager 
stated that the venture manager was granted with high strategic autonomy. However, 
subsequent interviews showed that the corporate manager made most strategic decisions 
himself and guided the strategic direction of the corporate venture, even without the 
participation of the venture manager. Such biased perception of corporate managers are also 
found in previous studies (see, e.g., Glaister, Husan, & Buckley, 2003).  
In order to test our observation statistically, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) in 
order to compare the assessment of autonomy among the corporate managers and the venture 
managers. Our results confirm that the assessment is significantly different. Venture managers 
assess strategic autonomy with 18.32 (s.d.=5.69) and job autonomy with 33.25 (s.d.=5.77). 
Corporate managers assess strategic autonomy with 14.68 (s.d.= 5.91) and job autonomy with 
31.11 (s.d.= 5.74). The results of the ANOVA given in the Appendix J2 and the Appendix J3 
show that the differences are significant (p<.00). Thus, the corporate managers assess autonomy 
on average lower than the venture managers. The results confirm our observation (made during 
the interviews) that corporate managers have the potential to generate biased results with 
respect to the assessment of the autonomy that venture managers enjoy. In order to avoid that 
data analysis is constrained through the biased perception of the corporate manager, the 
responses of group 3 (corporate manager currently supervising the venture manager) are not 
considered for data analysis.  
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For the three reasons given above, only those 87 responses of the venture managers that are 
currently involved in new business development are considered as valid for data analysis. 
Compared to the targeted sample of 2649 firm, our final response rate of 3.3% is not uncommon 
in empirical studies with our target group of middle managers (cf. Lepak, Takeuchi, & Snell, 
2003; Ozgen & Baron, 2007). The average size of the firms was 279.11 (SD=691.85) full-time 
employees whereas one firm had less than 30 employees and five firms had more than 400 
employees. The average team size of the corporate venture was 9.55 (SD=15.14) full-time 
employees. A list of the corporations from which the responses were received is provided in 
the Appendix C. The data set of the 87 venture managers is applied in Section 5.2 in order to 
evaluate the autonomy construct that was operationalized in Chapter 4.  
Remarks on the sample size 
The author of this thesis is aware that we live today in an age of big data and a sample size of 
87 is not acceptable in research domains where terabytes and petabytes of data are available. 
However, big data that would allow to analyze corporate venture management is not available 
to the author’s best knowledge. As it is later discussed in the limitations of the thesis (see 
Section 7.4), a sample size of 87 was the research standard in corporate venture scholars when 
the data was collected for this thesis in 2012. In order to inform the reader, the sample size of 
the most recent studies are given in the following: Johnson (2012) with a sample size of n=64, 
Crockett et al. (2013) with a sample size of n=78, Thornhill and Amit (2000) with a sample size of 
n=102, Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) with a sample size of n=95 and Garrett and Covin (2013), 
Garrett and Neubaum (2013) as well as Kuratko et al. (2009) with a sample size of n=145. Thus, 
studies with a sample size that would fulfill the criteria of big data are not available in the research 
domain of this thesis. 
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5.2 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND CONSTRUCT RELIABILITY 
The validity and the reliability of the autonomy construct developed in Chapter 4 are evaluated 
following the procedure described by Field (2010). The procedure includes the four steps (1) 
evaluating the appropriateness of the data set to apply variable reduction techniques, (2) 
component extraction, (3) component rotation and (4) computation of Cronbach’s Alphas. The 
construct validity is evaluated in the first three steps which are reported in the Subsections 5.2.1 
to 5.2.3. The construct reliability is evaluated in the fourth step which is reported in the 
Subsection 5.2.4. The results of the validity and reliability analyses are summarized in the 
Subsection 5.2.5.  
Table 5.2 shows how the items (questions) are distributed over the measurement scales (autonomy 
dimensions). A detailed overview of the items is given in the Appendix E. 
Table 5.2: List of Items Referring to the Four Autonomy Scales 
Measurement Scale  
(Autonomy Dimension) Questionnaire Items 
Job Autonomy  1-7 
Strategic Autonomy 8-13 
Decision Autonomy  14-21 
Functional Autonomy  22-29 
5.2.1 EVALUATING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE DATA 
In the first step, it is tested whether the data is appropriate to apply variable reduction techniques 
(e.g., principal factor analysis and principal component analysis).  
Definition 5.1: Variable Reduction Techniques “are multivariate statistical procedures to 
determine the number of variables that account for the variation and covariation among a set 
of observed measures” (Brown, 2015). 
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The following three criteria are checked to evaluate whether the data is appropriate to perform 
variable reduction techniques: (1) the correlation matrix, (2) the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index 
(KMO) and (3) the Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The three criteria are defined below.  
Definition 5.2: Correlation Matrix “is a matrix giving the correlations between all items. The 
correlation is a standardized measure of the strength of a relationship between two items on a scale 
from -1 to +1” (cf. Field, 2013). 
Definition 5.3: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin “is an index for comparing the magnitudes of observed 
correlation coefficients with the magnitude of partial correlation coefficients. The smaller the 
value of the index, the less appropriate the model” (cf. Henry, 2003).  
Definition 5.4: Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity “indicates whether the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix, which would indicate that the variable are unrelated. Very small values (less than 
0.05) indicate that there are probably significant relationships among the variables” (cf. Sobh, 
2008). 
To be considered suitable for variable reduction techniques, the correlation matrix should show 
(1) at least some correlation coefficients with a value of r > .3, (2) the KMO index should show a 
scores of .60 or higher, (3) the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity should be significant at p < .05. The 
results of the inspections with respect to the three criteria are reported in the following.  
 The correlation matrix associating the items reported in Table 5.2 with each other is 
reported in the Appendix F. The inspection of the correlation matrix shows that 74 
coefficients are above the r ≥ .3 threshold criteria, which indicates that some of the 23 
items of functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job 
autonomy are correlated. 
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 The KMO index was computed to measure the adequacy of the sample. The KMO index 
is computed with a value of .654, which is above the .60 threshold. Thus, the KMO 
criteria verifies the sampling adequacy for the analysis.  
 The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant at p<.000, which supports that common 
component are present in the correlation matrix.  
Based on the inspections of the correlation matrix, the KMO index and the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, we may conclude that the data is suitable for variable reduction techniques. So, we 
continue the procedure with the second step. 
5.2.2 COMPONENT EXTRACTION  
In the second step, it is evaluated (a) which variable reduction techniques is suitable to the data 
set and (b) how many variables should be extracted.  
Judgment on the suitable variable reduction technique 
Principal Factor Analysis (also known as Principal Axis Factoring) and Principal Component 
Analysis are the commonly used variable reduction techniques. The Principal Factor Analysis 
should be applied when the variables (here called factors) are correlated. In contrast, Principal 
Component Analysis should be performed when the variables (here called components) are 
correlated with each other. Therefore, the correlations of the variables (i.e., the four autonomy 
dimensions) are computed in order to assess whether Principal Factor Analysis or Principal 
Component Analysis is an appropriate technique. The correlation matrix of the four expected 
variables, namely, functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job 
autonomy is given in Table 5.3. The item operationalization of the four autonomy measures is 
given in the Appendix E. 
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Functional Autonomy 1    
Decision Autonomy .171 1   
Strategic Autonomy .144 .420* 1  
Job Autonomy .007 .213* .462* 1 
*. Correlation is significant at level of p≤.05 
The correlation matrix (Table 5.3) shows significant correlations between decision autonomy 
and strategic autonomy (r = .420), between decision autonomy and job autonomy (r = .213) as 
well as between strategic autonomy and job autonomy (r = .462). Thus, we may conclude that 
some of the variables (to be extracted) are correlated with each other. Accordingly, Principal 
Component Analysis is chosen instead of Principal Factor Analysis.  
Definition 5.5: Principal Component Analysis “A Principal Component Analysis is a 
mathematical procedure that transforms a number of (possibly) correlated variables into a 
(smaller) number of uncorrelated variables called principal components. It is a multivariate 
analysis technique for identifying the linear components of a set of variables” (cf. Field, 2013; 
Pallant, 2013).  
Judgment on the number of variables extracted 
The initial Principal Component Analysis is performed (with the 29 items shown in Table 5.2) 
in order to identify the number of components to extract from the data set. The Principal 
Component Analysis is based on the computation of Eigenvalues. 
Definition 5.6: Eigenvalues “represent the total variance that is explained by each component. 
The eigenvalue of a given component measures the variance in all the items which is accounted 
for by that component that can be computed as the sum of its squared component loadings for all 
the items under a particular component. The eigenvalue explains the relative importance of the 
component with respect to the items” (cf. Tam, Thomas, & Zhang, 2007).  
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The following three criteria on information are inspected to identify the number of components 
that should be retained for the final Principal Component Analysis: 
 (1) Kaiser’s criterion  
 (2) Point of inflexion in the Scree Plot of Eigenvalues  
 (3) Significant Eigenvalues computed by the Parallel Analysis.  
The three criteria are defined at the beginning of the discussions of the corresponding 
observations.  
(1) Kaiser’s Criterion 
Definition 5.7: Kaiser’s Criterion “is the rule to drop all components with eigenvalues under 
1.0” (cf. Kaiser, 1960). 
The results of the initial Principal Component Analysis allow to obtain the Eigenvalues of the 
components present in the data. The results show that ten components with an Eigenvalue greater 
than 1 are present in the data (see Table 5.4, second column), which fulfills the Kaiser’s criterion 
(Kaiser, 1960). The ten components explain 19.87%, 10.79%, 9.41%, 8.32%, 5.49%, 4.73%, 
4.33%, 3.93%, 3.56% and 3.49% of variance (see Table 5.4, third column). In total, the 
components explain a variance of 73.91 %. The components 11 to 29 should be rejected as they 
show Eigenvalues below 1. The results are summarized in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: Eigenvalues Extracted through the Initial Principal Component Analysis 
Component Actual eigenvalue from PCA Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.763 19.873 19.873 
2 3.129 10.789 30.662 
3 2.728 9.408 40.070 
4 2.412 8.319 48.389 
5 1.592 5.489 53.878 
6 1.371 4.729 58.607 
7 1.254 4.325 62.932 
8 1.138 3.926 66.858 
9 1.031 3.556 70.414 
10 1.014 3.496 73.910 
11 0.899 3.099 77.008 
…    
29 .112 .385 100.000 
It is acknowledged that the Kaiser’s criterion (Eigenvalues greater than 1) is not the most 
accurate criterion to determine the number of components to be retained in the Principal 
Component Analysis (cf. O’Connor, 2000). Applying the Kaiser’s criterion alone may misguide 
researchers to extract too many components. The initial results should therefore be compared 
with the Scree Plot of the extracted Eigenvalues of the component and the results of the Parallel 
Analysis (cf. Pallant, 2010), which is done in the following. 
(2) Scree Plot 
Definition 5.8: Scree Plot “is a graph that plotting each eigenvalue (Y-axis) against the 
components with which it is associated (X-axis). The scree plot indicates the relative importance 
of each component” (cf. Field, 2013).  
The Scree Plot illustrated in Figure 5.1 is checked for a change in its shape (i.e., elbow), 
described as the point of inflexion (cf. Field, 2013). The visual inspection indicates that four 
components should be retained as the components 1, 2, 3 and 4 are above the point of inflexion 
(illustrated in Figure 5.1). This judgment is however not accurate as it is not determined 
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statistically. Therefore, Parallel Analysis is conducted to determine statistically the number of 
components that should be retained for the final analysis.  
Figure 5.1: Scree Plot of the Component Eigenvalues 
 
(3) Parallel Analysis 
Definition 5.9: Parallel Analysis “is a Monte-Carlo-Simulation-based method that allows to 
determine the number of components to retain in the Principal Component Analysis. The method 
compares the observed Eigenvalues (raw data) extracted from the correlation matrix to be 
analyzed with those obtained from uncorrelated normal variables. Parallel Analysis implies a 
Monte-Carlo simulation process, since ‘expected’ eigenvalues are obtained by simulating normal 
random samples that parallel the observed data in terms of sample size and number of variables” 
(cf. Horn, 1965; Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007).  
Parallel analysis is conducted to determine the statistically significant Eigenvalues of the 
components. Significant Eigenvalues indicate more accurately the number of components to 
retain for Principal Component Analysis than the Kaiser’s criterion (cf. O’Connor, 2000). 
Research shows that the accurate number of components should be carefully evaluated to 
Point of 
Inflexion
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differentiate between major and minor components (cf. Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & 
Strahan, 1999). Studies comparing different kinds of methods that allow to make informed 
retaining decisions (see, e.g., Kaiser’s criterion, Bartlett’s chi-square test, average partial 
method and parallel analysis) found that parallel analysis produces the most accurate results 
(cf. Zwick & Velicer, 1986).  
Correspondingly, parallel analysis is conducted to determine the number of components. The 
syntax developed by O’Connor (2000) is therefore used. The full syntax is available online5 
and can be found in the Appendix G. The results of the parallel analysis are presented in Table 
5.5.  
Table 5.5: Results of the Parallel Analysis 
Components Raw Data Random Data Decision 
1 5.404 1.841 Accept 
2 2.773 1.559 Accept 
3 2.342 1.389 Accept 
4 1.989 1.247 Accept 
5 1.114 1.119 Reject 
6 0.999 1.001 Reject 
7 0.796 0.900 Reject 
8 0.679103 0.809881 Reject 
…   Reject 
29 -0.271326 -0.400754 Reject 
Table 5.5 shows the Eigenvalues extracted from the raw data (column 2) and the Eigenvalues 
extracted from the random data set at the significance-level of p=.05 (column 3). 
Correspondingly, Eigenvalues extracted from the raw data set (original data) that exceed the 
                                                 
5 https://people.ok.ubc.ca/brioconn/nfactors/nfactors.html  
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significant Eigenvalues of the random data set can be interpreted as meaningful. The results of 
the parallel analysis show that the Eigenvalues of four components (raw data) exceed the 
significant Eigenvalues of the random data set. Thus, the results of the parallel analysis provide 
evidence that the number of components to retain for further analysis should be four. 
The four components explain a variance of 19.87%, 10.79%, 9.41%, 8.32% (see Table 5.4, third 
column). In total the four components explain a variance of 48.38% (see Table 5.4, fourth 
column). Having evaluated the number of components, the procedure continuous with the 
component rotation.  
5.2.3 COMPONENT ROTATION  
In the third step, component rotation is conducted. Before component rotation is performed, the 
correlations between the four components are inspected in order to evaluate whether orthogonal 
or oblique rotation methods should be used. Orthogonal rotation methods (e.g., Varimax) assume 
that the components are uncorrelated in the analysis. In contrast, oblique rotation methods assume 
that the variables are correlated in the analysis. Following the procedure described by Field (2013), 
Principal Component Analysis is performed with Oblimin as a rotation method in order to compute 
the component correlation matrix.  
Definition 5.10: Oblimin “is a method of oblique rotation that allows the underlying factors to be 
correlated. The method is used when the researcher wishes a non-orthogonal (oblique) solution” 
(Field, 2013). 
The results are presented in Table 5.6. The highest correlation coefficient is with a value of r = .155 
below the threshold criteria (r > .3) which shows that the components are uncorrelated (cf. Field, 
2013). Thus, we may conclude that orthogonal rotation is the appropriate rotation method. 
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Functional Autonomy 1       
Decision Autonomy .155 1     
Strategic Autonomy .151 .112 1   
Job Autonomy -.011 .062 .046 1 
Varimax rotation is the most commonly used orthogonal rotation method (cf. Field, 2013) and is 
therefore chosen to perform the component rotation. 
Definition 5.11: Varimax Rotation ”is an orthogonal rotation of the component axes to maximize 
the variance of the squared loadings of a component (column) on all the items (rows) in a 
component matrix, which has the effect of differentiating the original items by extracted 
components” (cf. Tam et al., 2007).  
Table 5.7 shows the Varimax rotated solution. The component loadings and the cross-loadings 
of the items are checked to evaluate the construct validity. Good construct validity is given 
when the following two criteria are achieved. First, component loadings should be greater than 
.60. Second, cross-loadings should be below .30. The result of the initial component rotation 
shows that four items associated with component 1 and five items associated with component 2 
show component loadings above .60 and cross-loadings below .30 (highlighted in Table 5.7). In 
contrast, only two items associated with component 3 and one item associated with component 
4 adhere to the threshold criteria. However, at least three items for each component are 
recommended to perform further data analysis (cf. Field, 2013). Thus, the components 3 and 4 
should be rejected. As the components 3 and 4 are mainly loaded through the items of the 
measurement scales for functional autonomy and decision autonomy (see Table 5.2), it is 
decided to exclude these two measurement scales in order to improve the results of the 
component rotation.  
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Table 5.7: Component Matrix after Initial Component Rotation a,b 
Item 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
1 .531    
2 .743    
3 .747    
4 .682    
5 .612    
6 .624   .312 
7 .570    
8 .383    
9 .403 .434   
10 .478    
11  .617   
12  .606   
13  .595   
14  .600   
15   .478  
16  .643   
17  .466 .606  
18   .680  
19   .512  
20   .672  
21   .544  
22  .361 -.374 .358 
23    .460 
24  .638   
25  .341   
26    .690 
27    .301 
28    .544 
29    .418 
a Varimax rotated component matrix 
b Table includes all component loadings above the .30 cut-off point 
Correspondingly, the component rotation is performed with the items of the two measurement 
scales strategic autonomy and job autonomy retained. After excluding the items that still did 
not show component loadings greater than .60 and cross-loadings below .30, the component 
solution presented in Table 5.8 is found.  
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2 .800   
3 .789   
4 .794   
5 .695   
6 .640   
7 .627   
9   .681 
11   .851 
12   .832 
13   .787 
a Varimax rotated component matrix 
b Table includes all component loadings above the .30 cut-off point 
c Results after erasing item 1 for job autonomy and items 1 and 3 for strategic autonomy 
The final component rotation confirm the presence of two distinct autonomy measures, namely, 
strategic autonomy and job autonomy. In order to ensure good construct validity, the items with 
component loadings below .60 and cross-loadings above .30 were excluded. Consequently, item 
1 of component 1 (job autonomy) was excluded for the component rotation. Also, the items 8 
and 10 referring to component 2 (strategic autonomy) were exclude. Thus, the original seven-
item scale for job autonomy is reduced to a six-item scale and the original six-item scale for 
strategic autonomy is reduced to a four-item scale. Having validated the component solution, it 
is continued with the last step in which the reliability of the construct is evaluated. Therefore, 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients are calculated for the two remaining components. 
5.2.4 CRONBACH’S ALPHA  
In step four, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients are computed for the two validated components in 
order to evaluate the reliability of the autonomy construct.  
Definition 5.12: Cronbach’s Alpha “is a coefficient for measuring the internal consistency of a 
group of items. The coefficient is useful to understand the extent to which the rating from a group 
of items hold together to measure a common component” (cf. Cronbach, 1951; Osborne, 2008). 
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Cronbach’s Alpha (α) can range from a scale of .0 (low internal consistency) to 1.0 (high 
internal consistency). The interpretation of alpha coefficients is as follows: “α > .9 is excellent, 
α > .8 is good, α > .7 is acceptable, α > .6 is questionable, α > .5 is poor, and α < .5 is 
unacceptable” (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). Results show that the Alpha coefficient of the 
component 2 (strategic autonomy) is α=.81 and the Alpha coefficient of the component 1 (job 
autonomy) is α=.82. These results show that the autonomy construct has a good internal 
consistency as the Alpha coefficients are above .8. With this last step, the evaluation of the 
autonomy construct is completed. The results of the validation and reliability analysis are 
summarized in the following subsection. 
5.2.5 RESULTS OF THE VALIDITY ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The data analyses reveal a two-dimensional autonomy construct with a good validity and a good 
reliability. The rotated two-component solution (Table 5.8) shows that the retained items to 
measure strategic autonomy (items 9, 11, 12 and 13) and job autonomy (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) 
achieve cross-loadings <.30 and component loadings >.6. Good construct validity is evident as 
these two threshold criteria are fulfilled. Good construct reliability is confirmed as Cronbach’s 
Alpha coefficients for the strategic autonomy scale and the job autonomy scale are both above .8.  
5.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter answers RQ2: How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 be 
operationalized in a construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? Four 
autonomy dimensions (components) are initially extracted from the data using Principal 
Components Analysis in combination with Parallel Analysis. However, the results of the 
component rotation show that the construct validity of the initial four-dimensional autonomy 
construct (including the items of the four measurement scales, namely, functional autonomy, 
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decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job autonomy) is problematic. The general 
threshold criteria that would confirm construct validity are not achieved. The scales of 
functional autonomy and decision autonomy are removed as most of these scale-items do not 
load appropriately. The Varimax-rotated two-dimensional autonomy construct (two-component 
solution), with the scales of strategic autonomy and job autonomy retaining, produces good 
construct validity. Subsequent reliability analysis shows also good construct reliability of the 
two-dimensional autonomy construct. Therefore, the original four-dimensional autonomy 
construct is reduced to a two-dimensional autonomy construct (see Figure 5.2) in order to ensure 
construct validity and construct reliability. The two-dimensional autonomy construct is applied 
in the following Chapter 6. 













Chapter 6  
6 Applying the Autonomy Construct 
This chapter aims to answer RQ3: How are the autonomy dimensions related to the success of the 
corporate ventures? For this purpose, the two-dimensional autonomy construct (validated in 
Chapter 5) will be applied (see Figure 5.2). A survey study with 87 venture managers of SMEs is 
conducted in the German IT consulting industry. Multiple linear regression analysis is performed 
to analyze the relationship of the two autonomy dimensions strategic autonomy and job autonomy 
with corporate venture success. Additionally, two interaction effects (moderation) are included in 
the regression analysis in order to evaluate how the relationship between autonomy (strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy) and corporate venture success is influenced when venture managers 
are enforced to emphasize exploitative priorities in their decision making.  
Parts of this chapter are based on the following publication6: 
Gard, J., Baltes, G., Andersen, T. J., & Katzy, B. (Forthcoming 2016). Corporate venture 
management in small-medium sized enterprise: The roles and effects of autonomy and 
corporate policy. In the Journal of Business Venturing. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 highlights the challenge for corporate management 
to manage corporate ventures in a way that (a) the new business is invented and (b) made profitable 
at the same time. Following the organizational ambidexterity theory, we assume that an essential 
                                                 
6 The author would like to thank his co-authors and the publishers of the Journal of Business Venturing for their 
permission to reuse relevant parts of the articles in this thesis. 
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managerial challenge is to balance the corporate venture’s engagement in explorative activities 
and exploitative activities. In Section 6.2, we acknowledge the exploration objective of corporate 
ventures to invent the new business and highlight the relevance of exploitative priorities to achieve 
profitability at some point. In Section 6.3, we operationalize an empirical model for effective 
corporate venture management. Our model assumes that effective corporate venture management 
requires corporate management: (1) to grant the venture manager with broad decision authority 
(strategic autonomy and job autonomy) in order to enable effective explorative activities (as 
described in Chapter 3); and (2) to ensure at the same time some exploitation priority in the venture 
manager’s decision making to also emphasize exploitative activities. The research design to test 
our model is presented in Section 6.4, which enables us to answer the RQ3 and after that the PS. 
The results of the model testing are reported in Section 6.5 and discussed in Section 6.6. The 
chapter conclusions are given in Section 6.7. 
6.1 THE CHALLENGE TO MANAGE CORPORATE VENTURES 
Establishing corporate ventures is a promising approach for corporations to generate strategic 
renewal (cf. Christensen, 2004). The small entrepreneurial teams are an effective means to create 
new businesses aside the mainstream activities in which corporations capitalize on their existing 
businesses (cf. Kuratko et al., 2009). Researchers assume that corporate venturing on average has 
positive implications on firm performance (cf. Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Covin & Miles, 2007; 
Covin, Garrett, Kuratko, & Shepherd, 2010; McGrath et al., 2012). However, it is not obvious how 
corporate ventures are managed successfully (cf. Ginsberg & Hay, 1994; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012; 
Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). Burgelman and Valikangas (2005) argue that failure is not just 
attributable to the novel task environment but is linked to the challenge to manage corporate 
ventures effectively.  
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An essential challenge for corporate management is to ensure that corporate ventures achieve at 
the same time (a) the exploration objective to invent the new business and (b) the exploitation 
objective to reach profitability with the new business (cf. Garvin, 2004). Achieving the former 
objective is associated with explorative modes of search and experimentation whereas the latter 
objective is reached through exploitative modes of refinement and improvement (March, 1991a). 
However, too much emphasis on either mode of activities may have negative implications for the 
corporate venture as either the exploration objective or the exploitation objective may remain 
unfulfilled (cf. He & Wong, 2004). Following the organizational ambidexterity theory, we assume 
that an essential challenge for corporate management is to balance the engagement of corporate 
ventures in explorative modes and exploitative modes so that the new business is invented and 
reaches profitability (cf. Junni, Sarala, Taras, & Tarba, 2013). 
Two prior studies support our assumption. Thornhill and Amit (2000) highlight the necessity of 
corporate ventures to develop new capabilities (explore) and simultaneously utilize those already 
existing in the corporation (exploit). A second study shows that the ability to develop new 
capabilities and simultaneously to lever existing corporate capabilities increases the longevity of 
corporate venture divisions that large enterprises typically implement to manage corporate 
ventures (cf. Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012). Without any doubt, the development of new capabilities 
(to invent the business) involves explorative modes of search and experimentation whereas the 
utilization of existing corporate capabilities (to increase profitability) involves exploitative modes 
of refinement and improvement for adaptation to the venture’s new task environment (see, e.g., 
March, 1991a). Nevertheless, it remains unclear how corporate management may balance the 
engagement of corporate ventures in both modes.  
We propose a management model through which corporate management may master the challenge 
to achieve the balance between the exploration objective and the exploitation objective. The model 
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builds on two considerations. First, Burgers et al. (2009: 208) highlight that corporate ventures 
require a “sense of freedom and ownership over their activities” to invent the new business 
(explore). Providing corporate ventures with the “freedom of activities”, viz. autonomy, assumes 
that corporate management has delegated decision authority to the venture manager. Considering 
our findings in the Chapters 3-5 (see Figure 5.2), two types of autonomy are at play: (a) the freedom 
of the venture manager to make work-mode decisions without approval (job autonomy); (b) the 
freedom to make strategic decisions without approval (strategic autonomy). This broad autonomy 
enable the venture manager to engage effectively in exploration modes of search and 
experimentation for inventing the new business (cf. McGrath, 2001). Second, there is little hope 
that corporate ventures achieve profitability without exploitative priorities in decision making (cf. 
Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012). Corporate management may ensure such priorities by enforcing 
business policies that emphasize the exploitation objective to achieve profitability (see, e.g., 
Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006). Building on the two considerations, we develop an 
empirical model for effective corporate venture management in Section 6.3. The model (illustrated 
in Figure 6.1) assumes that corporate ventures are most successful when corporate management 
grants venture managers with broad decision authority in combination with business policies that 
ensure exploitation priority in the decision making of venture managers.  
In order to test our model, we apply our autonomy construct (Figure 5.2) for measuring the 
decision authority (strategic autonomy and job autonomy) that corporate management grants to 
the venture managers. The two-dimensional autonomy construct is further developed by including 
the measure exploitation priority which captures the business policy that corporate management 
enforces (see Figure 6.1). The definitions for strategic autonomy and job autonomy are already 
given in Chapter 4 (see definitions 4.4 and 4.5). Exploitation priority is introduced as a new 
measure and defined as follows.  
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Definition 6.1: Exploitation Priority “measures the extent to which corporate management 
forces venture managers to prioritize the exploitative objective to gain profit over the explorative 
objective to invent” (cf. Lubatkin et al., 2006). 
The overall aim of the study in this chapter is to test empirically the effectiveness of our 
management model by evaluating its power to predict corporate venture success. Therefore, we 
test two considerations. First, we consider that two types of autonomy are essential for effective 
corporate venture management. One is associated with strategic freedom (strategic autonomy) and 
the other is associated with operational freedom (job autonomy), which give the venture manager 
leeway to effectively invent the new business. We apply our autonomy construct to evaluate how 
the strategic freedom and the operational freedom of venture managers are related with corporate 
venture success, thereby answering RQ3. Results will show whether power dispersion is essential 
for effective corporate venture management (see Crockett et al., 2013). Second, we introduce 
business policy as an integrating management device to enforce exploitative priority in the venture 
manager’s decision making (cf. Lubatkin et al., 2006). We investigate whether the management 
device is effective for corporate venture management. The first and the second consideration are 
tested in combination for answering the PS. 
6.2 THE RELEVANCE OF EXPLOITATION PRIORITY 
Initially, a corporate venture is established by corporations following the exploration objective to 
invent a new business, often in a novel business domain (cf. Garrett & Covin, 2013). Early studies 
by corporate venture scholars highlight the necessity to separate corporate ventures from the 
corporate mainstream business (see Kanter, 1985; Sathe, 1989). The mainstream activities rather 
focuses on the exploitation objective to improve established businesses for increasing profitability, 
which may constrain the explorative activities of corporate ventures (cf. Jansen et al., 2009). By 
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keeping the corporate venture separate from the mainstream business, the ventures can operate 
outside the formal corporate constraints (cf. Garrett & Covin, 2013) with the flexibility necessary 
to explore new knowledge in the novel task environment (cf. McGrath, 2001). This call for 
separation is consistent with the notion to establish dual structures for achieving organizational 
ambidexterity. The notion builds on the consideration that explorative activities and exploitative 
activities are mutually incompatible (see March, 1991a), which necessitates to separate the two 
modes of activities in distinct organizational entities (cf. Duncan, 1976).  
However, it is also acknowledged that corporate ventures do not singularly engage in explorative 
activities for the purpose to invent the new business. Corporate ventures also need to engage in 
exploitative activities to reach profitability (see Hill & Birkinshaw, 2012). Without exploitation 
priority, corporate ventures may invent the new business (explore) but may fail to lever resources 
to gain scale and scope economies when the venture is commercialized as a new strategic 
businesses (exploit). We may therefore conclude that corporate ventures require at least some 
exploitation priory in their decision making.  
The current study assumes that corporate ventures are most successful when corporate 
management (a) delegates decision power to enable effective exploration of the new business and 
(b) enforces some exploitation priority in the venture manager’s decision making to ensure that 
profitability is also reached at some point. To test if the managerial influence of corporate 
management has an impact, the three independent variables, namely strategic autonomy, job 
autonomy and exploitation priority, are used to investigate the two assumptions (a and b) to explain 
corporate venture success. This way corporate management enhances exploration for new 
knowledge by granting both strategic autonomy and job autonomy to the venture manager while 
giving strategic priority to the exploitation objective to increase profitability.  
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6.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section continues the research on our autonomy construct (see Figure 5.2) to study the 
theoretical background and to develop the hypotheses. Therefore the outcomes of the Sections 6.1 
and 6.2 are used. In the Subsections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3 we discuss prior theoretical rationales and 
empirical findings as underpinnings for the development of our hypotheses. The hypotheses reflect 
the two suggested managerial assumptions (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2) for corporate venture success. 
For readability we show the outcome as a guideline for understanding the hypotheses. So, Figure 
6.1 illustrates the hypothesized relations H1 to H4, which are to be developed in the subsections 
below. 
Figure 6.1: The Hypothesized Model Relationships  
 
6.3.1 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND CORPORATE VENTURE SUCCESS 
Strategic autonomy refers to the authority delegated to venture managers on decisions that can 
influence strategic outcomes without obtaining prior approval from corporate management. These 
types of decisions go beyond concerns about job design for operational freedom. They rather deal 
with aspects such as (1) initiating specific R&D activities, (2) generating internal competencies, 
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as well as (6) qualification for new strategic moves. The operationalization of the original strategic 
autonomy measures (1 to 6) is described in Chapter 5. The results are briefly summarized in 
Subsection 6.4.1.  
According to the measures, strategic autonomy provides venture managers with the freedom to act 
independently and take advantage of opportunities in the new business environment, essentially in 
the form of autonomous actions (cf. Burgelman, 1983; Andersen, 2000). One stream of research 
by strategic management scholars illustrates the importance of autonomous action (i.e., resource-
committing decisions) across different parts of the organization as an important source of business 
initiatives that have longer-term implications for corporate strategy development and strategic 
adaptation (see, e.g., Mintzberg, 1978; Bower, 1986; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Mintzberg, 
1994). Five complementing core findings extracted from the stream of research are provided 
below, which lead to the first hypothesis.  
First, autonomous responsive actions represent the explorative component of strategy making that 
Mintzberg (1994) associates with emergent strategy initiated by actors operating throughout the 
organization. Second, autonomous responsive actions constitute the individual initiatives that form 
new internal ventures as the evolutionary element of strategy making that create variation in 
potential business activities for strategic renewal (see, e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman, 1996). 
Third, it is argued that the autonomous actions constitute a “form of efficient low-risk strategy 
probing based on active search” which generates new business opportunities through 
experimentation (cf. Andersen & Nielsen, 2007: 22). Fourth, this explorative component of 
strategy-making is found to have a positive association to firm performance in dynamic 
environments (cf. Andersen, 2000; Andersen, 2004). Fifth, Kuratko and Audretsch (2009) find that 
the success of corporate ventures is enhanced when the venture managers have authority to develop 
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the strategic direction of the new business. The five complementing findings lead to the following 
hypothesis. 
H1:   Higher strategic autonomy granted to the venture manager is associated with higher  
corporate venture success. 
6.3.2 JOB AUTONOMY AND CORPORATE VENTURE SUCCESS 
Autonomy is also recognized as an important feature when designing jobs characterized by, e.g., 
skill variety, task identity, significance and feedback (cf. Hackman & Oldham, 1975a). In this 
context it is often labeled “job autonomy”, indicating the discretion venture managers have when 
they set up (1) the job (work method) including scheduling, (2) the sequencing and timing (work 
scheduling) and (3) the performance evaluation (work criteria) (cf. Breaugh, 1985). The 
operationalization of the three original job autonomy measures (1 to 3) is described in Chapter 5. 
The results are briefly summarized in Subsection 6.4.1. The effects of job autonomy are reported 
in three research streams. The three key results of the three research streams that lead us to the 
second hypothesis are reported below.  
First, some key results suggest that job autonomy has a positive influence on (a) work effectiveness 
(cf. Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Langfred & Moye, 2004; Zhang & Bartol, 2010) and (b) fosters 
creative work involvement (cf. Volmer et al., 2012) as well as (c) role breadth self-efficacy (cf. 
Parker, 1998; Axtell & Parker, 2003; Unsworth & Clegg, 2010). There is little hope that good 
results are achieved when (ad a) the work of venture teams is organized ineffectively, (ad b) 
venture teams do not engage in creative processes at work and (ad c) teams are not carrying out 
broader work tasks beyond the prescribed technical requirements.  
Second, it is recognized that job autonomy has an inherent motivational effect that improves job 
performance (cf. Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Hackman, 2002). In a similar vein, studies find that 
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individuals with high job autonomy feel more responsible for their ideas and are therefore more 
likely to complete their jobs successfully (cf. Parker & Sprigg, 1999; Volmer et al., 2012). There 
is little hope that venture managers will create the new business successfully without having the 
motivation and/or feeling responsible to do so.  
Third, Parker (2014) finds a link between job autonomy and explorative behavior that drives 
actions to modify work methods in adaptation to changes in the task environment. This exploration 
enforcing effect of job autonomy is also noted in research on creativity (cf. Amabile, 1983). Here 
it is observed that managers with high job autonomy generate more ideas (cf. Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010), engage in broader proactive activities (cf. Unsworth & Clegg, 2010) and are more 
motivated to develop new work tasks (cf. Wang & Cheng, 2010). In this sense, job autonomy 
enables venture managers to break out of established routines and norms (cf. Shalley & Gilson, 
2004). Such explorative behavior is necessary to overcome organizational constraints of 
formalized organizations which is essential to pursue corporate venture activities (cf. Kanter, 1989; 
Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009). The evidence and reasoning in the three research 
streams leads us to the following hypothesis.  
H2:   Higher job autonomy granted to the venture manager is associated with higher  
corporate venture success. 
6.3.3 THE MODERATING ROLE OF EXPLOITATION PRIORITY  
A business policy that gives strategic priority to exploitation describes the emphasis that corporate 
management puts on the exploitation objective to increase profitability to the detriment of the 
exploration objective to invent. Exploitation priority forces the venture manager to focus on (1) 
committing to improve quality and lower cost, (2) improving the process efficiency and (3) 
penetrating more deeply into existing customer base instead of (4) creating products or services 
that are innovative to the firm, (5) looking for novel ideas by thinking “outside the box” and (6) 
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bringing ventures aggressively into new market segments (cf. Lubatkin et al., 2006). The 
operationalization of the exploitation priority measures (1 to 6) is given in Subsection 6.4.1 (see 
also Appendix E). It is not expected that a priority on exploitation by itself will have a direct effect 
on corporate venture success because, if anything, it will tend to make activities conform to 
existing norms, thereby limiting search and experimentation. However, it is expected that imposing 
a business policy with exploitation priority will have a positive impact on the effectiveness of both 
strategic autonomy and job autonomy. The reasoning for the positive moderation effect of 
exploitation priority on the influence of strategic autonomy and job autonomy on corporate venture 
success is given below.  
Amplifying the effectiveness of strategic autonomy 
The ability to take autonomous actions by making strategic decisions without approval makes it 
possible to gain new knowledge about the new business through search and experimentation. 
However, there is also a risk that the search and experimentation will incur excessive costs without 
generating knowledge about mature solutions that can be commercialized (cf. March, 1991a). In 
other words, search and experimentation where resources are deployed too broadly towards 
diverse opportunities increases the risk that the profitability demand is left unchecked (cf. Gupta 
et al., 2006).  
Levinthal and March (1993) characterize this potential risk as a self-reinforcing threat caused by 
the behavioral traits of individuals. They argue that search and experimentation is associated with 
increasing failure rates which can encourage individuals to intensify their search, thus leading 
towards an endless circle of search and failure referred to as the “failure trap” (cf. Levinthal & 
March, 1993: 106). By extension, strategic autonomy in the extreme may lead to a “garbage can” 
of new initiatives (cf. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) that diverts the strategic focus and dilutes 
corporate resources. Hence, it is argued that emergent strategy evolving from autonomous strategic 
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decision making should be intertwined with a business policy that promotes, or induces, the 
exploitation priority to increase profitability (cf. Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Burgelman & Grove, 
2007).  
Correspondingly, we suppose that it is essential for corporate venture success to provide strategic 
autonomy that enables exploration activities (search and experimentation). At the same time 
however, we expect that a business policy imposing exploitation priority will have a positive 
impact on the effectiveness of strategic autonomy because it will focus on the exploration activities 
in areas linked to existing market offerings. In contrast, the enforcement of a business policy that 
enforces exploration priority would diverge explorative activities. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is developed. 
H3:   The positive relationship between strategic autonomy and corporate venture success  
is higher when corporate management imposes exploitation priority. 
Amplifying the effectiveness of job autonomy 
We expected that imposing a business policy with exploitation priority will amplify the impact of 
job autonomy on corporate venture success. The studies leading to hypothesis 2 provide evidence 
that job autonomy promotes explorative behavior (cf. Parker, 2014). By granting job autonomy, 
corporate management enables venture managers to show the necessary explorative behavior for 
achieving the explorative objective to invent the new business.  
However, this way, the exploitative objective to increase profitability may remain unchecked due 
ineffective goal attainment (cf. Biron & Bamberger, 2010; Lanaj, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Barnes, & 
Harmon, 2012). So even though job autonomy provides the venture managers with the freedom to 
explore, there is no doubt that the work tasks of corporate ventures must be accomplished 
efficiently to also reach profitability (cf. Junni et al., 2013). Corporate management can ensure 
some exploitation priority in the venture manager’s work-mode decisions by encouraging him do 
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to so by enforcing the appropriate business policy (cf. Lubatkin et al., 2006). We suspect that 
corporate venture success is obtained not only when corporate management grants job autonomy, 
but when they concurrently promote a business policy that emphasizes exploitation priority in the 
venture manager’s work-mode decisions. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis. 
H4:   The positive relation between job autonomy and corporate venture success  
is higher when corporate management imposes exploitation priority. 
We have now described the hypothesized assumptions illustrated in Figure 6.1. The arguments 
leading to the hypotheses are not tested in this study. The hypotheses themselves are tested on the 
possibility that they must be rejected or they cannot be rejected (cf. Popper, 1954). In order to do 
so, we operationalize the measures for the two independent variables (strategic autonomy, job 
autonomy), the moderator variable (exploitation priority) and the dependent variable (corporate 
venture success) in the Section 6.4.  
6.4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
The hypothesized relationships are tested using multiple regression analysis. The data set and the 
procedure applied to collect the data for testing the hypotheses are already presented in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.1). Now, the measures used to operationalize our management model (Figure 6.1) are 
presented (6.4.1) and the research method is validated (6.4.2). Finally, model diagnostics are 
performed in Subsection 6.4.3 (1) to evaluate statistically whether linear regression techniques 
are appropriate for the data set and (2) to test whether data analysis is constrained through 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity or outliers. 
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6.4.1 MEASURES  
This subsection presents the dependent variable, the independent variables, the moderator variable 
and the control variables that are used in the regression analysis. The measures of the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are already operationalized in Chapter 4 and therefore 
briefly summarized in this subsection. Also, the subsection provides the measures of the moderator 
variable and the control variables. The measurement scales of all variables are also reported in the 
Appendix E. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable we use is corporate venture success. The measure assesses the subjective 
perception of distinct success-related criteria. Subjective performance measures are used instead 
of objective financial performance measures for the following reason. While objective financial 
performance measures, such as (a) growth-related criteria and (b) profitability-related criteria are 
generally applied in corporate strategy studies, they are not reliable to evaluate corporate venture 
success. Ad (a), growth-related criteria (e.g., sales growth) may be appropriate for established 
businesses. However, corporate ventures are non-established businesses and start with zero sales, 
which are factors that greatly skew and render incomparable the year-to-year growth rate 
computation. Ad (b), profitability-related criteria (e.g., return on assets), are equally troublesome 
due to the variety of accounting methods and decision policies that corporations can adopt when 
allocating costs to corporate ventures. Moreover, young corporate ventures have not yet reached 
break-even (cf. Garrett & Covin, 2013).  
Therefore, subjective measures of perceived success are commonly applied in corporate venture 
research and are acknowledged as an appropriate alternative to objective performance measures 
(cf. Thornhill & Amit, 2000; Johnson, 2012; Garrett & Covin, 2013; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). 
Measures of perceived success are based on the perceptions gathered from corporate managers 
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and their individual judgments on corporate venture success (cf. Covin et al., 1990; Kuratko et al., 
2009). Subjective measures are found to be valid performance indicators (cf. Brush & Vanderwerf, 
1992; Chandler & Hanks, 1993) that reflect both the current economic outcomes and the 
fulfillment of expectations (cf. Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997).  
As already outlined in Subsection 4.4.6, a seven-item scale of perceived success is used as a 
measure of corporate venture success (α=0.93). The measure reflects the extent to which (a) 
corporate management is satisfied with the financial performance of the corporate venture (cf. 
Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992) and (b) corporate management is overall satisfied with the 
performance of the corporate venture (cf. Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Four items are used 
to assess the satisfaction with financial performance (see the first four items in Table 4.6) and three 
items are used to assess the overall satisfaction with performance (see the last three items in Table 
4.6). Chandler and Hanks (1993) tested our measure of “satisfaction with performance index” for 
new businesses and found good internal consistency and high inter-rater reliability (cf. Chandler 
& Hanks, 1993). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the measure is appropriate to assess the 
success of corporate ventures.  
Independent Variables 
In this study we use two main variables (strategic autonomy and job autonomy) and one moderator 
variable (exploitation priority). The strategic autonomy measure builds on the construct developed 
by Andersen (2000, 2004). The six-item scale is provided in Table 4.4 (Chapter 4). It captures the 
extent to which the venture manager can make decisions of potential strategic importance without 
approval from corporate management. The job autonomy measure builds on a seven-item scale 
developed by Breaugh (1985). The measure is provided in Table 4.5 (Chapter 4). The measure 
reflects the freedom of venture managers with respect to work methods, including procedures 
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adopted by the team, the scheduling of the team’s work activities and the criteria used to evaluate 
work performance of the team.  
As presented in Chapter 5, we applied Principal Component Analysis to the questionnaire items of 
strategic autonomy and job autonomy which confirmed the presence of two distinct autonomy 
measures (Table 5.8). Results are briefly summarized. The six items for strategic autonomy and 
the seven items for job autonomy were included in the Varimax rotation and both constructs had 
Eigenvalues greater than one and included items with component loadings greater than .60 and 
cross-loadings below .30. The items one and three of the strategic autonomy scale (see Table 4.4) 
and the item one of the job autonomy scale (see Table 4.5) showed component loadings below .60. 
The three items were therefore excluded from further analysis. Thus, the original six-item scale 
for strategic autonomy (α=.81) was reduced to a four-item scale the original seven-item scale for 
job autonomy was reduced to a six-item scale (α=.82).  
The component scores from the Principal Component Analysis (see Chapter 5) were used to weigh 
the items for the constructs applied in the regression analysis. Alternative regressions were run 
based on constructs assigning equal weight to the items (sum scores) but did not lead to materially 
different results. In addition, an extended Principal Component Analysis was also performed, 
including the reduced four-item scale for strategic autonomy, the reduced six-item scale for job 
autonomy and the seven-item scale for corporate venture success. The results are provided in the 
Appendix H. The three components had Eigenvalues greater than one with component loadings 
greater than .60 and cross-loadings below .30, thus confirming three distinct components. The 
seven items used to measure corporate venture success were retained in the ensuing analysis. The 
exploitation priority measure was not included in the Principal Component Analysis. As it is 
described as follows, the measure is based on a ranking scale and not on a Likert scale. It is 
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therefore not feasible to include the exploitation priority measure in the Principal Component 
Analysis.  
The moderator variable exploitation priority builds on a construct developed by Lubatkin et al. 
(2006) and measures the extent to which corporate management forces venture managers to 
prioritize exploitative objectives. The additive twelve-item measure identified by Lubatkin et al. 
(2006) was reduced to six-items, three indicating explorative objectives and another three 
indicating exploitative objectives, that were then converted into a ranking measure. The venture 
managers were asked to rank the six items where 1 indicated the lowest priority and 6 indicated 
the highest priority. The ranks of the three exploitation items were added to a sum score measuring 
the extent to which corporate management prioritizes exploitative objectives. The measurement 
scale is presented in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Exploitation Priority Measurement Scale adapted from Lubatkin et al. (2006) 
Exploitation Priority adapted from Lubatkin et al. (2006)  
Participants were asked to order the following aspects to which corporate management 
(supervisor) prioritizes them.  
(1=not important to my supervisor, 6= important to my supervisor). 
1 My team is forced to identify new market segments 
2 My team is forced to explore innovative solution or services for commercialization 
3 My team is forced to look for novel ideas by thinking “outside the box” 
4 My team is forced to penetrate more deeply into the existing customer base 
5 My team is forced to increase the levels of routinization of operations 
6 My team is forced to improve quality and lower cost 
Control Variables 
Six control variables are used in our study in order to control for possible confounding effects of 
the hypothesized assumptions. The reasoning for including the control variables in the regression 
analysis is given below where each variable is discussed. The six control variables are (1) 
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environmental dynamism, (2) maturity stage, (3) team experience, firm size which is captured 
through the two variables, (4) total number of employees as well as (5) total sales and (6) team 
size. Concerning references are given below. The control variables are also reported in the 
Appendix E.  
Ad (1), Environmental dynamism is expected to influence the need for autonomy, which is 
considered important when business conditions are changing (cf. Bruining, 1992). Technological 
discontinuity, intensity of competition and change of market demand are used to indicate the level 
of environmental dynamism (cf. Miller, 1987). Respondents were accordingly asked to evaluate 
technology shifts, pace of innovation, competitive intensity and changes in market demand over 
the past five to ten years. Environmental dynamism was included as a control variable to account 
for the potential effects of environmental change.  
Ad (2), maturity stage is found to be positively related with corporate venture success, with large 
differences between high- and low-performing corporate ventures at the early stage and small 
differences at the middle and established stages (cf. Thornhill & Amit, 2000). Hence, we included 
maturity stage as an escalating variable. The participants were asked to indicate the maturity stage 
of the corporate venture according to three classifications: (1) the corporate venture is at the early 
stage when initial financial investment is made by the parent company or external partners but 
revenue is not yet generated, (2) the corporate venture is at the middle stage when the new business 
generates sales revenue but has not yet achieved profitability, (3) the corporate venture is at the 
established stage when the revenue of the new business exceeds the costs, thus the business 
generates profits. The control variable is included in the regression analysis by the use of a dummy 
variable whereas the value 1 indicates the early stage, the value 2 indicates the middle stage and 
the value 3 indicates a venture at the established stage (cf. Thornhill & Amit, 2000).  
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Ad (3), team experience reflects the experience of the corporate venture team. Team experience is 
included as it may influence corporate venture success (cf. Delmar & Shane, 2006). This influence 
may be present as some studies assume that experience has a positive effect on venture 
performance (cf. Taylor, 1999; Klepper, 2001) whereas others did not find such a relation (Shane 
& Stuart, 2002; Van Praag, 2003; Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, & De Wit, 2004). Team experience 
is measured as the sum of years the members of the corporate venture have been engaged in venture 
activities.  
Ad (4), total employees reflects the size of the firm in terms of full time equivalent employees 
(FTEs). The total number of employees is the amount of human resources that are potentially 
available to support the corporate venture, which may have a direct impact on corporate venture 
success (cf. Garrett & Neubaum, 2013). Large corporations have more human resources both in 
terms of quantity and variety to support venture creation compared to smaller firms. To account 
for this effect, we include the total number of employees as a control variable. As it is later 
described in Subsection 6.4.3, the measure is subject to significant skewness. Therefore, the 
measure is log transformed (natural logarithm) in order to correct skewness before it is included 
in the regression. 
Ad (5), total sales also reflect the size of the firm. The measure is included in the regression by the 
use of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when sales are below 2 million Euro, 2 when 
sales are between 2 and 10 million Euro, 3 when sales are between 10 and 50 million Euro and 4 
when sales exceed 50 million Euro. The measure is included in the regression analysis as the 
amount of financial resources (reflected in total sales) indicates the extent to which corporations 
can support corporate ventures. As such financial support may have direct influence on corporate 
venture success (cf. Garrett & Neubaum, 2013), we include total sales in the regression analysis. 
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Ad (6), team size can also influence corporate venture success because large teams have more 
resources available and may accomplish business development activities faster and better. Large 
teams can involve more and more diverse functional specialists, which has a positive effect on 
innovation (cf. Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). Hence, team size measured as the number of 
employees (FTEs) in the corporate venture team is included as a control variable. However, it is 
shown in Subsection 6.4.3 that the skewness of total number of employees is problematic. In order 
to correct skewness, the measure is log transformed (natural logarithm) before it is included in the 
regression models.  
6.4.2 METHOD VALIDITY  
In this subsection, five potential limitations are discussed with which corporate venture research 
is generally confronted. The potential limitations are (1) hindsight bias, (2) success bias, (3) social 
desirability bias, (4) non-response bias and (5) common source bias. 
Ad (1) hindsight bias is present when participants provide incorrect information due to loss of 
memory and re-interpretation. The study eliminated hindsight bias by only considering responses 
from venture managers that were currently operating and thus provided real-time information (see 
Section 5.1).  
Ad (2) success bias may be present when only those responses of successful cases are captured, 
which may blindside the reasons for which corporate ventures failed. The success bias is 
minimized in our study as 71.3% of corporate ventures in the sample are at the early stage or 
middle stage. These corporate ventures have not yet achieved profitability. More specifically, 22 
(25.3%) corporate ventures are at the early stage, 40 (46.0%) corporate ventures are at the 
middle stage and 25 (28.7%) are at the established stage. The period until the venture reaches 
the established stage (break-even point) is referred to as the “valley of death” (Murphy & Edwards, 
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2003). Accordingly, two-thirds of the corporate ventures in the dataset are at the critical stage 
before break-even is reached (early stage and middle stage). This means that the data contains 
information about corporate ventures that will both fail and succeed in the future. Thus, we may 
conclude that the success bias is not problematic in our study.  
Ad (3) social desirability bias would be present when respondents answer questions in a manner 
that is favored by others. Potential social desirability bias is minimized in our study as it was 
guaranteed to the respondents that the collected data is kept confidential, thus not communicated 
to others in any way (cf. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
Ad (4) non-response bias occurs when the answers of respondents are different from the potential 
answers of those that did not provide an answer. Analysis of variance was conducted to test for 
potential non-response bias. Therefore, the total sales and the total number of employees was 
compared between the responding and the non-responding firms (considering the database of all 
2649 SMEs in the IT consulting industry in Germany). Results are presented in the Appendix I. 
The responding firms had on average turnover of 13.3 million Euro (s.d.=11.64) and 93.6 
employees (s.d.=65.35) whereas non-responding firms had an average turnover of 15.1 million 
Euro (s.d.=27.33) and 86.0 employees (s.d.=70.03). The analysis of variance shows that these 
minor differences between the responding firms and non-responding firms are not significant. 
These results provide evidence that data is not constrained through non-response bias.  
Ad (5) common source bias can be problematic when subjective performance measures are used 
because the assessment of success may be skew. Analysis of variance was performed in order to 
test for common source bias. Therefore, the subjective assessment of corporate ventures success 
was compared among the venture managers and the corporate managers. Results are presented in 
the Appendix J1. The venture managers assessed corporate venture success on average with 30.39 
(s.d.=6.85) whereas corporate managers assessed corporate venture success on average with 29.56 
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(s.d.=6.82). Thus, the analysis of variance shows that venture managers assess the corporate 
venture success slightly better than the corporate managers. However, the differences are not 
significant, which provides evidence that data is not constrained through common source bias. Our 
findings are consistent with those of a prior study which shows that corporate managers and 
venture managers have a similar perception when assessing corporate venture success. Garrett and 
Covin (2013) find a high inter-rater reliability (r = .82, p < .001) for the measure of perceived 
success, which is also used in our study.  
6.4.3 MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
In this subsection, it is tested whether the data is suitable for linear regression techniques and to 
test for potential constraints. Four analytical tests are therefore performed, namely, (A) skewness 
analysis, (B) residual analysis, (C) heteroscedasticity analysis and (D) multicollinearity analysis. 
These four statistical test are defined below. In (E) we summarize the results of the model 
diagnostics.  
A: Skewness Analysis 
Definition 6.2: Skewness Analysis “measures the degree to which a distribution is asymmetric. 
It describes how the distribution of a data set departs from the normal distribution (cf. Postawa, 
2012).  
Descriptive statistics including histograms were carried out for each variable used in the study 
in order to check distributions of the variables. Visual inspections of the distributions indicated 
that the variables were in range for linear regression with some exceptions. Therefore, statistical 
tests were conducted for analyzing the significance of the skewness.  
Table 6.2 lists all variables used in the study (column 1) and their skewness scores. Significant 
skewness is indicated when (a) the skewness score is lower than -1.0 or higher than 1.0; or (b) 
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the skewness is higher than three times the standard error (Field, 2013). Although these criteria 
are not met for the three main variables, it was tested whether skewness could be corrected in 
order to improve the quality of the data analysis. Therefore, the variables were log transformed. 
Before performing the log transformation, the date was reflected for those variables with 
negative skewness scores. However, the log transformation increased skewness. The 
corrections were therefore discarded.  
Table 6.2: Results of the Skewness Analysis  
Variable Skewness Standard Error of Skewness 
Main Variable  
 
Strategic Autonomy .062 .258 





Corporate Venture Success -.616 .258 
Control Variable  
 
Environmental Dynamism -.317 .258 
Maturity Stage -.053 .257 
Team Experience .267 .258 
Total Employees 4.928 .258 
Total Sales .064 .257 
Team Size 4.253 .257 
In contrast, significant skewness is indicated for the two control variables, total employees and 
team size, as both threshold criteria (a and b) are exceeded. Log transformation corrected the 
skewness of both variables to a slight skewness of .661 (from 4.928) for total employees and of 
1.027 (from 4.253) for team size. Thus, the log transformation corrected the skewness 
significantly for both variables. The log transformed variables were used for further data 
analysis as these corrections improve the quality of the data analysis. 
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B: Residual Analysis 
Definition 6.3: Residual Plots “show the residuals on the vertical axis and the independent 
variable on the horizontal axis“(cf. Edwards, 2013).  
Furthermore, residual plots (using standardized residuals with standardized predictor values) 
were generated for the two main variables (strategic autonomy and job autonomy), the 
moderator variable (exploitation priority) and the control variables (environmental dynamism, 
maturity stage, team experience, total employees, total sales and team size), using corporate 
venture success as the predictor value. The nine resulting residual plots are given in the 
Appendix K. The residual plots were analyzed visually (a) to identify potential outliers, (b) to 
test whether data is appropriate to apply linear regression techniques and (c) to identify potential 
heteroscedasticity concerns. The three remarks on the residual plots were in order, which is 
reported in the following.  
Ad (a), the nine residual plots indicate that the cases (87 cases) were in range. Those cases that 
were locate slightly outside the point clouds were examined to check whether the questionnaire 
was answered through repeated patterns (e.g., 12341234) that would indicate any error or bias. 
Such patterns were not examined. As all cases were in range and patterns that would indicated 
any error or bias were not observed, all 87 cases were retained for further analysis.  
Ad (b), residual plots showed random scattering of cases around the residual-zero line. Such 
scattering provides evidence that the standard deviation of the response variable y is constant 
over x and that linear regression models do not under- or overestimate results. It was therefore 
assumed that linear regression techniques are appropriate for analyzing the data.  
Ad (c), residual plots were further used to examine the scattering for identifying potential 
heteroscedasticity constraints. The plots showed consistent and flat scattering of cases along 
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the residual-zero line. These results indicate homoscedasticity (cf. Field, 2013). In order to 
cross-check the results of the visual inspections that the data is homoscedastic, 
heteroscedasticity analysis was performed. The procedure and the results are described in the 
following. 
C: Heteroscedasticity Analysis 
Definition 6.4: Heteroscedasticity “is present if the variability of a variable is unequal across the 
range of values of a second variable that predicts it. Accordingly, the scattering (variability) of a 
dependent variable against an independent variable widens or narrows along their regression line 
if data is heteroscedastic” (cf. Field, 2013). 
The Koenker tests were performed for identifying potential heteroscedasticity. The Koenker 
test was chosen as it is more accurate than the Breusch-Pagan test when the small sample size 
is small (cf. Field, 2013). The sample size of the data used in the thesis is n=87. The term 
Koenker test is defined below. 
Definition 6.5: Koenker Test “is a method to test for heteroscedasticity in linear models based 
the regression quantiles” (cf. Koenker & Bassett Jr, 1982; Field, 2013).   
Evaluated syntax was used for the analysis (see Pryce, 2002). The syntax is provided in 
Appendix L. It can also be found online7. The Koenker tests showed that Chi-Square values 
were non-significant for any of the variables listed in Table 6.2. Chi-Square values are reported 
in Table 6.4 (Section 6.5). These results provided evidence that data analysis is not constrained 
                                                 
7 http://www.spsstools.net/Syntax/RegressionRepeatedMeasure/Breusch-PaganAndKoenkerTest.txt  
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through heteroscedasticity. Thus, the initial results of the visual inspections of the residual plots 
were supported.  
D: Multicollinearity Analysis 
Definition 6.6: Multicollinearity “is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more independent 
variables in a regression model are highly correlated. In this situation the coefficient estimates 
may change erratically in response to small changes in the model or the data. Multicollinearity 
does not reduce the predictive power of the model as a whole; it only affects calculations regarding 
individual independent variables” (cf. Swanson & Tayman, 2012).  
Multicollinearity analysis was conducted with all variables because multicollinearity effects 
may lead to misinterpretation and cause problems when conducting linear regression analysis. 
The analysis is based on the computation of the Variance Inflation Factor which is defined in the 
following. 
Definition 6.7: Variance Inflation Factor “quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an 
ordinary least squares regression model” (cf. Webster, 2013).  
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were calculated according to the procedure described by 
Aiken, West and Reno (1991). Results showed that the highest VIF was 2.17, which is far below 
the critical value of 10 or higher that would indicate multicollinearity effects (see, e.g., 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, we may conclude that data analysis is not constrained 
through multicollinearity effects. The results of the model diagnostics are summarized in the 
following. 
E: Results of the Model Diagnostics 
The results of the model diagnostics show that data is appropriate to apply linear regression 
techniques. Skewness analysis confirms that all variables are in range for linear regression. 
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However, the skewness of the two control variables total employees (number of FTEs employed 
the firm) and team size (number of FTEs employed at corporate venture) needed to be corrected 
through log transformation. Inspections of the residual plots show that outliers are non-
problematic, linear regression is appropriate and heteroscedasticity constraints are not present. 
Heteroscedasticity analysis was conducted to cross-check the visual inspections. The results 
confirm that data is homoscedastic. Finally, multicollinearity analysis shows that data analysis 
is not constrained through multicollinearity concerns. Thus, the model diagnostics confirm that 
the data is appropriate for linear regression analyses and data is not constrained through 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity or outliers. Having evaluated the appropriateness of linear 
regression techniques, the study proceeds with the (linear) multiple regression analysis. 
6.5 RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 6.3 reports the mean values, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for all variables 
in the study. Not surprisingly, we observe high correlations between total employees, total sales 
and team size. Results show further that team size generally increases as the venture matures. As 
one might expect, there is a high correlation of strategic autonomy with maturity stage. Also not 
surprising, team experience increases as the venture matures. We observe strong positive 
correlations between job autonomy, strategic autonomy and corporate venture success whereas the 
correlation between exploitation priority and corporate venture success is negative but statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1)  Environmental 
Dynamism 
17.87 3.23          
(2)  Maturity Stage 2.031 .73 .060         
(3)  Team Experience 6.32 3.68 .232* .218*        
(4)  Total Employees 
(Log Transformed) 
4.892 1.13 -.037 -.001 -.031       
(5)  Total Sales 2,811 .69 -.016 .058 .129 .802**      
(6)  Team Size 
(Log Transformed) 
1.772 .89 .-.001 .289** .078 .338** .262*     
(7)  Strategic 
Autonomy 
10.85 3.87 .156 .357** .018 -.110 -.182 .144    
(8)  Job 
Autonomy 
29.32 4.93 .173 .086 .203 -.021 .035 .042 .293**   
(9)  Exploitation 
Priority 
11.45 2.84 -.065 -.030 .128 -.123 -.124 .076 .093 .176  
(10) Corporate Venture 
 Success 
33.39 6.85 .125 .273 .023 .068 .096 .139 .440** .447** -108 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
1. This value is represented through a dummy variable (see 6.4.1).  
2. The natural logarithm is used in the regression analysis in order to correct skewness (see 6.4.1). The average size of the firms 
was 279.11 (SD=691.85) full-time employees. The average size of the corporate venture was 9.55 (SD=15.14) full-time 
employees. 
The results of the step-wise multiple regression analyses on corporate venture success are reported 
in Table 6.4. In Model 1 (as the first step) the control variables are regressed on the dependent 
variable. The two main effect variables are added in Model 2 in the second step to test the 
hypothesized effects of job autonomy (Hypothesis 1) and strategic autonomy (Hypothesis 2) on 
corporate venture success. Finally, the interaction effects on corporate venture success between the 
autonomy constructs and the policy variable exploitation priority are assessed in Model 3 
(Hypotheses 3 and 4). As described in Subsection 6.4.3, the regressions are tested for potential 
heteroscedasticity influence. We performed Koenker tests on all regressions reporting Chi-squares 
that show no significant effects, which provides evidence that heteroscedasticity is not present. It 
is also tested whether multicollinearity effects are present. Therefore, variance inflation factors 
(VIF) were calculated for each regression (cf. Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). The highest score of 
2.17 is well below the critical value of 10 that would indicate multicollinearity effects (cf. 
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Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). To properly assess multicollinearity constraints in the interaction 
terms, the variables were mean-centered before multiplication (cf. Hayes, 2009).  
Table 6.4: Results from Multiple Regression Resting Effects on Corporate Venture Success a 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control Variables    
Environmental Dynamism .101 .022 -.097 
Maturity Stage .257* .149 .127 
Team Experience -.101 -.130 -.076 
Total Employees -.124 -.136 -.171 
Total Sales .144 .200 .212 
Team Size .081 .040 -.018 
    
Main Effects    
Strategic Autonomy  .327** .357** 
Job Autonomy  .416*** .499*** 
    
Moderating Variable    
Exploitation Priority   -.158 
    
Interaction Effects (Moderation)    
Strategic Autonomy * Exploitation Priority   .264** 
Job Autonomy * Exploitation Priority   .249** 
    
R² .098 .348 .502 
Adjusted R² .028 .278 .426 
F 1.391 5.003*** 6.597*** 
Chi-Square (Koenker Test) 2.400 8.467 13.858 
* p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
a N=87; Standardized coefficients 
Model 1 only shows one significant regression coefficient indicating a positive relationship 
between maturity stage and venture success (β=.257, p<.05). Model 2 shows two significantly 
positive regression coefficients on corporate venture success for strategic autonomy (β=.327, 
p<.01) and job autonomy (β=.416, p<.001), which leads to the conclusion that the Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. The explanatory power of Model 2 is highly significant 
(p<.001), showing a significant improvement compared to Model 1 (p<.05). Model 3 retains the 
significance of the two regression coefficients on strategic autonomy (β=.357, p<.01) and job 
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autonomy (β=.499, p<.001). Moreover, the model shows positive moderation effects of 
exploitation priority with a significant regression coefficient on the interaction term between 
strategic autonomy and exploitation priority (β=.264, p<.01) and the interaction term between job 
autonomy and exploitation priority (β=.249, p<.01). These results lead to the conclusion that 
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected. Model 3 has a significant increase in 
explanatory power compared to Model 2 (p<.05).  
Hence, the regression analyses find outcomes consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that strategic autonomy and job autonomy are positively associated with corporate 
venture success as strategic autonomy facilitates explorative venture development based on the 
ability to take responsive initiatives (cf. Nonaka, 1988; Andersen & Nielsen, 2007) and job 
autonomy enhances venture managers to develop work methods fitting the novel task environment 
(cf. Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Unsworth & Clegg, 2010).  
The outcomes are also consistent with Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, which predict that a 
business policy with a priority for exploitation will enforce the positive effects of strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy. A corporate policy with an exploitation priority may enhance the 
positive effect of strategic autonomy on corporate venture success. That is, the performance effect 
of strategic autonomy can be substantially higher in situations with high exploitation priority 
compared to situations with low or medium exploitation priority (Figure 6.2). The illustration 
below is computed based on the statistical data. 
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Figure 6.2: Interaction Effect between Strategic Autonomy and Exploitation Priority 
 
Similarly, a corporate policy with an exploitation priority may have incremental positive effects 
on corporate venture success when corporate management simultaneously grants job autonomy to 
the venture manager. Hence, the positive performance effect of job autonomy can be substantially 
higher in situations with high exploitation priority compared to situations with low or medium 
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Figure 6.3: Interaction Effect between Job Autonomy and Exploitation Priority 
 
These findings indicate that the effectiveness of both strategic autonomy and job autonomy 
increase significantly when corporate management simultaneously emphasizes exploitation 
priority in the venture manager’s work-mode decisions. 
6.6 DISCUSSION 
It was stated that corporate venturing is an effective way for corporations to develop opportunities 
that extend the corporate business portfolio as a basis for ongoing strategic renewal and adaptation 
for long-term survival (cf. Kuratko, 2010). Approximately at the same time it was proposed that 
effective corporate venture management is linked to (a) semi-autonomous structures (cf. Covin et 
al., 2010) with (b) loose corporation-venture relations (cf. Burgers et al., 2009). From these two 
statements we may derive that the freedom of action that the corporations grant to their ventures 
and the business policy they impose affect corporate venture success (cf. Thornhill & Amit, 2000). 
In accordance with the conclusions drawn from the two statements, (1) we analyzed how corporate 
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management to the venture managers. We also (2) investigated the moderating effects of corporate 
business policy that forces exploitation priority in the venture manager’s decision making. In the 
following, we discuss the research results guided by our four hypotheses.  
Ad (1), the results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 whereby it is indicated that corporate venture 
success is enhanced when corporate management provides venture managers with higher levels of 
job autonomy. Job autonomy can enable the ventures to break out of established routines, 
procedures and norms (cf. Shalley & Gilson, 2004; Parker, 2014) to develop new capabilities that 
fit the task environment of the novel business environment (cf. Kanter, 1989). The results are also 
consistent with Hypothesis 2 as it is indicated that strategic autonomy is positively related to 
corporate venture success. Strategic autonomy can trigger exploration as it provides venture 
managers the freedom to take responsive strategic initiatives and thereby engage in experimental 
learning about new effective ways to achieve market impact (cf. Andersen, 2004). We may state 
that the empirical study is consistent with the hypothesized assumption that the job autonomy of 
venture managers can be beneficial for developing new capabilities and that the strategic autonomy 
of the venture manager can be beneficial to explore new market opportunities. 
Ad (2) we also tested the proposed moderation effect of business policy on the relations of strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy on corporate venture success. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, our 
results indicates that the positive effect of strategic autonomy on corporate venture success can be 
amplified when corporate management simultaneously emphasizes a business policy that forces 
venture managers to consider exploitation priority in their work-mode decisions. In line with 
Hypothesis 4, the regression results show also that the positive effect of job autonomy on corporate 
venture success can be increased by corporate management when simultaneously enforcing a 
business policy that forces venture managers to consider exploitation priority in their strategic 
decision making.  
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Main contribution of the study  
In conclusion, our results indicate that corporate venture success is positively affected by both job 
autonomy and strategic autonomy, which is amplified by a business policy that simultaneously 
imposes exploitation priority in the strategic decisions and work-mode decisions of the venture 
manager. These findings lead us to the main contribution of the study. 
So, our study provides a management model that shows how corporate management may master 
the challenge to balance the corporate venture activities such that the new business can be invented 
and reaches profitability. Our results offer fairly straightforward recommendations for corporate 
venture management by generally acknowledging the positive influence of a “guided hands-off 
strategy”. The findings show that corporate management can gain significantly greater corporate 
venture success by (1) granting venture managers with the authority to make autonomous strategic 
decisions and (2) to make autonomous work-mode decisions. This broad decision authority 
enables venture managers to engage effectively in explorative activities to invent the new business. 
However, corporate management should (3) at the same time impose a business policy that 
enforces the exploitation objective to increase profitability. 
Prior research suggested that effective exploration may depend on a balance between tight and 
loose corporation-venture relations (cf. Thornhill & Amit, 2000) with a certain relatedness between 
the corporation and the ventures (cf. Kuratko et al., 2009; Crockett et al., 2013) reflecting 
differentiation-integration design aspects (cf. Burgers et al., 2009). Consistent with our findings, 
these prior studies highlight the need to provide some freedom to enable effective explorative 
activities for inventing the new business but also emphasize to ensure that corporate ventures also 
engage to a certain degree in exploitation activities to increase profitability. In line with these prior 
findings, our results indicate that corporate ventures are most successful when corporate 
management grants venture managers with the autonomy to effectively engage in explorative 
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activities and simultaneously promotes a business policy emphasizing exploitative venture 
activities. Our study allows us to also draw further conclusions.  
Further contributions of the study 
The study contributes to the venture management literature in five further ways. First, it shows 
that corporate venture autonomy fundamentally depends on the dispersion of power from 
corporate management to the venture manager. The finding indicates that corporate venture 
autonomy is not necessarily created by separating corporate venture activities from the corporate 
mainstream activities (structural differentiation) (see, e.g., Burgers et al., 2009), but may also be 
sufficiently generated through power dispersion. Second, our study extends the conceptual 
understanding of the role and effect of different kinds of decision authority providing operational 
freedom (job autonomy) and strategic freedom (strategic autonomy) to the venture manager for 
effective corporate venture management. In contrast, prior research has not differentiated between 
strategic and work-mode aspects in the decision making of corporate ventures (see, e.g., Thornhill 
& Amit, 2000; Crockett et al., 2013). Thus, we contribute a new construct that enable researchers 
to measure the decision authority of corporate ventures more precisely. Third, the study identifies 
business policy as a strategic integration device where exploitation priority enforces the positive 
effects of autonomous strategic and operational action by enhancing economic efficiencies. 
Fourth, the proposed corporate venture management model is tested on a sample of SMEs and 
thereby updates the limited pool of empirical studies supporting the assumption that it is beneficial 
to establish corporate ventures as (semi-)autonomous subunits even in less formalized 
organizations (cf. Johnson, 2012; Garrett & Covin, 2013). Fifth, our results hold methodological 
implications to future research endeavors as the thesis shows that the autonomy of corporate 
ventures can effectively be measures by capturing the decision authority of the venture managers. 
Prior studies have often measured the independence of the corporate venture operations (i.e., 
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workflows, procedures and processes) from the corporation as an indicator for corporate venture 
autonomy (see, e.g., Kuratko et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; Garrett & Covin, 2013).  
6.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter answers RQ3 and provides an answer to the PS. The answers are briefly summarized 
in the following two subsections.  
6.7.1 ANSWER TO THE RQ3  
The results of the performed multiple regression analysis enable us to answer RQ3: How are the 
autonomy dimensions related to the success of the corporate ventures? Model 2 (shown in Table 
6.4) supports our assumption that strategic autonomy and job autonomy are both positively related 
with corporate venture success. Also, the study further developed the autonomy construct (Figure 
5.2) evaluated in Chapter 5. Exploitation priority is included as a variable that moderates the 
positive impact of strategic autonomy and job autonomy on corporate venture success (see Figure 
6.1). The hypothesized moderation effects were tested and could not be rejected.  
6.7.2 ANSWER TO THE PS 
The study in this chapter provides also an answer to the PS: How can corporate management 
effectively manage corporate ventures? The results of the multiple regression analysis reveal an 
empirical management model (Model 3 in Table 6.4) which shows how corporate management 
can effectively manage corporate ventures by following three principles. Corporate management 
should grant the venture managers with both, (1) the authority to make work-mode decisions 
without approval (job autonomy) and (2) the authority to make strategic decisions without 
approval (strategic autonomy). Corporate management should at the same time (3) enforce a 
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business policy that forces the venture manager to consider exploitation priority in their strategic 







Chapter 7  
7 Answering the Problem Statement and 
Identifying the Contributions 
This chapter provides the conclusive answers to the research questions (RQs) and to the problem 
statement (PS), formulated in Chapter 1. The answers to the three research questions RQ1 to RQ3 
are given in the Chapters 3 to 6 and are summarized in Section 7.1. The problem statement is 
answered in Section 7.2 based on the empirical model (Table 6.4, Model 3) that is evaluated 
statistically in Chapter 6. The theoretical and practical implications of the thesis are presented in 
Section 7.3. The limitations of the research results are reported in Section 7.4. Recommendations 
for future research endeavors are given in Section 7.5.  
7.1 ANSWERS TO THE THREE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this section, the three research questions (RQs) are answered. Guided by the research questions, 
the thesis seeks to explore the dimensions that are underpinning the autonomy of venture managers 
(RQ1) and operationalize these autonomy dimensions into a multidimensional measurement 
instrument (RQ2) that enables to investigate the relations between the autonomy dimensions and 
corporate ventures success (RQ3). The answers that are given to the three research questions 
throughout the thesis are summarized in the Subsections 7.1.1 to 7.1.3. 
7.1.1 THE DIMENSIONS REFLECTING THE AUTONOMY OF VENTURE MANAGERS 
Chapter 2 highlights that corporate ventures are an effective means for corporations to enter novel 
business domains as an attempt to renew the corporate business portfolio strategically. However, 
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corporations often fail with these initiatives which is attributed to mismanagement through 
corporate management (cf. Ginsberg & Hay, 1994; Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). Managing corporate 
ventures is a challenge as corporate ventures are semi-autonomous subunits (cf. Kuratko, 2010). 
While corporate ventures are somehow related to the corporation, it is essential that corporate 
management grants venture managers with sufficient autonomy to enable effective engagement in 
venture activities (cf. McGrath, 2001). However, the literature review (see Chapter 2) shows that 
it is not well understood what kind of autonomy should be granted to venture managers. In order 
to shed some light upon this matter, we formulated three research questions that built on one 
another. The first research question intending to explore what kind of autonomy venture managers 
may enjoy is formulated as follows.  
RQ1:  What are the dimensions reflecting the autonomy that corporate management 
grants to venture managers? 
Chapter 3 provides an answer to the RQ1. The chapter shows that venture managers have a pivotal 
role to enter novel business domains with their corporate venture teams. Consistent with the 
literature, we found that venture managers develop the new business through explorative activities 
(i.e., experimentation, improvisation and search) which is workable when venture managers are 
granted with sufficient autonomy (cf. McGrath, 2001). In addition to what is already known in 
literature, we provide some evidence that the autonomy of venture managers is reflected in the 
following four autonomy dimensions: (a) functional autonomy, (b) decision autonomy, (c) 
strategic autonomy and (d) job autonomy. The autonomy dimensions are described in the 
following. 
Ad (a), corporate ventures with full functional autonomy would represent a cross-functional team 
that includes representatives from all business functions (e.g., sales, marketing, R&D) which are 
required to develop the new business. Correspondingly, functional autonomy indicates the extent 
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to which the venture managers can act autonomously with their teams without relying on external 
expertise on function.  
Ad (b), decision autonomy is the authority of venture managers to make operational decisions 
without approval through corporate management. This authority enables venture managers to 
bypass hierarchical analytical decision procedures which are often associated with time consuming 
approval meetings with corporate management. Thus, decision autonomy may provide venture 
managers with the flexibility that is necessary for responsive decision making.  
Ad (c), strategic autonomy is the authority of venture managers to make strategic decisions without 
approval. Strategic decisions may refer to strategic issues such as new market activities, new 
product and service developments as well as change in practices and policies (cf. Andersen, 2004). 
Granting venture managers with strategic autonomy enables venture managers to engage in 
strategy probing (cf. Andersen, 2004) which provides the necessary space for new and effective 
strategic action to evolve. 
Ad (d), job autonomy is the authority of venture managers to make work-mode decisions without 
approval. This authority reflects the freedom that venture managers hold in their job with respect 
to work methods, including the choice of procedures adopted by the team, the scheduling of the 
team’s work activities and the choice of criteria used to evaluate the work performance of the team. 
Thus, job autonomy enables the venture manager to perform his jobs outside the corporate standard 
procedures. 
The following research question is addressed in order to operationalize an instrument that enables 
to measure the autonomy of the venture managers based on the four autonomy dimensions.  
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7.1.2 INTEGRATING THE AUTONOMY DIMENSIONS IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT 
As shown in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1), the autonomy of venture managers may reflect various 
conditions, such as loose versus tight control, centralized versus decentralized decision-making, 
dependent versus independent venture operations and dependency versus independency on 
corporate resources. A multidimensional autonomy construct (measurement instrument) is 
accordingly proposed to precisely measure the autonomy of venture managers. However, the 
literature review conducted in Chapter 2 highlights that an appropriate measurement instrument is 
yet to be provided. Building on the answers given to RQ1, an initial four-dimensional measurement 
instrument (functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job autonomy) is 
operationalized in Chapter 4. The initial measurement instrument is evaluated statistically and 
adapted in Chapter 5. Thereby, the thesis provides an answer to the following research question.  
RQ2:  How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 be operationalized in a 
construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? 
In Chapter 4, a theoretical model (Figure 4.7) is developed based on literature research. The model 
positions the four autonomy dimensions, namely, functional autonomy, decision autonomy, 
strategic autonomy and job autonomy as distinct (unrelated) dimensions and associates them with 
corporate venture success. The variables of the model are operationalized which provides an initial 
four-dimensional measurement instrument that allows to measure the autonomy of venture 
managers at various dimensions and degrees.  
In Chapter 5, the validity and the reliability of the initial four-dimensional measurement instrument 
(developed in Chapter 4) is evaluated. The initial measurement instrument had to be adapted in 
order to ensure good validity and reliability. Variable reduction techniques are applied to evaluate 
and adapt the instrument. The study follows therefore the four step procedure described by Field 
(2013). In the first step, it is shown (based on the correlation matrix, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
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index and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity) that the data is suitable to apply variable reduction 
techniques (e.g., Principal Component Analysis or Principal Factor Analysis). In the second step, 
Principal Component Analysis is found to be the appropriate technique and Parallel Analysis 
provides evidence that the number of components to extract should be four. In the third step, it is 
evaluated that Varimax rotation is the appropriate rotation method. The results of the Varimax 
rotation show that most of the items of the functional autonomy measure and the decision 
autonomy measure do not load appropriately as the component loadings are below the .6 
threshold and the cross-loadings are above the .3 threshold (Table 5.7). Therefore, the items of 
both measures are excluded to test whether results can be improved. The Varimax rotation with 
the items for the strategic autonomy measure and the job autonomy measure retained provides 
a two-dimensional component solution (Table 5.8) with good construct validity (with 
component loadings above .6 and cross-loadings below .3). In the fourth step, Cronbach’s 
Alpha coefficients are computed for the measures of strategic autonomy and job autonomy. 
Results confirm good internal consistency for both autonomy measures (with Alpha coefficient 
above .8). Thus, Chapter 5 reveals a two-dimensional instrument that enables to measure the 
autonomy of the venture manager. 
7.1.3 REVEALING THE IMPACT OF AUTONOMY ON CORPORATE VENTURE SUCCESS 
RQ3 is addressed to evaluate whether strategic autonomy and job autonomy are associated with 
corporate venture success. The evaluated measurement instrument (Chapter 5) enables us to 
investigate the association of strategic autonomy and job autonomy with corporate venture 
success. For that purpose, a questionnaire is distributed in the German IT consulting industry. The 
answers of 87 venture managers are analyzed through multiple regression analysis in Chapter 6. 
The results provide an answer the following research question.  
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RQ3:  How are the autonomy dimensions related to the success  
of the corporate ventures? 
Before linear multiple regression analysis is conducted to answer the question, (1) the general 
methodology is evaluated, (2) it is tested whether linear regression analysis is appropriate and if 
data analysis is constrained through potential outliers and (3) whether heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity effects are present. Ad (1), corporate venture research may generally be subject 
to the following five methodological limitations: hindsight bias, success bias, social desirability 
bias, non-response bias and common source bias. It is however shown in Subsection 6.4.2 that 
none of these limitations constrains the data analysis in such a way that further analysis is 
impossible. Ad (2), skewness analysis and residual analyses are performed in Subsection 6.4.3 and 
confirm that data analysis is not constrained through outliers in a way that data analysis is 
impossible and the data is appropriate for linear regression analysis, after the skewness of two 
control variables (number of FTEs employed the firm and number of FTEs employed at 
corporate venture) is corrected through log transformation. Ad (3), heteroscedasticity analysis and 
multicollinearity analysis are performed in Subsection 6.4.3 and confirm that data is 
homoscedastic and multicollinearity is not present. Having evaluated the research methodology 
and the appropriateness of the data to apply linear regression analysis, the relationships of strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy with corporate venture success is analyzed in Section 6.5. The results 
of the regression analysis reveal an empirical model (Model 2 of Table 6.4) which shows that 
strategic autonomy and job autonomy are both positively related with corporate venture success. 
These regression results provide an answer to RQ3. 
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7.2 ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the following, the problem statement (PS) is answered based on the results of the regression 
analysis performed in Chapter 6. The consecutive research carried out to answer the three research 
questions (RQ1 to RQ3) led to the empirical results reported in Chapter 6, which enable us to 
answer the problem statement. The problem statement reads as follows.  
PS: How can corporate management effectively manage corporate ventures? 
The research results of Chapter 6 reveal an empirical model (Model 3 of Table 6.4, illustrated in 
Figure 6.1) that shows how corporate management can effectively manage corporate ventures. The 
answer to the problem statement is given in Subsection 7.2.1 where the empirical model is 
described and the essence of the model is summarized in three principles. Additionally, it is 
discussed in Subsection 7.2.2 how corporate managers may realize the model through management 
routines. 
7.2.1 THE MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE VENTURE MANAGEMENT 
The empirical model provides evidence that strategic autonomy and job autonomy are both 
positively associated with corporate venture success. The model shows further that the positive 
relations of strategic autonomy and job autonomy with corporate venture success are further 
amplified when the achievement of exploitative objectives is emphasized at the same time. The 
essence of these empirical model is summarized below in order to provide an answer the problem 
statement.  
First, corporate managers should allow venture managers to make strategic decisions without their 
approval (strategic autonomy). The authority to make autonomous strategic decisions (i.e., new 
market activities, new product and service developments and change in practices and policies) 
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provides venture managers with the freedom to act independently and engage in autonomy actions 
(cf. Andersen, 2004). Autonomous actions are a “form of efficient low-risk strategy probing based 
on active search” which enables effective strategic influence to emerge from the venture manager 
(cf. Andersen & Nielsen, 2007: 22). 
Second, corporate managers should grant venture managers with the authority to make work-mode 
decisions without their approval (job autonomy). Work-mode decisions refer to the work methods 
including the procedures the venture adopts, the scheduling of venture activities and the criteria 
used to evaluate work performance of venture activities. Job autonomy provides venture managers 
with the freedom necessary to break out of established routines, procedures and norms of the 
corporate mainstream business in order to develop work methods that fit the novel task 
environment of the new business domain.  
Third, granting venture managers with essential freedom to act (i.e., strategic autonomy and job 
autonomy) does not imply that corporate management should reduce the influence on the activities 
of venture managers to a minimum. In fact, our model shows that the positive influence of strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy on corporate venture success is amplified when venture managers 
are simultaneously enforced through business policy  to consider exploitation priority (e.g., 
improving achieved solutions, penetrate more deeply in existing customer segments and routinize 
established operations) in their strategic and work-mode decisions. It is therefore concluded that 
corporate management (a) should grant venture managers with essential freedom to act for 
inventing the new business and (b) should ensure at the same time that general efficiency 
requirements are also achieved. 
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7.2.2 REALIZING EFFECTIVE VENTURE MANAGEMENT THROUGH MANAGEMENT ROUTINES 
While the principles of the empirical model provides straight forward recommendations, it is not 
obvious how corporate managers may effectively realize them. As is reported in Chapter 2 
(Subsection 2.2.3), I build on the dynamic capability-based view to address the challenge of 
corporate management to manage corporate ventures effectively. The dynamic capability-based 
view associates effective management with routines (cf. Strehle, 2006; Teece, 2012) which are 
described as the recurrent interaction patterns carried out among multiple actors (cf. Becker, 2004). 
The routines refer in the context of corporate venture management to the regular and recurring 
meetings between the corporate management and the venture managers (management routines). 
The corporate management can exercise influence and control over the venture managers in the 
management routines. Correspondingly, corporate managers can realize effective corporate 
venture management (according to our empirical mode) by establishing management routines in 
which they: (a) limit their control to provide venture managers with the authority to make strategic 
decisions (strategic autonomy) as well as work-mode decisions (job autonomy) without their 
approval and simultaneously (b) exercise sufficient influence on the venture manager to ensure 
some exploitation priority in the venture manager’s decision making. 
7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions of the thesis are twofold. First, our results hold essential theoretical implications 
that contribute to the current body of knowledge meant for corporate venture scholars. Second, the 
study contributes important practical implications that are of relevance for corporate management 
in charge for supervising venture managers. In the Subsections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, I summarize the 
theoretical and practical contributions.  
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7.3.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The results of this thesis contributes to the theoretical discussion in four ways. First, the research 
contributes to the current conceptual understanding of the instrument that allows to measure the 
autonomy of venture managers. The literature review (Chapter 2) shows that the autonomy of 
venture managers is primarily measured through the extent to which venture managers are 
authorized to make decisions without approval (see, e.g., Crockett et al., 2013). We explore the 
relevance of two distinct aspect of decision authority (strategic autonomy and job autonomy). The 
distinction between strategic decisions and work-mode decisions is not made before by corporate 
venture scholars. Thus, we contribute a new instrument that enables researchers to measure more 
precisely the autonomy of venture managers than the established instruments. Applying our 
measurement instrument in future research may essentially contribute to the controversial 
discussion (see Chapter 2) concerning the relationship between decision authority and corporate 
venture success.  
Second, the thesis is among the first research products that investigate whether the principles of 
segregation also applies to SMEs. Even though SMEs are less formalized organizations, still our 
results provide evidence that the segregation of corporate ventures from mainstream business in 
terms of power dispersion (strategic autonomy and job autonomy) can have a positive influence 
on the success of corporate ventures. So far, the necessity to segregate corporate ventures has only 
been shown in the context of large, formalized corporations (cf. Johnson, 2012).  
Third, our findings show further how to realize the segregation of corporate ventures. The 
dispersion of decision power grants autonomy to corporate ventures and thereby contributes to 
segregation. Our results provide missing evidence that the segregation of corporate ventures 
through the dispersion of power concerning strategic decisions as well as work-mode decisions 
can positively influence the success of corporate ventures. So far, prior research has associated 
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segregation of corporate ventures with the structural differentiation of venture activities from 
corporate mainstream activities (cf. Burgers et al., 2009).  
Fourth, following the dynamic capability-based view, we acknowledge that management routines 
through which corporate management and venture managers interact are essential for effective 
venture management. Corporate managers can realize effective venture management by limiting 
their control (i.e., grant venture managers with decision authority) and exercising influence (i.e., 
pushing venture managers to achieve exploitative objectives) in the management routines. As 
shown in Chapter 2, prior research has followed the resource-based view and the organizational 
design-based view without providing a sound explanation for effective corporate venture 
management. Thus, our research results contribute to the current body of knowledge by corporate 
venture scholars as we reveal that the dynamic capability-based view may provide an alternative 
analytical lens to investigate the management of corporate ventures. 
7.3.2 PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
The research conducted in this thesis reveals an empirical model that provides straight forward 
recommendations for corporate managers to evaluate/improve their venture management 
practice. Corporate venture activities and their outcomes are associated with increased 
unpredictability. Corporate managers may, as a result, follow their intuition to increase control in 
order to reduce the information asymmetry that generally exists between them and the venture 
managers. However, increased control chokes the explorative behavior of venture managers. 
Corporate managers should therefore give up excessive control and pass on the authority to make 
strategic decisions as well as work-mode decisions to the venture managers in order to increase 
the probability for corporate venture success.  
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Granting increased decision authority may allow venture managers to effectively engage in venture 
activities (cf. McGrath, 2001) but also increases the risk that general efficiency requirements (i.e., 
profitability) are left unfulfilled. Our empirical model shows that corporate managers should not 
only grant venture managers with increased decision authority but should simultaneously enforce 
venture managers to achieve exploitative objectives. Correspondingly, we may conclude that a 
“guided hands-off strategy” which combines decision authority with continuous pushes towards 
exploitative objectives is promising to manage corporate ventures effectively.  
7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
While we have taken reasonable precaution to ensure the reliability and the validity of our research 
results, the generalizability of our findings may be limited due to the following five aspects.  
First, the research carried out throughout the thesis (data set A, B and C) has focused on SMEs. 
Future research is necessary to evaluate whether our findings also hold for large multinational 
corporations (MNCs).  
Second, the three data sets (A, B and C) on which this thesis builds are collected in Germany. The 
German ‘Mittelstand’ (SMEs) is known for its international competitiveness (e.g., the hidden 
champions which are globally market leadership in niches). Correspondingly, SMEs in other 
countries may potentially learn from the practice of German SMEs. Nevertheless, cross-cultural 
differences may exist that limit the transferability of our findings. It is recognized that cultural 
differences across countries may influence entrepreneurial behavior within corporations (cf. 
Morris, Davis, & Allen, 1994). Future research is required to evaluate whether our findings are 
also applicable to other national and geographical contexts.  
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Third, the sample (data set C) of the research carried out in Chapter 6 is limited to corporations in 
the IT consulting industry. Thus, the results associated with our empirical model may not reflect 
effective corporate venture management in other industries. Cross-industry research may provide 
clarity.  
Fourth, the level of dynamism in the German IT consulting industry is relatively high with a mean 
value of 17.87 (s.d. 3.23) on a maximum scale of 24. Prior research has shown that the 
effectiveness of autonomy is increased in industries with high levels of dynamism relatively to 
industries with low levels of dynamism (cf. Andersen, 2004). Thus, our findings may not be 
transferable to corporations that operate in industries with low levels dynamism.  
Fifth, the generalizability of our results may also be limited due to the sample size (87 observations 
only). However, it is acknowledged that an ultimate source which would allow to identify 
corporate ventures does not exist (cf. Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). Multiple studies by corporate 
venture scholars state that it is particularly difficult to collect large data sets on corporate ventures 
(Kuratko et al., 2009; Johnson, 2012; Crockett et al., 2013; Garrett & Covin, 2013; Garrett & 
Neubaum, 2013). As already discussed in Section 5.1, small sample sizes are acceptable as no 
other source is available. The following studies published in corporate venture scholars provide 
evidence that our sample size of n=87 is acceptable in our research domain. The study by Johnson 
(2012) has a sample size of n=64, the study published by Crockett et al. (2013) has a sample size 
of n=78, the study of Thornhill and Amit (2000) has a sample size of n=102, the study of 
Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) has a sample size of n=95 and the studies published by Garrett and 
Covin (2013), Garrett and Neubaum (2013) and Kuratko et al. (2009) have a sample size of n=145. 
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7.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section provides three recommendations for future research. First, our regression results show 
a positive relationship of strategic autonomy and job autonomy with corporate venture success. 
Although the validity and the reliability of these results are carefully checked, it is also true that 
our results do not provide evidence for a causal relationship between the two autonomy dimensions 
and corporate venture success. A longitudinal study is therefore recommended in which the 
interplay of strategic autonomy and job autonomy with corporate venture success can be examined 
over time. Such a longitudinal study may further benefit from including a variable (e.g., as a 
dependent variable) that measures the explorative behavior of corporate venture teams. The link 
between decision authority and explorative activities has been made in previous studies (cf. 
McGrath, 2001). However, the interaction of strategic autonomy and job autonomy (as distinct 
aspects of decision authority) and explorative behavior may be essential to understand the causal 
linkage between autonomy and corporate venture success.  
Second, the power of strategic autonomy and job autonomy to predict corporate venture success 
may be influenced by internal and external factors as it is indicated in prior studies. As highlighted 
in the limitations (Section 7.4), external factors, such as industry characteristics and cultural 
aspects may have an influence on the relation between autonomy and corporate venture success. 
Cross-cultural and cross-industry studies may thus provide a valuable contribution to further 
understand the conditions in which strategic autonomy and job autonomy are effective. Future 
research should also include internal factors such as top management team characteristics, trust 
between corporate management and venture management as well as the entrepreneurial orientation 
of a firm, as these internal factors may also influence the effectiveness of autonomy.  
Third, the thesis demonstrates that corporate venture management is associated with the 
management routines in which corporate management and venture manager engage in interaction. 
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While our research results enable us to describe parts of this interaction, we also acknowledge that 
the total interaction patterns are not well understood. The research design of the thesis does not 
enable us to provide an extensive and detailed description of the entire interaction patterns of 
corporate management and venture managers. Qualitative research might be the most promising 
research methodology to broadly observe and describe the interaction patterns. Qualitative 
research is known for its appropriateness to carry out in-depth observations, which is required to 
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APPENDIX A1: FIRST SERIES OF INTERVIEWS FOR THE CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
The table below shows the first series of interviews that was conducted for the research outlined 
in Chapter 3. Interviews were conducted with six corporate managers in six companies in three 
industries (Information Technology, Automotive Supplier and Photovoltaic Industry). The date of 
the interviews are given in the last column.  
Company Interviewee Industry Date 
Company 1 Corporate Manager Information Technology 27.05.2011 
Company 2 Corporate Manager Automotive Supplier 06.09.2011 
Company 3 Corporate Manager Information Technology 24.05.2011 
Company 4 Corporate Manager Photovoltaic Industry 31.05.2011 
Company 5 Corporate Manager Information Technology 30.05.2011 
Company 6 Corporate Manager Information Technology 18.07.2011 
APPENDIX A2: SECOND SERIES OF INTERVIEWS FOR THE CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
The table below shows the second series of interviews that was conducted for the research outlined 
in Chapter 3. Interviews were conducted with three corporate managers and four venture managers 
in 5 companies. The companies 2, 3 4 and 5 are the same than in the first series of interviews. 
Company 7 was interviewed for the first time. 
Company Interviewee Industry Date 
Company 2 Corporate Manager Automotive Supplier 14.03.2012 
Company 3 Venture Manager Information Technology 07.09.2011 
Company 4 Venture Manager Photovoltaic 14.09.2011 
Company 4 Venture Manager Photovoltaic 02.11.2011 
Company 5 Corporate Manager Information Technology 06.09.2011 
Company 5 Venture Manager Information Technology 30.04.2012 
Company 7 Corporate Manager Information Technology 16.05.2012 
 
  




APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS TO EVALUATE THE MEASURES 
The table below shows the managers that were interviewed to evaluate the measurement scales as 
described in Chapter 4. The interviews are conducted with corporate managers and venture 
managers in six companies. The companies 4, 5 and 7 were already part of the interviews 
conducted for the Chapter 3 (see Appendices A1 and A2). The companies 8, 9 and 10 were 
interviewed for the first time. In company 7, interviews were conducted with two corporate 
managers (corporate manager 1 and corporate manager 2) and two venture managers (venture 
manager 1 and venture manager 2). The companies are part of four industries (Information 
Technology, Media Industry, Consulting Industry and Photovoltaic Industry). The date of the 
interviews are given in the last column. 
Company Evaluation Study Industry Date 
Company 7 Venture Manager 1 Information Technology 16.05.2012 
Company 5 Venture Manager Information Technology 22.05.2012 
Company 8 Corporate Manager Media Industry 29.05.2012 
Company 8 Venture Manager Media Industry 29.05.2012 
Company 9 Corporate Manager Information Technology 30.05.2012 
Company 10 Corporate Manager Consulting Industry 30.05.2012 
Company 7 Corporate Manager 1 Information Technology 31.05.2012 
Company 7 Corporate Manager 2 Information Technology 31.05.2012 
Company 7 Venture Manager 1 Information Technology 01.06.2012 
Company 7 Venture Manager 2 Information Technology 01.06.2012 
Company 4 Venture Manager Photovoltaic Industry 26.06.2012 
Company 5 Corporate Manager Information Technology 26.06.2012 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF CORPORATIONS 
The following table lists the names of the companies that are part of the data set used for data 
analysis performed in the Chapters 5 and 6. The data refers to the survey answers given by the 
venture managers. In six cases (marked in italics), two answers were received from the same 
company. In all six cases, the survey was answered by different respondents. This is evaluated (a) 
by the entered access codes and (b) the email address that the respondents entered at the end of the 
questionnaire to receive the results of the study. The access code (individually created for each 
participant and thus linked to a specific name) in combination with the entered email address 
enabled us to clearly identify the participants.  
1. 4C Group AG 
2. 7P ERP Consulting 
GmbH 
3. Abilis GmbH 
4. ABIT GmbH 
5. Albat + Wirsam 
Software GmbH 
6. Albat + Wirsam 
Software GmbH 
7. ALPHA Business 
Solutions AG 
8. ams.Solution AG 
9. Artundweise GmbH 
10. ASCAD GmbH 
11. Avantgarde Business 
Solutions GmbH 
12. b+m Informatik AG 
13. Bauserve GmbH 
14. BINSERV Gesellschaft 
für interaktive 
Konzepte und neue 
Medien mbH 
15. Binserv GmbH 
16. CAS Software AG 
17. CGI Deutschland Ltd. 
& Co. KG 
18. COC AG 
19. Consileon Business 
Consultancy GmbH 




 22. Devoteam Danet GmbH 
23. Devoteam Danet GmbH 
24. d-fine GmbH 







27. Empalis Consulting GmbH 
28. EXCON Externe 
Controlling Services 
GmbH 
29. FAS AG 
30. Fun Communications 
GmbH 
31. GFOS Gesellschaft für 
Organisationsberatung und 
Softwareentwicklung mbH 
32. goetzpartners Management 
Consultants GmbH 
33. Hönigsberg & Düvel 
Datentechnik GmbH 
34. Habel GmbH & Co. KG 
35. HGV Hanseatische 
Gesellschaft für 
Verlagsservice mbH 
36. IKOR Management- und 
Systemberatung GmbH 
37. Incadea GmbH 
38. Interbrand Zintzmeyer & 
Lux GmbH 
39. iTEC Services GmbH 




CONTINUING THE LIST OF CORPORATIONS 




42. iXOS Software AG 
43. J&M Management 
Consulting GmbH 
44. Janz IT AG 
45. KCS.net Deutschland 
GmbH 
46. Kerkhoff Consulting 
GmbH 
47. Kloepfel Consulting 
GmbH 
48. Koch Media GmbH 
49. Korn Ferry International 
GmbH 
50. KWP team HR GmbH 
51. KWP team HR GmbH 
52. matrix technology AG 
53. Miebach Consulting 
GmbH 
54. Moser GmbH & Co. KG 
55. Namics (Deutschland) 
GmbH 
56. ODAV AG Gesellschaft 
für Informatik und 
Telekommunikation 
57. OPITZ CONSULTING 
München GmbH 
58. ORBIS AG 
59. PanDacom Networking 
AG 
60. parameta Projektberatung 
GmbH & Co. KG 
61. pit-cup GmbH 
 62. prevero AG 
63. PRION GmbH 
64. PROFI Engineering Systems 
AG 
65. realtime AG 
66. Renostar GmbH 
67. Sachsen DV Betriebs- und 
Servicegesellschaft mbH 
68. Sage bäurer GmbH 
69. SanData Solutions GmbH 
70. Schema Consulting GmbH 
71. Schleupen AG 
72. Schleupen AG 
73. SEAL Systems AG 
74. secunet Security Networks 
AG 
75. SimPlan AG 
76. Star Cooperation GmbH 
77. Tagueri AG 
78. Telecomputer Gesellschaft 
für Datenverarbeitung mbH 
79. arxes-tolina GmbH 
80. TriFinance GmbH 
81. TTS Training GmbH 
82. TXS GmbH 
83. UBH Software & 
Engineering GmbH 
84. VEDA GmbH 
85. VEDA GmbH 
86. Weiss IT Solutions GmbH 
87. WERBAS AG 
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APPENDIX D1: INVITATION E-MAIL 
Appendix D1 provides the invitation email that was send to the participants of the study. The 
invitation introduces the study, highlights the benefits for participants, defines corporate ventures, 
provides the link that directs to the questionnaire and provides the code to access it.  
Sehr geehrter Damen und Herren, 
der Aufbau neuer Geschäftsfelder ist für mittelständische, deutsche IT- und Beratungsdienstleister im globalen 
Wettbewerb existentiell. Wie diese Fähigkeit verbessert werden kann – das untersuchen die Hochschule Konstanz 
und die Universität Leiden. Auftraggeber ist das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF).  
 Wir laden Sie ein sich an unserer Untersuchung zu beteiligen. Als Gegenleistung bieten wir Ihnen: 
 Die Studienergebnisse, die das optimale Maß an Autonomie für den Geschäftsaufbau zeigen 
 Eine individuelle Analyse der Situation Ihres Unternehmens 
 Ein Benchmark mit dem „Best in Class“ deutscher IT- und Beratungsdienstleiter 
 Ermäßigte Teilnehmergebühren für einen internationalen Expertenworkshop in Den Haag 
Eine Einladung zu einem exklusiven Roundtable in München mit Geschäftsführern namhafter deutscher 
Unternehmen des Mittelstandes 
Aktuelle Untersuchungen zeigen, dass neue Geschäftsfelder im Mittelstand erfolgreich durch teilautonome Teams 
aufgebaut werden können. Diese Teams werden zu Beginn oftmals provisorisch besetzt, mit der Aufgabe eine 
Geschäftsidee zu prüfen und weiterzuentwickeln. Im Laufe des Projekts etablierten sich daraus oftmals Business 
Units mit zusätzlichem Wachstumspotential. Je nachdem in welcher Phase sich die Geschäftsentwicklung befindet, 
benötigen diese Teams unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägte Autonomie. 
In dieser Studie untersuchen wir, welche Art von Autonomie in welchem Maß optimal für die Geschäftsentwicklung 
in den einzelnen Reifephasen ist. 
Hierzu bitten wir Sie um Ihr Expertenwissen und 15-20 Minuten Ihrer Zeit. 
Kopieren Sie diesen Sicherheitscode BAFsyUfV und beginnen Sie unter folgendem Link mit der Umfrage: 
https://qtrial.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_3eXPjl6dvbw1Zhr 
Ihre Angaben werden selbstverständlich vertraulich behandelt und anonymisiert. Für Rückfragen stehen wir Ihnen 
jederzeit gerne zur Verfügung. Sie erreichen uns per e-mail unter jeromegard@htwg-konstanz.de oder telefonisch 
unter +49 7531 206 412.  
Mit freundlichen Grüßen 
Prof. Dr. Guido Baltes 
M.Eng. Dipl.-Ing. Jérôme Gard 
Hochschule für Technik Wirtschaft und Gestaltung 
78462 Konstanz 
Telefon: +49 7531 206 412 
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Katzy 
Universität Leiden (Niederlande) 
Graduate School of Science 




APPENDIX D2: COVER LETTER 
Appendix D2 shows the start page of the survey. It defines the focus of the study, defines corporate 





APPENDIX E1: QUESTIONNAIRE – GERMAN VERSION 
Appendix E1 shows the questionnaire used to collect data. The survey was conducted in German. 
The questionnaire is therefore provided in its original language. An English version is reported in 
Appendix E2. The questionnaire consists of two parts. E1.1 is the screener which gathers general 
information on the participant. E1.2 gathers information on corporate venture management.  
E1.1 – Screener (8 Fragen) 
Screener – Frage 1 




○ Leiter der Abteilung Business Development 
○ Abteilungs- oder Divisionsleiter 
○ Teamleiter/Projektleiter○ 
○ Mitarbeiter 




Screener – Frage 2 
Wie lange sind Sie in Ihrer jetzigen Position in diesem Unternehmen bereits tätig? 
○ weniger als 1 Jahr 
○ zwischen 1-2 Jahren 
○ zwischen 2-3 Jahren 
○ zwischen 3-5 Jahren 
○ Länger als 5 Jahre 
 
Screener – Frage 3 
Gibt es in Ihrem Unternehmen Teams, die aktuell ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufbauen 
oder Teams, die in den letzten 3 Jahren ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufgebaut haben? 
○ Ja, es gibt ein oder mehrere Teams, die aktuell ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufbauen 
○ Ja, wir haben ein oder mehrere Teams die in den letzten 3 Jahren ein Geschäftsfeld aufgebaut haben 
○ Nein, solche Teams gibt es in meinem Unternehmen aktuell nicht 
 
  




Screener – Frage 4 
Haben Sie in der Vergangenheit Erfahrungen mit dem Aufbau eines neuen 
Geschäftsfelds durch Teams gemacht? 
○ Ja, ich habe den Aufbau eines neuen Geschäftsfelds in der Vergangenheit mitbegleitet 
○ Nein, ich habe keine Erfahrung mit dem Aufbau eines neuen Geschäftsfelds durch Teams  
 
Screener – Frage 5 
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der Teams, die in Ihrem Unternehmen derzeit ein neues 
Geschäftsfeld aufbauen? 













Screener – Frage 6 
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der Teams, die in Ihrem Unternehmen in den letzten 3 Jahren 
ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufgebaut haben? 
















Screener – Frage 7 
Wie groß ist die Anzahl der Teams, die in den letzten 5 Jahren den Aufbau eines neuen 
Geschäftsfelds abgebrochen haben? 













Screener – Frage 8 
Welche der nachfolgenden Aussagen trifft eher auf Sie zu? 
○ Ich bin aktuell Leiter eines Teams, das die Aufgabe hat ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufzubauen 
○ Ich bin aktuell Leiter eines Teams bzw. einer Business Unit das/die in den letzten 3 Jahren bereits ein Geschäftsfeld aufgebaut hat 
○ Ich bin aktuell der Vorgesetzte des Leiters eines Teams das aktuell ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufbaut 
 
Ich bin der Vorgesetzte des Leiters eines Teams das in den letzten 3 Jahren 
bereits ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufgebaut hat 
○ Ich bin aktuell Mitarbeiter in einem Team das aktuell ein neues Geschäftsfeld aufbaut oder in den letzten 3 Jahren aufgebaut hat 
○ 
Mit dem Aufbau eines Geschäftsfelds durch ein Team habe ich aktuell 
nichts zu tun. Allerdings habe ich dazu in der Vergangenheit Erfahrungen 
gemacht 
○ Mit dem Aufbau eines Geschäftsfelds durch ein Team habe ich noch nie Erfahrungen gemacht 
 
  




E1.2 – Venture Manager (16 Fragen) 
Venture Manager – Frage 1 
Bitte geben Sie an, in welcher Beziehung Ihr Team (verantwortlich für den Aufbau des 
neuen Geschäftsfelds) mit Ihrem Unternehmen steht. 
○ Das neue Geschäftsfeld wird im Unternehmen aufgebaut 
○ Das neue Geschäftsfeld wird außerhalb des Unternehmens aufgebaut und ist im Grunde eine eigene Organisation 
○ Das neue Geschäftsfeld wird in Kooperation mit einem oder mehreren anderen Unternehmen aufgebaut 
○ Das Geschäftsfeld wurde ursprünglich von einem anderen Unternehmen aufgebaut und später von uns übernommen 
○ Gibt es eine andere Art der Beziehung? Bitte nachfolgend kurz beschreiben: 
  
 
Venture Manager – Frage 2 (# der Mitarbeiter des Corporate Ventures) 
Aus welcher Anzahl an Vollzeitmitarbeitern besteht Ihr Team aktuell? 
Anzahl der Mitarbeiter:  
 
Venture Manager – Frage 3 (Umsatz des Corporate Venture) 
In welchem Bereich lag der Umsatz (in €) Ihres Teams im letzten abgelaufenen 
Geschäftsjahr? 
Umsatzbereich im letzten abgelaufenen Geschäftsjahr: 
○ 0-50 T-€ 
○ 50-100 T-€ 
○ 100-500 T-€ 
○ 500-1000 T-€ 
○ 1 Mio.-3 Mio. € 
○ 3 Mio.-10 Mio. € 
○ über 10 Mio. € 
 
Venture Manager – Frage 4 (# der Mitarbeiter des Unternehmens) 
Wie hoch ist die Anzahl der Vollzeitmitarbeiter, die aktuell in Ihrem Unternehmen 
beschäftigt sind? 
Anzahl der Mitarbeiter:  
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Venture Manager – Frage 5 (Umsatz des Unternehmens) 
In welchem Bereich lag der Umsatz (in €) Ihres Unternehmens im letzten 
abgelaufenen Geschäftsjahr? 
Umsatzbereich des Unternehmens im letzten abgelaufenen Geschäftsjahr 
○ < 2 Mio. € 
○ 2 Mio. – 10 Mio. € 
○ 10 Mio. – 50 Mio. € 
○ > 50 Mio. € 
 
Venture Manager – Frage 6 (Reifegrad) 
Bitte geben Sie an, bis zu welcher Reifephase Ihr Team bis heute gekommen ist. 
○ Erste Reifephase: Es wurden erste Investitionen getätigt 
○ Zweite Reifephase: Es wurden erste Umsätze erwirtschaftet 
○ Dritte Reifephase: Das Geschäftsfeld wurde profitabel 
 
Venture Manager – Frage 7 (Reifegrad) 
Bitte geben Sie ungefähr an, wann Ihr Team die nachfolgenden Reifephasen erreicht 
hat. 
 Jahr Quartal 
Erste Reifephase (A):  
Die Entscheidung wurde getroffen 
das neue Geschäftsfeld aufzubauen 
  
Erste Reifephase (B):  
Es wurden erste Investitionen 
getätigt 
  
Zweite Reifephase:  
Es wurden erste Umsätze 
erwirtschaftet 
  
Dritte Reifephase:  









Venture Manager – Frage 8 (Erfahrung) 
Wie viele Jahre Erfahrung hat Ihr Team in Summe bis heute (Sie eingeschlossen, Ihre 
Vorgesetzten ausgeschlossen) mit dem Aufbau neuer Geschäftsfelder? 
○ weniger als1 Jahr 
○ 1-2 Jahre 
○ 2-3 Jahre 
○ 3-4 Jahre 
○ 4-5 Jahre 
○ 5-6 Jahre 
○ 6-7 Jahre 
○ 7-8 Jahre 
○ 8-9 Jahre 
○ 9-10 Jahre 
○ 10-15 Jahre 
○ 15-20 Jahre 
○ Mehr als 20 Jahre 
 
Venture Manager – Frage 9 (Dynamik des Umfelds) 
Vor dem Hintergrund des Geschäftsumfeldes in dem der Geschäftsaufbau stattfindet, 





    Sehr schnelle 
Veränderung 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Technologie ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Wettbewerb ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Innovationsrate ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




Venture Manager – Frage 10 (Job Autonomie) 
Wie unabhängig von Ihren Vorgesetzten können Sie agieren, um das neue 
Geschäftsfeld aufzubauen? 
 Trifft fast 
nie zu 
    Trifft fast 
immer zu 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ich gehe unabhängig von meinen 
Vorgesetzten meinen Weg, um Projekte 
durchzuführen 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich entscheide unabhängig von meinen 
Vorgesetzten, wie ich mit meinem 
Team Aufgaben bewältige 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich entscheide unabhängig von meinen 
Vorgesetzten, wie ich mit meinem 
Team definierte Ziele erreiche 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich entscheide unabhängig von meinen 
Vorgesetzten, wann die Mitglieder 
meines Teams welche Arbeiten 
verrichten 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann meine Arbeit unabhängig von 
meinen Vorgesetzten terminieren ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich habe maßgeblich Einfluss auf die 
Definition der Indikatoren (Key 
Performance Indikatoren), nach denen 
meine Arbeit beurteilt wird 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich habe maßgeblich Einfluss auf die 
Definition der Ziele, die ich mit 
meinem Team erreichen soll 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
  




Venture Manager – Frage 11 (Strategische Autonomie) 
Wie häufig treffen Sie Entscheidungen hinsichtlich des Aufbaus des neuen 
Geschäftsfelds ohne Zustimmung Ihrer Vorgesetzten? 
 Trifft fast 
nie zu 
    Trifft fast 
immer zu 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ich kann ohne Zustimmung meiner 
Vorgesetzten Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungsaktivitäten durchführen 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann ohne Zustimmung meiner 
Vorgesetzten neue Produkte oder 
Dienstleistungen entwickeln 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann ohne Zustimmung meiner 
Vorgesetzten Mitarbeiter für 
zukünftige Projekte qualifizieren 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann ohne die Zustimmung meiner 




○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann ohne die Zustimmung meiner 
Vorgesetzten entscheiden, mit welchen 
Kundensegmenten ich zukünftig 
Geschäfte mache 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Ich kann ohne Zustimmung meiner 
Vorgesetzten neu Geschäftspraktiken 
einführen (z.B. Vertriebs- und 
Vermarktungspraktiken oder Praktiken 
des Controllings) 




Venture Manager – Frage 12 (Wichtigkeit der Funktionsbereiche) 
Bitte geben Sie an, für wie wichtig Sie die nachfolgenden Bereiche für den 










 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing (z.B. Vermarktung neuer 
Produkte und Dienstleistungen) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
HR (z.B. Qualifizierung, Recruiting 
neuer Mitarbeiter) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales (z.B. Vertriebsaktivitäten) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Kundenservice (z.B. Support und 
Service) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Controlling (z.B. Projekt-Controlling, 
Erfolgsrechnung) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Juristische Belange (z.B. 
Geschäftsbeziehungen, Patente) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Projektmanagement (z.B. Definition 
von Meilensteinen und Key 
Performance Indikatoren) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Forschung und Entwicklung (z.B. 
Entwicklungs- und 
Programmierungsaktivitäten) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
  




Venture Manager – Frage 13 (Entscheidungs-Autonomie) 
Wie häufig sind Sie bei Entscheidungen hinsichtlich des Geschäftsaufbaus in den 





ist fast nie 
notwendig 






 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing (z.B. Vermarktung 
neuer Produkte und 
Dienstleistungen) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
HR (z.B. Qualifizierung, 
Recruiting neuer Mitarbeiter) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales (z.B. Vertriebsaktivitäten) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Kundenservice (z.B. Support 
und Service) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Controlling (z.B. Projekt-
Controlling, Erfolgsrechnung) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Juristische Belange (z.B. 
Geschäftsbeziehungen, Patente) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Projektmanagement (z.B. 
Definition von Meilensteinen 
und Key Performance 
Indikatoren) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Forschung und Entwicklung 
(z.B. Entwicklungs- und 
Programmierungsaktivitäten) 




Venture Manager – Frage 14 (Functionale Autonomie) 
Bitte geben Sie an, ob Expertise bezüglich der nachfolgenden Bereiche eher in Ihrem 
Team vorhanden ist, oder eher extern vom Unternehmen oder anderweitig 
bereitgestellt wird. 
 Expertise wird 
primär extern 
bereitgestellt 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing (z.B. Vermarktung 
neuer Produkte und 
Dienstleistungen) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
HR (z.B. Qualifizierung, 
Recruiting neuer Mitarbeiter) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales (z.B. Vertriebsaktivitäten) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Kundenservice (z.B. Support 
und Service) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Controlling (z.B. Projekt-
Controlling, Erfolgsrechnung) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Juristische Belange (z.B. 
Geschäftsbeziehungen, Patente) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Projektmanagement (z.B. 
Definition von Meilensteinen 
und Key Performance 
Indikatoren) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Forschung und Entwicklung 
(z.B. Entwicklungs- und 
Programmierungsaktivitäten) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Venture Manager – Frage 15 (Priorität exploitativer Ziele) 
In welcher Reihenfolge priorisieren Ihre Vorgesetzten die nachfolgenden Aspekte in 
der aktuellen Reifephase Ihrer Geschäftsentwicklung. Ordnen Sie die nachfolgenden 
Aspekte der Priorität nach, nutzen Sie dazu die Drag & Drop Funktion (klicken und 
ziehen). 
(1=unwichtig für meine Vorgesetzten, 6=wichtig für meine Vorgesetzten). 
1 Mein Team soll neue Marktsegmente identifizieren 
2 Mein Team soll innovative Produkte und Dienstleistungen finden und nutzbar machen 
3 Mein Team soll neue Ideen entwickeln, indem wir außerhalb gängiger Lösungsansätze denken 
4 Mein Team soll die bestehende Kundenbasis tiefer durchdringen 
5 Mein Team soll Routinen für Abläufe und Tätigkeiten entwickeln, damit wir effizienter arbeiten 
6 Mein Team soll die Qualität verbessern und die Kosten reduzieren 
 
  




Venture Manager – Frage 16 (Corporate Venture Erfolg) 
Bitte geben Sie an, inwiefern die nachfolgenden Punkte zutreffen bzw. nicht zutreffen 




    Trifft voll 
zu 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Die Unternehmensführung ist mit 
dem Umsatz zufrieden, den unser 
Team erzielt 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Die Unternehmensführung ist damit 
zufrieden, in welcher Zeit wir (Team) 
den Break-Even-Point erreichen 
werden bzw. erreicht haben 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Die Unternehmensführung ist mit der 
Steigerung unserer Umsatzmarge 
zufrieden 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Unser Team erfüllt generell die 
Erwartungen der 
Unternehmensführung 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Insgesamt sieht die 
Unternehmensführung den Aufbau 
des Geschäftsfelds als erfolgreich an 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Die Unternehmensführung sieht, 
dass unser Team die definierten 
Meilensteine (entsprechend der 
jeweiligen Reifephase) planmäßig 
erfüllt 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Unser Team erfüllt die Leistungen, 
entsprechend der definierten 
Erfolgskriterien (z.B. Umsatz, 
Lernen, Marktpositionierung...) 




APPENDIX E2: QUESTIONNAIRE – ENGLISH VERSION 
Appendix E2 provides the English version of the questionnaire used to collect data. The survey 
was originally conducted in German. The German version is reported in Appendix E1. The 
questionnaire consists of two parts. E1.1 is the screener which gathers general information on the 
participant. E1.2 gathers information on corporate venture management.  
E2.1 – Screener (8 Questions) 
Screener – Question 1 
Please indicate your current position in the company: 
○ Board of Directors 
○ Executive Board 
○ Chief Executive 
○ Head of the Business Development Department 
○ Head of another Department 
○ Project Manager/ Team Leader○ 
○ Employee 




Screener – Question 2 
How long are you in the current position in the company? 
○ Less than 1 year 
○ Between 1-2 years 
○ Between 2-3 years 
○ Between 3-4 years 
○ Longer than 5 years  
 
Screener – Question 3 
Is there a teams in your company that currently develops a new business, or did so 
during the past 3 years?    
○ Yes, there are one or more teams that are currently developing a new business 
○ Yes, we had one or more teams that developed a new business in the past 3 years.  
○ No, there are no such teams in our company 
 
  




Screener – Question 4 
Have you made experience in the past with teams that development a new business?   
○ Yes, I have accompanied teams that developed a new businesses in the past.  
○ No, I don’t have any experience with the development of a new business through teams.  
 
Screener – Question 5 
What is the number of teams that are currently developing a new business in your 
company? 













Screener – Question 6 
What is the number of teams that developed a new business in your company in the 
past 3 years? 















Screener – Question 7 
What is the number of teams that terminated the development of a new business in the 
past 5 years?  













Screener – Question 8 
Which of the following statements applies to you personally? 
○ I am currently the leader of a team that has the task to develops a new business 
○ I am currently the leader of a team that already has developed a new business in the past 3 years  
○ I am currently the supervisor of the leader of a team that currently develops a new business 
 
I am the supervisor of the leader of a team that already developed a new 
business in the past 3 years 
○ I am currently member of a team that currently develops a new business or that already did so in the past 3 years 
○ I have currently no relation with a team that develops a new business. However, I have made some experience in the past  
○ I have never made any experience with a team that develops a new business  
 
  




E2.2 –Venture Managers (16 Questions) 
Venture Manager – Question 1 
What relation does your team (developing a new business) have with the company?  
○ The new business is developed within the company 
○ The new business is developed outside the company and is basically an own organization 
○ The new business is developed in cooperation with one or more other companies  
○ The new business was initially developed by another company and was later acquired by our company 
○ Does the team have another relation with the company? Please describe the relationship below: 
  
 
Venture Manager – Question 2 (# of Employees in the Corporate Venture) 
What is the total number of the full time equivalent employees (FTEs) of your team? 
Number of Employees:  
 
Venture Manager – Question 3 (Turnover of the Corporate Venture) 
Which of the following ranges applies to the turnover (€) that your team has made in 
the previous year? 
Turnover in the previous year: 
○ 0-50 K-€ 
○ 50-100 K-€ 
○ 100-500 K-€ 
○ 500-1000 K-€ 
○ 1-3 Mio. € 
○ 3-10 Mio. € 
○ über 10 Mio. € 
 
Venture Manager – Question 4 (# of Employees in the Corporation) 
What is the total number of the full time equivalent employees (FTEs) in your 
company? 
Number of Employees:  
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Venture Manager – Question 5 (Turnover of the Corporation) 
Which of the following ranges applies to the turnover (€) that your company has made 
in the previous year? 
Turnover in the previous year: 
○ < 2 Mio. € 
○ 2 Mio. – 10 Mio. € 
○ 10 Mio. – 50 Mio. € 
○ > 50 Mio. € 
 
Venture Manager – Question 6 (Maturity Stage) 
Please indicate the maturity stage that your team reaches today. 
○ First Stage: Investments in the new business were made 
○ Second Stage: First turnover was achieved 
○ Third Stage: The new business reached break-even 
 
Venture Manager – Question 7 (Maturity Stage) 
Please indicate when your team has reached the following stages. 
 Year Quarter 
First Stage (A):  
The decision was made to develop 
a new business 
  
Second Stage (B):  
First investments in the new 
business were made 
  
Second Stage:  
First turnover was achieved   
Third Stage:  
Break-even was reached   
 
  




Venture Manager – Question 8 (Experience) 
How many years of experience (including you and excluding your supervisor) does 
your team have with the development of a new business? 
○ Less than 1 year 
○ 1-2 years 
○ 2-3 years 
○ 3-4 years 
○ 4-5 years 
○ 5-6 years 
○ 6-7 years 
○ 7-8 years 
○ 8-9 years 
○ 9-10 years 
○ 10-15 years 
○ 15-20 years 
○ More than 20 years 
 
Venture Manager – Question 9 (Environmental Dynamism) 
Considering the business environment in which the new business is developed, please 
indicate how quickly the following aspects have changed in the past 5-10 years.  
 No change 
 at all 
    Very quick 
change 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Technology ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Competition ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Pace of Innovation  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




Venture Manager – Question 10 (Job Autonomy) 
How independent from your supervisor(s) can you act to develop the new business? 
 Is almost 
never true 
    Is almost 
always 
true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can decide how to go about getting a 
job done without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I choose the way the team goes about a 
job without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I decide how the team reaches its goals 
without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I can schedule the work of the team 
without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I decide without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) when the team conducts 
particular work activities  
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
My job allows to modify the way work 
is evaluated, so I can emphasize some 
aspects of the work and play down 
others 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I have control over what the team is 
supposed to accomplish ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
  




Venture Manager – Question 11 (Strategic Autonomy) 
How frequently can you make decisions concerning the development of the new 
business without the approval of your supervisor(s)? 
 Is almost 
never true 
    Is almost 
always 
true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I can start research and development 
activities without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I am able to develop new products and 
services without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I can qualify employees for new 
projects without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I can decide without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) in which market 
segments future activities are 
conducted 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I can decide without the approval of 
my supervisor(s) which customer 
segments are targeted in the future 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I can introduce new policies and 
practices without the approval of my 
supervisor(s) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Venture Manager – Question 12 (Functional Importance) 
Please indicate the importance of each of the eight business functions for the 
successful development of the new business 
 Very little 
influence 
on success  
    Critical for  
success 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Human Resource Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




Venture Manager – Question 13 (Decision Autonomy) 
How frequently do you need to seek the approval of your supervisor(s) when making 
decisions in the following business functions? 
 Approval though 
my supervisor is 
almost always 
necessary 
    Approval though 
my supervisor is 
almost never 
necessary 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Human Resource 
Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Research and Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Venture Manager – Question 14 (Functional Autonomy) 
Please indicate whether expertise with respect to the following business functions is 
available within the team or provided externally 




    Expertise is 
primarily 
available in the 
team 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Marketing ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Human Resource Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sales ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Finance and Controlling ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Legal Affairs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Project Management ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Research and Development ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
  





Venture Manager – Question 15 (Exploitation Priority) 
In which order does your supervisor prioritize the following aspects in the current 
maturity stage of the new business. Please use the Drag & Drop function to order the 
following aspects according to the priority of your supervisor.  
(1=not important to my supervisor, 6= important to my supervisor). 
1 My team is forced to identify new market segments 
2 My team is forced to explore innovative solution or services for commercialization 
3 My team is forced to look for novel ideas by thinking “outside the box” 
4 My team is forced to penetrate more deeply into the existing customer base 
5 My team is forced to increase the levels of routinization of operations 
6 My team is forced to improve quality and lower cost 
 
Venture Manager – Question 16 (Corporate Venture Success) 
Please assess the extent to which the following aspects concerning the development of 
the new business are true 
 Is not true     Is true 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Corporate management is satisfied 
with the turnover that our team 
achieves 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Corporate management is satisfied 
with the time that our team has 
reached (or will reach) break-even 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Corporate management is satisfied 
with the sales margins that our team 
achieves 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Our team generally fulfills the 
expectations of the corporate 
management 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Overall corporate management 
perceives the development of the 
new business as being successful 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Corporate management finds that our 
team fulfills the planned milestones 
as scheduled 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Corporate management finds that our 
team performs well according to the 
defined key performance indicators 
(KPIs) 
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APPENDIX G: SYNTAX USED TO RUN THE PARALLEL ANALYSIS 
Appendix G provides the Syntax used to perform the parallel analysis. The syntax is developed 
and published by Brian O'Connor. The publication of the syntax can be found in the following 
reference: O'Connor, B. P. (2000). SPSS and SAS programs for determining the number of 
components using parallel analysis and Velicer's MAP test. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instrumentation, and Computers, 32, 396-402. The syntax reads as follows. 
* Parallel Analysis Program For Raw Data and Data Permutations. 
* To run this program you need to first specify the data for analysis and then RUN, all at once, the 
commands from the MATRIX statement to the END MATRIX statement. 
* This program conducts parallel analyses on data files in which the rows of the data matrix are 
cases/individuals and the columns are variables;  Data are read/entered into the program   using 
the GET command (see the GET command below);  The GET command reads an SPSS data file, 
which can be either the current, active SPSS data file or a previously saved data file; A valid 
filename/location must be specified on the GET command; A subset of variables for the analyses 
can be specified by using the "/ VAR =" subcommand with the GET statement;  There can be no 
missing values. 
* You must also specify:  
the # of parallel data sets for the analyses; the desired percentile of the distribution and random 
data eigenvalues; whether principal components analyses or principal axis/common factor analysis 
are to be conducted, and whether normally distributed random data generation or permutations of 
the raw data set are to be used in the parallel analyses. 
* Permutations of the raw data set can be time consuming; Each parallel data set is based on 
column-wise random shufflings of the values in the raw data matrix using Castellan's (1992, 
BRMIC, 24, 72-77) algorithm; The distributions of the original raw variables are exactly preserved 
in the shuffled versions used in the parallel analyses; Permutations of the raw data set are thus 
highly accurate and most relevant, especially in cases where the raw data are not normally 
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distributed or when they do not meet the assumption of multivariate normality (see Longman & 
Holden, 1992, BRMIC, 24, 493, for a Fortran version); If you would like to go this route, it is 
perhaps best to (1) first run a normally distributed random data generation parallel analysis to 
familiarize yourself with the program and to get a ballpark reference point for the number of 
factors/components; (2) then run a permutations of the raw data parallel analysis using a small 
number of datasets (e.g., 100), just to see how long the program takes to run; then (3) run a 
permutations of the raw data parallel analysis using the number of parallel data sets that you would 
like use for your final analyses; 1000 datasets are usually sufficient, although more datasets should 
be used if there are close calls. 
* These next commands generate artificial raw data (500 cases) that can be used for a trial-run of 
the program, instead of using your own raw data; Just select and run this whole file; However, 
make sure to delete the artificial data commands before attempting to run your own data. 
 
set mxloops=9000 printback=off width=80  seed = 1953125. 
matrix. 
 
* Enter the name/location of the data file for analyses after "FILE ="; If you specify "FILE = *", 
then the program will read the current, active SPSS data file; Alternatively, enter the name/location 
of a previously saved SPSS data file instead of "*"; you can use the "/ VAR =" subcommand after 
"/ missing=omit" subcommand to select variables for the analyses. GET raw / FILE = * / 
missing=omit / VAR = Q34.16_1, Q34.16_2, Q34.16_3, Q34.16_4, Q34.16_5, Q34.16_6, 
Q34.16_7, Q34.16_8  
Q34.10_1, Q34.10_2, Q34.10_3, Q34.10_4, Q34.10_5, Q34.10_6, Q34.10_7  
Q34.11_1, Q34.11_2, Q34.11_3, Q34.11_4, Q34.11_5, Q34.11_6  
Q.15_1u, Q.15_2u, Q.15_3u, Q.15_4u, Q.15_5u, Q.15_6u, Q.15_7u, Q.15_8u. 
 
* Enter the desired number of parallel data sets here.  
compute ndatsets = 1000. 
* Enter the desired percentile here. 
compute percent  = 95. 
* Enter either 
  1 for principal components analysis, or 
  2 for principal axis/common factor analysis. 
compute kind = 2 . 





* Enter either 
  1 for normally distributed random data generation parallel analysis, or 
  2 for permutations of the raw data set. 
compute randtype = 2. 
 
****************** End of user specifications. ****************** 
 
compute ncases   = nrow(raw).  
compute nvars    = ncol(raw). 
 
* principal components analysis & random normal data generation. 
do if (kind = 1 and randtype = 1). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(raw) - ((t(csum(raw))*csum(raw))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute realeval = eval(d * vcv * d). 
compute evals = make(nvars,ndatsets,-9999). 
loop #nds = 1 to ndatsets. 
compute x = sqrt(2 * (ln(uniform(ncases,nvars)) * -1) ) &* 
            cos(6.283185 * uniform(ncases,nvars) ). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(x) - ((t(csum(x))*csum(x))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 




* principal components analysis & raw data permutation. 
do if (kind = 1 and randtype = 2). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(raw) - ((t(csum(raw))*csum(raw))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute realeval = eval(d * vcv * d). 
compute evals = make(nvars,ndatsets,-9999). 
loop #nds = 1 to ndatsets. 
compute x = raw. 
loop #c = 1 to nvars. 
loop #r = 1 to (ncases -1). 
compute k = trunc( (ncases - #r + 1) * uniform(1,1) + 1 )  + #r - 1. 
compute d = x(#r,#c). 
compute x(#r,#c) = x(k,#c). 




compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(x) - ((t(csum(x))*csum(x))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 




* PAF/common factor analysis & random normal data generation. 
do if (kind = 2 and randtype = 1). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(raw) - ((t(csum(raw))*csum(raw))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute cr = (d * vcv * d). 
compute smc = 1 - (1 &/ diag(inv(cr)) ). 
call setdiag(cr,smc). 
compute realeval = eval(cr). 
compute evals = make(nvars,ndatsets,-9999). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
loop #nds = 1 to ndatsets. 
compute x = sqrt(2 * (ln(uniform(ncases,nvars)) * -1) ) &* 
            cos(6.283185 * uniform(ncases,nvars) ). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(x) - ((t(csum(x))*csum(x))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute r = d * vcv * d. 
compute smc = 1 - (1 &/ diag(inv(r)) ). 
call setdiag(r,smc). 




* PAF/common factor analysis & raw data permutation. 
do if (kind = 2 and randtype = 2). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(raw) - ((t(csum(raw))*csum(raw))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute cr = (d * vcv * d). 
compute smc = 1 - (1 &/ diag(inv(cr)) ). 
call setdiag(cr,smc). 
compute realeval = eval(cr). 
compute evals = make(nvars,ndatsets,-9999). 
compute nm1 = 1 / (ncases-1). 
loop #nds = 1 to ndatsets. 




compute x = raw. 
loop #c = 1 to nvars. 
loop #r = 1 to (ncases -1). 
compute k = trunc( (ncases - #r + 1) * uniform(1,1) + 1 )  + #r - 1. 
compute d = x(#r,#c). 
compute x(#r,#c) = x(k,#c). 
compute x(k,#c) = d. 
end loop. 
end loop. 
compute vcv = nm1 * (sscp(x) - ((t(csum(x))*csum(x))/ncases)). 
compute d = inv(mdiag(sqrt(diag(vcv)))). 
compute r = d * vcv * d. 
compute smc = 1 - (1 &/ diag(inv(r)) ). 
call setdiag(r,smc). 




* identifying the eigenvalues corresponding to the desired percentile. 
compute num = rnd((percent*ndatsets)/100). 
compute results = { t(1:nvars), realeval, t(1:nvars), t(1:nvars) }. 
loop #root = 1 to nvars. 
compute ranks = rnkorder(evals(#root,:)). 
loop #col = 1 to ndatsets. 
do if (ranks(1,#col) = num). 





compute results(:,3) = rsum(evals) / ndatsets. 
 
print /title="PARALLEL ANALYSIS:". 
do if (kind = 1 and randtype = 1). 
print /title="Principal Components & Random Normal Data Generation". 
else if (kind = 1 and randtype = 2). 
print /title="Principal Components & Raw Data Permutation". 
else if (kind = 2 and randtype = 1). 
print /title="PAF/Common Factor Analysis & Random Normal Data Generation". 
else if (kind = 2 and randtype = 2). 
print /title="PAF/Common Factor Analysis & Raw Data Permutation". 
end if. 
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compute specifs = {ncases; nvars; ndatsets; percent}. 
print specifs /title="Specifications for this Run:" 
 /rlabels="Ncases" "Nvars" "Ndatsets" "Percent". 
print results  
 /title="Raw Data Eigenvalues, & Mean & Percentile Random Data Eigenvalues" 
 /clabels="Root" "Raw Data" "Means" "Prcntyle"  /format "f12.6". 
 
do if   (kind = 2). 
print / space = 1. 
print /title="Warning: Parallel analyses of adjusted correlation matrices". 
print /title="eg, with SMCs on the diagonal, tend to indicate more factors". 
print /title="than warranted (Buja, A., & Eyuboglu, N., 1992, Remarks on parallel". 
print /title="analysis. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 27, 509-540.).". 
print /title="The eigenvalues for trivial, negligible factors in the real". 
print /title="data commonly surpass corresponding random data eigenvalues". 
print /title="for the same roots. The eigenvalues from parallel analyses". 
print /title="can be used to determine the real data eigenvalues that are". 
print /title="beyond chance, but additional procedures should then be used". 
print /title="to trim trivial factors.". 
print / space = 2. 
print /title="Principal components eigenvalues are often used to determine". 
print /title="the number of common factors. This is the default in most". 
print /title="statistical software packages, and it is the primary practice". 
print /title="in the literature. It is also the method used by many factor". 
print /title="analysis experts, including Cattell, who often examined". 
print /title="principal components eigenvalues in his scree plots to determine". 
print /title="the number of common factors. But others believe this common". 
print /title="practice is wrong. Principal components eigenvalues are based". 
print /title="on all of the variance in correlation matrices, including both". 
print /title="the variance that is shared among variables and the variances". 
print /title="that are unique to the variables. In contrast, principal". 
print /title="axis eigenvalues are based solely on the shared variance". 
print /title="among the variables. The two procedures are qualitatively". 
print /title="different. Some therefore claim that the eigenvalues from one". 
print /title="extraction method should not be used to determine". 
print /title="the number of factors for the other extraction method.". 
print /title="The issue remains neglected and unsettled.". 
end if. 
 
compute root      = results(:,1). 
compute rawdata = results(:,2). 
compute percntyl = results(:,4). 
 




save results /outfile= 'C:\Users\jgard\Desktop\Dissertation\Daten\Business Developer\Parallel 
Analysis\screedata.sav' / var=root rawdata means percntyl . 
end matrix. 
 
* plots the eigenvalues, by root, for the real/raw data and for the random data; This command 
works in SPSS 12, but not in all earlier versions.  
 
GET file= 'C:\Users\jgard\Desktop\Dissertation\Daten\Business Developer\Parallel 
Analysis\screedata.sav'. 
TSPLOT VARIABLES= rawdata means percntyl /ID= root /NOLOG.  
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APPENDIX H: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS WITH THREE VARIABLES 
Appendix H provides the results of the principal component analysis, including the reduced six-
item scale for job autonomy (items 2-7), the reduced four-item scale for strategic autonomy (items 
9, 11, 12 and 13) and the seven items measuring corporate venture success (items 14-20). 
Item 
Component 
1 2 3 
2 .805    
3 .764    
4 .783    
5 .655    
6 .620    
7 .619    
9    .604 
11    .863 
12    .843 
13    .748 
14  .850  
15  .752  
16  .765  
17  .831  
18  .782  
19  .776  
20  .831  
a Varimax rotated component matrix 
b Table includes all component loadings above the .30 cut-off point 
c Results after erasing item 1 for job autonomy and items 1 and 3 for strategic autonomy 
d The items 8 to 13 refer to the strategic autonomy scale, the items 1 to 7 refer to the job autonomy scale and the items 14 to 20 
refer to the strategic autonomy scale 
  




APPENDIX I: ANOVA FOR TESTING NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) compares (a) the turnover and (b) the number of employees of 
firms that did not respond to the survey and of those firms that responded to the survey. The 
descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that non-responding firms have with 15.1 million Euro on 
average (mean) a higher turnover and are with 86 employees smaller than responding firms. 
Responding firms have on average a turnover of 13.3 million Euro and 93 employees. However, 
the analysis of variance (Table 2) shows that these differences are not significant. Thus, we may 
state that non-responding firms and responding firms are not different.  
Descriptives 
Turnover N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 








2097 15.1245 27.3320 .5968 13.9540 16.2950 .03 549.30 
Responding 
Firms 
72 13.3086 11.6406 1.3718 10.5732 16.0440 3.30 60.00 
Total 2169 15.0642 26.9588 .5788 13.9290 16.1993 .03 549.30 
         
# of Employees         
Non-Responding 
Firms 
2363 86.02 70.031 1.441 83.20 88.85 0 650 
Responding 
Firms 
77 93.62 65.346 7.447 78.79 108.46 27 335 
Total 2440 86.26 69.889 1.415 83.49 89.03 0 650 








Between Groups 229.524 1 229.524 .316 .574 
Within Groups 1575423.354 2167 727.007   
Total 1575652.878 2168    
      
# of Employees      
Between Groups 4310.641 1 4310.641 .882 .348 
Within Groups 11908747.103 2438 4884.638   
Total 11913057.744 2439    
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APPENDIX J1: ANOVA TO TEST SOURCE BIAS ON CORPORATE VENTURE SUCCESS 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) compares the venture manager’s and corporate manager’s 
assessment of corporate venture success. The descriptive statistics (Table 1) shows that venture 
managers assess corporate venture success with 30.4 on average higher that the corporate 
managers with 29.6. However, the analysis of variance (Table 2) shows that these differences are 
not significant. Thus, we may conclude that the assessment of corporate venture success does not 




Success N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 








87 30.3908 6.8528 .7347 28.9303 31.8513 7.00 42.00 
Corporate 
Manager 
287 29.5645 6.8194 .4025 28.7721 30.3568 14.00 42.00 
Total 374 29.7567 6.8270 .3530 29.0625 30.4508 7.00 42.00 










Between Groups 45.588 1 45.588 .978 .323 
Within Groups 17339.270 372 46.611   
Total 17384.858 373    
 
  




APPENDIX J2: ANOVA FOR TESTING SOURCE BIAS ON STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) compares the assessment of the strategic autonomy venture 
managers enjoy, given by the venture managers and the corporate managers. The descriptive 
statistics (Table 1) shows that venture managers assess the strategic autonomy on average higher 
(18.3) that the corporate managers (14.6). The analysis of variance (Table 2) shows that these 
differences are significant at p< .001. Thus, we may conclude that the assessment of strategic 




Success N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 








87 18.3218 5.6967 .6107 17.1077 19.5360 5.00 30.00 
Corporate 
Manager 
289 14.6851 5.9191 .3481 13.9998 15.3704 5.00 30.00 
Total 376 15.5266 6.0587 .3124 14.9122 16.1410 5.00 30.00 










Between Groups 884.400 1 884.400 25.678 .000 
Within Groups 12881.335 374 34.442   




APPENDIX J3: ANOVA FOR TESTING SOURCE BIAS ON JOB AUTONOMY 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) compares the assessment of the job autonomy venture 
managers enjoy, given by the venture managers and the corporate managers. The descriptive 
statistics (Table 1) shows that venture managers assess the job autonomy on average higher (33.3) 
that the corporate managers (31.1). The analysis of variance (Table 2) shows that these differences 
are significant at p< .01. Thus, we may conclude that the assessment of job autonomy differs 




Success N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 








87 33.2529 5.7712 .6187 32.0229 34.4829 15.00 42.00 
Corporate 
Manager 
289 31.1142 5.7455 .3379 30.4490 31.7794 10.00 42.00 
Total 376 31.6090 5.8143 .2998 31.0194 32.1986 10.00 42.00 










Between Groups 305.861 1 305.861 9.246 .003 
Within Groups 12371.669 374 33.079   
Total 12677.529 375    
 
  




APPENDIX K: RESIDUAL PLOTS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 
Residual plots using standardized residuals (y-axis) with standardized predictor values (x-axis) 
are generated for the two main variables (strategic autonomy and job autonomy), the moderator 
variable (exploitation priority) and the control variables (environmental dynamism, maturity 
stage, team experience, total employees, total sales and team size) using corporate venture 
success as the independent variable. The nine residual plots are illustrated below.  
K1: Strategic autonomy on corporate venture success 
 





K3: Exploitation Priority on corporate venture success 
 
K4: Environmental Dynamism on corporate venture success 
 
K5: Maturity Stage on corporate venture success 
 
  




K6: Team Experience on corporate venture success 
 
K7: Total employees on corporate venture success 
 




K9: Team Size on corporate venture success 
 
 
(Baltes & Gard, 2010b, a; Baltes, Gard, & Sticksel, 2010; Baltes, Gard, & Mogck, 2011; 
Gous, Gard, Baltes, Schutte, & Gerber, 2011; Gard, Baltes, & Katzy, 2012b, a; Katzy, Baltes, 







APPENDIX L: SYNTAX USED TO RUN THE HETEROSCEDASTICITY ANALYSIS 
Appendix K provides the Syntax used to perform the heteroscedasticity analysis. The syntax is 
developed by Gwilym Pryce and acknowledged as an official SPSS macro. The syntax reads as 
follows. 
* BREUSCH-PAGAN & KOENKER TEST MACRO * 
* See 'Heteroscedasticity: Testing and correcting in SPSS' 
* by Gwilym Pryce, for technical details. 
* Code by Marta Garcia-Granero 2002/10/28. 
  
* The MACRO needs 3 arguments: 
* the dependent, the number of predictors and the list of predictors 
* (if they are consecutive, the keyword TO can be used) . 
  
* (1) MACRO definition (select an run just ONCE). 
  
DEFINE bpktest(!POSITIONAL !TOKENS(1) /!POSITIONAL !TOKENS(1) /!POSITIONAL 
!CMDEND). 
* Regression to get the residuals and residual plots. 
REGRESSION 




/RESIDUALS HIST(ZRESID) NORM(ZRESID) 
/SAVE RESID(residual) . 
do if $casenum=1. 
print /"Examine the scatter plot of the residuals to detect" 
/"model misspecification and/or heteroscedasticity" 
/"" 
/"Also, check the histogram and np plot of residuals " 
/"to detect non normality of residuals " 
/"Skewness and kurtosis more than twice their SE indicate non-normality ". 
end if. 
* Checking normality of residuals. 
DESCRIPTIVES 
VARIABLES=residual 
/STATISTICS=KURTOSIS SKEWNESS . 







/rss = SUM(sq_res) 
/N=N. 
MATCH FILES /FILE=* 
/FILE='tempdata.sav'. 
EXECUTE. 
if missing(rss) rss=lag(rss,1). 
if missing(n) n=lag(n,1). 
compute g=sq_res/(rss/n). 
execute. 
* BP&K tests. 
* Regression of g on the predictors. 
REGRESSION 
/STATISTICS R ANOVA 
/DEPENDENT g 
/METHOD=ENTER !3 
/SAVE RESID(resid) . 
*Final report. 
do if $casenum=1. 
print /" BP&K TESTS" 
/" ==========". 
end if. 
* Routine adapted from Gwilym Pryce. 
matrix. 
compute p=!2. 
get g /variables=g. 



























/title="Sample size (N)". 
print p 
/format="f4.0" 




/title="Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity" 









/title="Koenker test for Heteroscedasticity" 









* (2) Sample data (replace by your own)*. 
  
INPUT PROGRAM. 
- VECTOR x(20). 
- LOOP #I = 1 TO 50. 
- LOOP #J = 1 TO 20. 
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- COMPUTE x(#J) = NORMAL(1). 
- END LOOP. 
- END CASE. 
- END LOOP. 
- END FILE. 
END INPUT PROGRAM. 
execute. 
  
* x1 is the dependent and x2 TO x20 the predictors. 
  
* (3) MACRO CALL (select and run). 
  






The thesis describes the continuous need for corporations to renew their business portfolio in order 
to adapt to the changing conditions of today’s business environment (i.e., technological change, 
new competition and volatile customer demand). The ongoing booming of founding international 
start-ups suggests that small entrepreneurial teams are an effective means to develop new 
businesses. Corporations should be able to establish small entrepreneurial teams (corporate 
ventures) for strategic renewal. However, in these cases corporate management is facing two 
obstacles. First, corporate ventures often fail for reasons to be more closely investigated. Second, 
it remains unclear how the partial successes may be improved to large successes. Although the key 
success factors are not well understood, there is no indication that corporate ventures will be 
successful without effective management. Since an empirical model for corporate venture 
management does not exists so far, it is high time to pay attention to the development of such a 
model. 
In order to investigate the intricacies of the current situation, the following problem statement is 
formulated in Chapter 1. How can corporate management effectively manage corporate ventures? 
Guided by three research questions (RQ1 to RQ 3), a four-stage methodology is applied to answer 
the problem statement. First, the autonomy of corporate ventures is explored. Second, the 
identified autonomy dimensions are operationalized into an autonomy construct. Third, the 
autonomy construct is evaluated and adapted. Fourth, the autonomy construct is applied. 
Following the research methodology, an empirical model for effective corporate venture 
management is developed, giving an answer to the problem statement. 
Chapter 2 reviews related work which characterizes corporate ventures as a means to realize dual 
structures that enable corporations to development new businesses while improving the 
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mainstream business at the same time. The chapter presents the two analytical frameworks 
(resource-based view and organizational design-based view) that are applied in prior studies to 
investigate the management of corporate ventures. It identifies the dynamic capability-based view 
as an alternative analytical framework. 
Chapter 3 deals with RQ1: What are the dimensions reflecting the autonomy that corporate 
management grants to venture managers? The answer is based on the explorative research of a 
case study. Following an interpretive approach, the research builds on the perception of corporate 
managers and venture managers to observe the autonomy that venture managers may enjoy. 
Literature research is conducted to explore the dimensions reflecting the observed autonomy. The 
results indicate that the autonomy of venture managers is underpinned through four autonomy 
dimensions, namely functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job 
autonomy.  
Chapter 4 gives a partial answer to RQ2: How can the autonomy dimensions identified by RQ1 be 
operationalized in a construct that enables us to measure the autonomy of venture managers? A 
theoretical model is developed based on literature research. The model associates the four 
autonomy dimensions (functional autonomy, decision autonomy, strategic autonomy and job 
autonomy) with corporate venture success. We operationalize the model by which it provides an 
initial four-dimensional construct that reflects the autonomy of venture managers. 
Chapter 5 present the research results that provides a conclusive answer to RQ2. Therefore the 
initial construct is evaluated and adapted by following a four-step variable reduction procedure. 
First, the appropriateness of the data to apply variable reduction techniques is evaluated. Second, 
component extraction is performed. Third, component rotation is conducted. Fourth, Cronbach’s 
Alphas are computed. The construct validity is evaluated in the first three steps and the construct 




dimensional construct is reduced to a two-dimensional construct with the scales of strategic 
autonomy and job autonomy retained.  
In Chapter 6, the two-dimensional autonomy construct is applied to answer RQ3: How are the 
autonomy dimensions related to the success of the corporate ventures? A questionnaire is 
distributed in the German IT consulting industry. Having evaluated the research methodology and 
the appropriateness of the data, the answers of 87 venture managers are analyzed. The results show 
that strategic autonomy and job autonomy are both positively related with corporate venture 
success. Both relations are amplified when corporate management enforces at the same time a 
business policy that prioritizes the achievement of exploitation objectives. The findings reveal a 
management model which also provide an answer to the PS.  
Chapter 7 provides the answers to the three RQs and the PS. The research carried out throughout 
the thesis to answer the three research questions led to the empirical results reported in Chapter 6. 
These results suggest an empirical model for effective corporate venture management, highlighting 
three management principles. First, corporate management should allow venture managers to 
make strategic decisions without their approval. Second, corporate management should grant 
venture managers with the authority to make work-mode decisions without their approval. Third, 
corporate management should emphasize a business policy that forces venture managers to 
consider exploitation priority in their strategic decisions and work-mode decisions. Following the 
dynamic capability-based view, it is further discussed how corporate management can realize the 
three management principles. Finally, the chapter (a) provides the implications of the research 
results for researchers and practitioners, (b) highlights the limitations of the research and (c) gives 







De dissertatie beschrijft de voortdurende noodzaak voor bedrijven om hun bedrijfsportfolio te 
vernieuwen. Bedrijven dienen zich immers aan te passen aan de veranderende voorwaarden van 
de huidige bedrijfsomgeving. Het gaat daarbij om technologische veranderingen, nieuwe 
vormen van competitie en vluchtige gebruikers eisen. De voortgaande, ongehinderde groei van 
internationale start-ups vormt een aanwijzing dat kleine ondernemende teams een effectief 
middel zijn om nieuwe omzet-mogelijkheden te bewerkstelligen. De bedrijven moeten evenwel 
in staat zijn om de kleine ondernemende teams (ook genoemd: corporate ventures) aan te sturen 
ten behoeve van hun strategische vernieuwing. In al deze gevallen ontmoet het 
bedrijfsmanagement twee obstakels. 
Allereerst falen de corporate ventures redelijk vaak vanwege redenen die nauwkeuriger 
onderzocht dienen te worden. Ten tweede, blijft het onduidelijk hoe een potentieel succes kan 
worden verbeterd tot een goed succes. Hoewel de belangrijkste succesfactoren nog niet volledig 
geïmplementeerd zijn, is er geen enkele indicatie dat corporate ventures succesvol zullen zijn 
zonder effectief management. Omdat een empirisch model voor corporate venture management 
nog altijd niet bestaat, is het de hoogste tijd dat zulk een model wordt ontwikkeld.  
Om de onduidelijkheden rondom de huidige situatie diepgaand te onderzoeken hebben we in 
Hoofdstuk 1 de volgende probleemstelling (PS) geformuleerd: Hoe kan corporate management 
de corporate ventures effectief aansturen? Een vier-stappen methodologie is ontwikkeld om 
deze probleemstelling nader te onderzoeken en te beantwoorden. Er zijn drie onderzoeksvragen 
(OVs) die het pad naar de beantwoording vorm geven, te weten OV1, OV2 en OV3. Zij komen 
bij de hoofdstukbespreking aan de beurt. De vier stappen van de onderzoeksmethodologie 
luiden als volgt: (1) de autonomie van de corporate ventures wordt exploratief onderzocht; (2) 
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de geïdentificeerde autonomie-dimensies worden geoperationaliseerd in een autonomie-
construct; (3) het autonomie-construct wordt geanalyseerd en aangepast; (4) het autonomie-
construct wordt toegepast. Na het doorlopen van deze vier-stappen methodologie, wordt een 
empirisch model voor effectief corporate venture management ontwikkeld. Dat model geeft 
een antwoord op de probleemstelling.  
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt gerelateerd werk dat de corporate ventures karakteriseert als een middel 
om duale structuren te bewerkstelligen. Een duale structuur stelt corporaties in staat om een 
nieuwe bedrijfsaanpak te realiseren terwijl de oude vertrouwde aanpak op hetzelfde moment 
wordt verbeterd. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft twee analytische kaders (een kader is een kijk op het 
bedrijf), te weten, een resource-based view en een organisational design-based view. Zij zijn 
ontleend aan eerdere situaties die het management van corporate ventures onderzocht. Voorts 
identificeert het hoofdstuk de dynamic capability-based view als een alternatief analytisch 
kader.  
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt OV1: Wat zijn de dimensies die de mate van autonomie beschouwen die 
het corporate management toestaat aan de venture managers? Het antwoord is gebaseerd op 
het exploratieve onderzoek van een case study. Er wordt een interpretatieve benadering 
gevolgd; het onderzoek richt zich op de perceptie van de corporate managers en de venture 
manager om zodoende de autonomie-dimensies op te sporen. De percepties van beide groepen 
worden verdeeld in twee reeksen van interviews. De resultaten geven aan dat de autonomie van 
de venture manager wordt ondersteund door vier autonomie-dimensies, te weten functionele 
autonomie, beslissings autonomie, strategie-autonomie, en werk-autonomie. 
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een gedeeltelijk antwoord op OV2: Hoe kunnen de autonomie-dimensies die 
geïdentificeerd zijn door OV1 worden geoperationaliseerd in een construct dat in staat stelt de 




van literatuuronderzoek. Het model verbindt de vier autonomie-dimensies (functionele 
autonomie, beslissings autonomie, strategie-autonomie en werk-autonomie) met de successen 
van een corporate venture. Wij operationaliseren dit model waardoor het ons een beginnend 
vier-dimensionaal construct oplevert dat de autonomie van de venture managers weerspiegelt. 
Hoofdstuk 5 toont de resultaten van ons onderzoek en daarmee geeft het een concluderend 
antwoord op OV2. Het initiële construct wordt geëvalueerd en aangepast door de vier stappen 
procedure die het aantal variabelen reduceert. Het verloop is als volgt: (1) de delen worden 
geëvalueerd op hun geschiktheid om de reductie-technieken toe te passen op de variabelen; (2) 
we passen de component extractie-techniek toe (PCA, principal component analysis), (3) we 
passen component-rotatie toe; (4) Cronbach’s alphas worden berekend. De validiteit van het 
construct wordt gemeten in de eerste drie stappen en de betrouwbaarheid van het construct 
wordt bepaald in de vierde stap. Door onze statistische procedure stap voor stap te volgen wordt 
het initiële vier-dimensionale construct gereduceerd tot een twee-dimensionaal construct met 
als overblijvende dimensies: strategie-autonomie en werk-autonomie.  
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het twee-dimensionale autonomie-construct gebruikt om een antwoord te 
formuleren op OV3: Hoe zijn de autonomie-dimensies verbonden met het succes van de 
corporate ventures? Een vragenlijst is gedistribueerd onder de Duitse IT consulting industrie. 
Na de evaluatie van de onderzoeksmethodologie en van de geschiktheid van de data (beide 
evaluaties zijn in orde), zijn de antwoorden van 87 venture managers geanalyseerd.  
De resultaten tonen aan dat zowel de strategie-autonomie als de werk-autonomie positief 
gerelateerd zijn aan het succes van de corporate venture. Beide relaties worden verruimd 
wanneer het corporate management te zelfder tijd het bedrijfsbeleid bekrachtigt dat de 
voltooiing van de exploitatie-doelstellig prioriteert.  
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Hoofdstuk 7 geeft het antwoord op de Probleemstelling. Het onderzoek dat leidde tot de 
beantwoording van de drie OVs heeft geleid tot empirische resultaten die in Hoofdstuk 6 zijn 
opgenomen. Deze resultaten bevelen een empirisch model aan voor een effectieve corporate 
venture management, en belichten drie management-principes: (1) corporate management 
dient venture managers toe te staan om strategische beslissingen te nemen zonder hun 
goedkeuring; (2) corporate management dient venture managers de autoriteit te geven om 
beslissingen over de wijze van werken te nemen zonder hun goedkeuring; (3) corporate 
management dient de nadruk te leggen op een bedrijfsbeleid dat venture managers dwingt de 
exploitatie prioriteiten in ogenschouw te nemen bij hun strategische beslissingen en hun 
beslissingen over de wijze van werken. Volgens de dynamic capability-based view, hebben we 
verder beschreven hoe het corporate managemenent de drie management principes kan 
realiseren 
Tenslotte geeft het hoofdstuk: (1) de implicaties van onze studie voor onderzoekers en praktijk-
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